Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

Claudia Cox v. Utah Power and Light/Energy
Mutual Insurance, Employers Reinsurance Fund,
and the Industrial Commission of Utah : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Edward B. Havas; Wilcox, Dewsnup & King; Attorneys for Applicant/Petitioner; Erie V. Boorman;
Attorney for Employer\'s Reinsurance Fund; Sharon Eblen; Attorney for Utah Industrial
Commission;
Rinehart L. Peshell; Fairbourn & Peshell; Attorney for Utah Power and Light and energy Mutual
Insurance.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Cox v. Utah Power and Light, No. 930342 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5244

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

' '.^APPEALS

L KV^H £' ""
it>.^ *

•_

«**>*»

UT'IH
U ^*» V/ ^ . w < i - • ^ '

KFU
50
.A0
DOCKET NO..

^20£^

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CLAUDIA COX,
Applicant/Petitioner
vs.
UTAH POWER AND LIGHT/
ENERGY MUTUAL INSURANCE,
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND,
and THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,

Case No. 930342-CA

Priority No. 7
Industrial Commission
No. 92000255

Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ENERGY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
IN RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR
REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ORDER

EDWARD B. HAVAS (1425)
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING
2020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Applicant/Petitioner

ERIE V. BOORMAN (0380)
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND
P.O. BOX 146611
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6611
Attorney for Employers'
Reinsurance Fund
SHARON EBLEN (5832)
UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
P.O. F J*. 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250
Attorney for Industrial
Commission of Utah

RINEHART L. PESHELL (2573)
FAIRBOURN & PESHELL
7321 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 255-3591
Attorney for Utah Power &
Light and Energy Mutual
Insurance

PILE3
Utah Court of Appea's

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CLAUDIA COX,
Applicant/Petitioner
vs.
UTAH POWER AND LIGHT/
ENERGY MUTUAL INSURANCE,
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND,
and THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,

Case No. 930342-CA
Priority No. 7
Industrial Commission
No. 92000255

Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ENERGY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
IN RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR
REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ORDER

EDWARD B. HAVAS (1425)
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING
2020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Applicant/Petitioner

ERIE V. BOORMAN (0380)
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND
P.O. Box 146611
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6611
Attorney for Employers'
Reinsurance Fund
SHARON EBLEN (5832)
UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
P.O. BOX 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250
Attorney for Industrial
Commission of Utah

RINEHART L. PESHELL (2573)
FAIRBOURN & PESHELL
7321 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 255-3591
Attorney for Utah Power &
Light and Energy Mutual
Insurance

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

2

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

. .

3

DETERMINING STATUTES

4

DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

11

ARGUMENT

12

POINT I
THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE
AND
THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PROPERLY FOUND THAT
PETITIONER FAILED TO SHOW MEDICAL CAUSATION
BETWEEN THE AUGUST 15, 1988 INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT AND APPLICANT'S ALLEGED PERMANENT
TOTAL DISABILITY

12

POINT II
THE ODD LOT DOCTRINE IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS
CASE
CONCLUSION

17
19

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Allen v. Industrial Commission.
729 P2d 15 (Utah 1991)

11,13

King v. Industrial Commission,
850 P2d 1256 (Utah App. 1993)

4

Large v. Industrial Commission.
758 P2d 945 (Utah App. 1988)

13

Luckau v. Board of Review.
840 P2d 811 (Utah App. 1992)

4,13

Morton International Inc. v. Auditing Division.
814 P2d 581 (Utah 1991)
Stewart v. Board of Review.
831 P2d 134 (Utah App. 1992)
Willardson v. Industrial Commission.
216 U.A.R. 12 (Utah App. June 28, 1993)
Zimmerman v. Industrial Commission.
785 P2d 1131 (Utah App. 1989)
Zupon v. Industrial Commission.
221 U.A.R. 37 (Utah App. Sept. 14. 1993)

4
3,16
3,13,15
12,18
12,15,18

STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-45 (1988)

4

Utah Code Annotated §35-1-67 (1888)

4

Utah Code Annotated §35-1-82.53(2) (1988)

2

Utah Code Annotated §35-1-86 (1988)

2

Utah Code Annotated §63-46(b)-16(4) (1988)

2,3

Utah Code Annotated §78-2(a)-3(2) (1988)

2

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 14

2

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

CLAUDIA J, COX,
Claimant,

Case No. 930342-CA

vs.

Priority No. 7

UTAH POWER AND LIGHT/ENERGY
MUTUAL INSURANCE, EMPLOYERS
REINSURANCE FUND, and THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,

Industrial Commission
No. 9200255

Defendants.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ENERGY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
IN RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR
REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ORDER
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
a)

Whether

preponderance

of

there
the

is sufficient

evidence,

a

evidence

causal

to

show, by a

relationship

between

applicant's industrial injury of, August 15, 1988 and her claimed
permanent and total disability.
b)

Whether the applicant is entitled to an award for being

permanently and totally disabled under the odd lot doctrine.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appeal filed herein is to seek a review of the Industrial
Commission's Order denying Applicant's request for a permanent
total

disability

award.

The

Industrial

Commission

denied

Applicant's request for a permanent total disability award on the
basis that Applicant had not proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that her total disability was caused by the industrial
accident of August 15, 1988, and further held that the odd lot
doctrine did not apply in this case because there was no proven
medical causation between the accident of August

15, 1988 and

Petitioner's alleged permanent total disability.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Petitioner
Commission's

filed a Petition

Order,

dated

April

for Review of the
28,

1993,

which

Industrial
upheld

the

Administrative Law Judge's determination that Petitioner was not
entitled to a permanent total disability award because Petitioner
had failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that her
permanent total disability was caused by the industrial incident
of August 15, 1988.
Thereafter, on May 27, 1993, Applicant filed a timely Petition
for Writ of Review.
The

Appeals

Court

has

jurisdiction

to

hear

this

matter

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2) (1988); 351-86

(1988); 63-46(b)16(4)(1988); 78-2a-3(2) (1988); and Rule 14

of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented for consideration in this appeal are:
a)

Whether there is sufficient evidence to prove, by a

preponderance

of

the

evidence, a

causal

relationship

between

applicant's industrial injury of August 15, 1988 and her claimed
permanent and total disability.
Standard of Review:
Is the "substantial evidence" standard because the issue of
medical causation
findings

of

is a question of fact and "the Commission's

fact will

be

affirmed

if they

are

supported

by

substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record."
Willardson v. Industrial Commission, 216 U.A.R. 12 (Utah App. June
28, 1993); Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P2d 134, 137 (Utah App.
1992); and Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46(b)-16 (4) (1988);
and
b)

Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award for being

permanently and totally disabled under the odd lot doctrine.
Standard of Review:
Is the "correction of error," standard since the issue above
presented
agency's

involves questions of law, and no deference
view

of

the

law

is

necessary

or

required.

to the
Utah

Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 6346(b)-16(4) (1988), Willardson v. Industrial Commission, 216 U.A.R.
3

12 (Utah App. June 28, 1993), King v. Industrial Commission, 850
P2d 1281, 1286 (Utah App, 1993), Luckau v. Board of Review, 840 P2d
811 (Utah App. 1992), and Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing
Division, 814 P2d 581 (Utah 1991).

DETERMINING STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-45 and 35-1-67 (1988) are
the

applicable

and

determinative

statutory

provisions.

See

Appendix "A."

DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
On

February

4,

1993, Petitioner's

claim

for

a

permanent

disability award was denied by the Administrative Law Judge on the
basis that Petitioner had failed to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the industrial incident of August 15, 1988 was the
cause of Petitioner's total disability.
On March 5, 1993, Petitioner made a Motion for Review before
the Industrial Commission.
On April

28, 1993, the

Industrial

Commission

upheld

the

Administrative Law Judge's Order and denied Petitioner's Motion for
Review.
On May 27, 1993, Petitioner filed her appeal with the above
entitled Court.
4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of this appeal, Respondent accepts the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law as determined by the Administrative
Law Judge and the Industrial Commission. The relevant facts which
should be considered in determining this appeal are as follows:
1.

Petitioner had back pain as early as 1959

(R-68,

Appendix B at 2)•
2.

From

1972

forward,

Petitioner

suffered

from

fatigue/anemia/depression and, in 1973, Petitioner was seen for
allergic rhinitis
3.

(R-66, Appendix B a t 3).

In 1977, Petitioner began working for Utah Power & Light

in a clerical/accounting position
4.

(R-66, Appendix B at 3).

In 1978, Petitioner began seeing a chiropractor for

treatment of a non work related traumatic lumbar-sacral strain
(R-66, Appendix B at 3) .
5.

Thereafter, Petitioner sought chiropractic treatments two

times a week in September and October, 1978; once or twice a week
in July 1979; almost daily in August 1979; almost daily in late
August 1980; almost daily in late 1981, tapering off in October and
November 1981; two to four times a month from April through October
1982; two to four times a month in February, June, July and
December of 1983; three times a week from mid May through mid June
5

1984; almost daily in late August 1986, tapering off in September
1986

(R-67, Appendix B at 4) .
6.

On

October

4,

1986,

Petitioner

was

injured

in

Albuquerque, New Mexico while on vacation at the hot air balloon
festival
7.

(R-67, Appendix B at 4) .
In 1986, Petitioner was treated

for depression on a

weekly basis for at least six (6) months at a mental health clinic
(R-68, Appendix B at 5 ) .
8.

In December, 1986, Dr. L. Gaufin diagnosed Petitioner as

suffering from acute and chronic lumbar radiculopathy secondary to
centrally herniated

L4-5 disc, a mild bulge at L3-4, cervical

radiculopathy secondary to encroachment upon the nerve roots C45 and C5-6 bilaterally
9.

(R-68, Appendix B at 5 ) .

On January 5, 1987, Dr. L. Gaufin performed a semi-hemi

laminotomy foraminotomy and nerve root decompression at L4-5 on
Petitioner
10.

(R-68, Appendix B at 5 ) .
On March 10, 1987, Dr. Gaufin did a second surgery on

Petitioner and performed an anterior cervical diskectomy with nerve
root decompression and interbody fusion C4-5 and C5-6

(R-69,

Appendix B at 6 ) .
11.

On August 5, 1987, Petitioner was released by Dr. Gaufin

to return to work

(R-68, Appendix B at 5 ) .

6

12.

In December, 1987, Petitioner, while at work, sat down

on her chair, and as she sat down, the chair rolled back and away
from her so that Petitioner slid off the end of the seat and fell
to the floor on her buttocks
13.

(R-69, Appendix B at 6 ) .

While the above incident resulted in back pain and right

leg pain with muscle spasms, Petitioner did not visit a doctor or
miss any work time.

Petitioner did, however, get a refill of soma

on December 29, 1987

(R-69-70, Appendix B at 6-7).

14.

On August 15, 1988, Petitioner suffered a second accident

at work.

Petitioner attempted to open the bottom drawer of one of

her

co-worker's

file drawers.

Said

file

drawer, unknown

Petitioner, was filled with papers and books.

to

When Petitioner

tried to open the drawer, it stuck, injuring Petitioner's neck and
back

(R-70, Appendix B at 7 ) .
15.

There were no immediate doctor visits resulting from the

August 15, 1988 injury; but Petitioner did mention on September 29,
1988, when

she saw her doctor for a mammogram, that she had

reinjured her neck "the other day" and needed a soma refill

(R-

70, Appendix B at 7) .
16.

After the August 15, 1988 incident, Petitioner continued

to have pain in her neck, shoulders, and arms, and numbness in the
first, second and third digits of both hands.

However, medical

tests performed by Dr. Gaufin and others showed a stable fusion at
7

C4-5 and C5-6, but degenerative disc disease at C6-7, producing a
bar-type defect obliterating the thecal sac and impinging the nerve
roots bilaterally, right greater than left; with no evidence of
recurrent disc injury in the lumbar areas; and normal nerve tests
(R-71, Appendix B at 8 ) .
17.

Petitioner worked

April 1990
18.

overtime

from January

1990 through

(R-72, Appendix B at 9 ) .

On July 9, 1990, Petitioner was seated at her desk and

merely turned her head with resultant neck spasm and symptoms down
her spine
19.

(R-73, Appendix B at 10).
As a result of the July 9, 1990 incident, Petitioner was

reduced to even less activity than she performed after the August
15,

1988 accident, and was, as a result of the July

incident, "Totally down"
20.

1990

(R-77, Appendix B at 10).

After the July 9, 1990 incident, Petitioner was unable

to continue working because of her pain
21.

9,

(R-73, Appendix B at 10) .

On February 11, 1992, Petitioner filed her Application

for Hearing asking for unpaid medical expenses, temporary total
compensation,

permanent

partial

compensations and interest
22.

compensation,

permanent

total

(R-l).

On November 3, 1992, Petitioner was referred to a Medical

Panel which

issued

Appendix C at 1-11).

its report on November

27,

1992

(R-39-49,

Said Medical Panel Report was adopted by the
8

Administrative Law Judge to resolve the issues of causation and
impairment
23.

(R-80, Appendix B at 17).
The medical

panel

rated

Petitioner's

cervical

spine

lumbar spine and her hypothyroidism and based upon those factors,
found Petitioner to have a 36% whole person partial permanent
impairment
24.

(R-78, Appendix B at 15).
Of said 36%, the medical panel found 1.27% attributable

to the December 12, 1987 injury and 2.87% attributable to the
August 15, 1988 accident
25.

(R-78, Appendix B at 15).

The remainder of the 36% impairment the medical panel

found attributable to non-industrial causes

(R-78, Appendix B at

15).
26.

The medical panel found that Petitioner suffered from

depression with pre-existing personality disorder.
panel

held

these

problems

were

the

result

of

industrial factors, but did not rate said factors

The medical
multiple

non-

(R-78, Appendix

B at 15).
27.
by

the

On December 21, 1992, Petitioner was found to be disabled
Social

Security

Administration

(R-51-57, 65,

Social

Security Decision, Appendix D at 1-6).
28.

The Social Security Decision lists ten

(10) separate

problems that contribute to Petitioner's disability which include
a lumbar disc surgery in January, 1987, cervical disc surgery in
9

March 1987, post traumatic right, greater than left, hand numbness
with

decreased

grip

and

intermittent

hand

pain,

fibromyalgia

syndrome, inflammatory polyarthritis, polypharmacy, hypothyroidism,
degenerative joint disease, degenerative disc disease, depression
and

passive

dependent

personality

disorder.

Nowhere

in said

determination was the incident of August 15, 1988 mentioned or
considered as a reason or cause of Petitioner's disability

(R-

54, Appendix D at 2 ) .
29.

The Administrative Law Judge noted that although six (6)

of the problems listed in the Social Security Disability Award
possibly

may

have

been

affected

by

Petitioner's

industrial

injuries, there was no evidence of that fact in this case

(R-83,

Appendix B at 20).
30.

On March 31, 1992, a functional capacity evaluation was

performed at Carbon Emery Physical Therapy/Alta Health Services
which found that Petitioner could do light/sedentary work

(R-76,

Appendix B at 13) .
31•

On

June

15,

1992, a

Career

Guidance

Center

report

concluded there are jobs available for which the applicant
trained, but that she may have difficulty

is

finding an employer

willing to make the accommodations that are necessary in order for
her to tolerate the workplace

(R-77, Appendix B at 14).
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32.

The Administrative Law Judge found that Petitioner was

probably totally disabled due to multiple factors as noted in the
Social Security decision
33.

(R-85, Appendix B at 22).

Based on all of the above, the Administrative Law Judge

denied Petitioner's claim for permanent total disability benefits
associated with the August 15, 1988 and July, 1990 incidents and
dismissed Petitioner's claim with prejudice

(R-85, Appendix B at

22) .
34.

The Administrative Law Judge made no separate finding

with respect to Petitioner's ability to work

(R-85, Appendix B at

22) .
35.
Judge's

The Industrial Commission affirmed the Administrative Law
decision

on

the

grounds

that

the

relatively

small

proportion of the applicant's impairment that related to the August
15, 1988 industrial accident was insufficient to support a finding
that applicant's permanent total disability was caused by the
August 15, 1988 accident

(R-122, Appendix E at 7 ) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.
disability

For Petitioner to succeed in obtaining permanent total
benefits,

Petitioner

must

prove

her

disability

is

medically the result of an exertion or injury that occurred during
a work-related activity.

Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P2d
11

15, 27 (Utah 1986).

In this case, no evidence has been presented

by Petitioner that her August 15, 1988 work related incident caused
her to become

totally

disabled.

There

is evidence

that

the

Petitioner has an impairment of 2.85% as a result of the August 15,
1988 accident and that thereafter she suffered some additional
pain;

but

no

medical

evidence

that

said

pain

resulted

in

Petitioner's becoming totally disabled.
2.
claim

The odd lot doctrine cannot be applied to Petitioner's

for benefits because no causal relationship between the

August 15, 1988 accident and Petitioner's total disability has been
established.
App.

Sept.

Zupon v. Industrial Commission, 221 U.A.R. 37 (Utah
14,

1993);

and

even

if

such

a

connection

were

established, the Administrative Law Judge made no finding as to
Petitioner's ability to work

(R-85, Appendix B at 22), nor was

there the required showing by Petitioner that the Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation had determined that Petitioner could not
be

rehabilitated

as

set

forth

in

Zimmerman

v.

Industrial

Commission. 785 P2d 1131 (Utah App. 1989).

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
PROPERLY FOUND THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO SHOW MEDICAL
CAUSATION BETWEEN THE AUGUST 15, 1988 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT AND
APPLICANT'S ALLEGED PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY.
12

Petitioner argues that the Workers' Compensation Act "should
be liberally construed and applied to provide coverage and any
doubts should be resolved in favor of the applicant."
Luckau v. Board of Review. 840 P2d 811, 815 (Utah App. 1992).
Petitioner then argues that "The ALJ and the Industrial
Commission did not give the applicant the benefit of the doubt in
any regard and thus have defeated the purpose of this act, leaving
Ms. Cox without remedy" (Appellant's brief, p.10).
Petitioner misreads and has misinterpreted the law. While it
is true that the Workers' Compensation Act should be liberally
construed to provide coverage, that does not mean that Petitioner
is entitled to the "benefit of the doubt" in proving that the
August 15, 1988 accident was the cause of her disability.

It is

the statutes that are to be read broadly to provide coverage rather
than the facts of the case as is suggested by Petitioner.

The

appropriate standard to be applied in this matter, and the standard
which was applied is the "preponderance of the evidence" standard.
Large v. Industrial Commission. 758 P2d, 954 (Utah App. 1988).
In order to prove medical causation, Petitioner must prove,
by a preponderance

of the evidence, that her disability

is

medically the result of an exertion or injury that occurred during
a work-related activity." Willardson v. Industrial Commission, 216
U.A.R. 12, (Utah App. June 28, 1993) (quoting Allen v. Industrial
13

Commission, 729 P2d 15 (Utah 1986) (Emphasis added).
In this case, Petitioner failed to meet that burden of proof.
Petitioner had a history of back pain dating back to 1959
(R-68, Appendix B at 5 ) . Petitioner injured her neck and back in
a non-industrial accident on October 4, 1986
4).

(R-67, Appendix B at

As a result of the above referred to accident, Petitioner

underwent

a semi-hemi

laminotomy,

foraminotomy

and

nerve

roct

decompression at C4-5 on January 5, 1987, and an anterior cervical
diskectomy with nerve root decompression and interbody fusion C45 and C5-6

(R-69, Appendix B at 6 ) .

After recovering from these surgeries, Petitioner returned to
work.

Petitioner then injured herself in December, 1987 (R-69,

appendix B at 6 ) , on August 15, 1988 (R-71, Appendix B at 8 ) , and
on July 9, 1990 (R-73f Appendix B at 10).

Petitioner testified

that after the August 15, 1988 incident, she had to reduce her
activities and suffered an increase in pain (R-71, Appendix B at
8) ; but she continued to work and in fact worked overtime from
January, 1990 through April, 1990
July

9,

(R-72, Appendix B at 9) .

1990, Petitioner, while at work, turned

suffered neck spasms and symptoms down her spine
B at 10).

On

her head and

(R-73, Appendix

Thereafter, Petitioner's activities were reduced even

more than they had been after the August 15, 198 8 incident and
Petitioner described her then level of activity as "totally down"
14

(R-77, Appendix

B at 14).

After the July

9,

1990 incident,

Petitioner never returned to work.
In reviewing Petitioner's medical history, the medical panel
found that the August 15, 1988 incident contributed 2.83% of the
36% permanent partial impairment they granted Petitioner based on
her

reported

back,

neck

and

hypothyroidism

problems

(R-78,

Appendix B at 15). However, the medical panel did not state that
Petitioner's

2.83%

impairment

was

in

any

way

Petitioner's claimed permanent total disability.

related

to

In Zupon, this

Court found that a finding of medical causation issue between an
industrial accident and permanent total disability is:
"... a different question from, and not controlled in any way
by the determination that ...[an] . . . industrial accident
caused a permanent partial disability. Zupon v. Industrial
Commission. 221 U.A.R. 37, 38 (Utah App., September 14, 1993).
Based upon Zupon, the medical panel report fails to establish
medical

causation

between

the

August

15,

1988

incident

and

Petitioner's alleged permanent total disability.
Additionally, the Social Security Administration's Disability
Award listed ten (10) items that caused Petitioner's disability,
none of which included the December, 1987, the August 15, 1988, or
the July 9, 1980 accidents

(R-53-55, Appendix D at 1-3). In fact,

the Administrative Law Judge found there was no evidence to show
that the problems listed in the Jocial Security Award were in
any way affected by the industrial accident of August 15, 1988
15

(R-83, Appendix B at 30).
The Administrative Law Judge noted in her findings that the
only evidence that the August 15, 1988 accident caused Petitioner's
permanent

total

disability

and was the

"straw that broke the

camel's back" was applicant's testimony; and that

Petitioner's

testimony alone was insufficient to sustain that theory

(R-83,

Appendix B at 20).
Based upon all of the above factors, the* Administrative Law
Judge and the Industrial Commission were well justified in finding
that Petitioner had failed, by a preponderance of the evidence, to
establish medical causation between the August 15, 1988 incident
and Petitioner's alleged permanent total disability.
In

this matter, the

Standard

of

Review

which

should

be

employed in determining whether to affirm or demy the Industrial
Commission's ruling concerning medical causation is the substantial
evidence standard.

In Zupon, this court held:

Medical causation is an issue of fact and we review the
determination of the Industrial Commission under the
substantial evidence standard. Zupon, Id. p.38.
Substantial

evidence

is

"such

relevant

evidence

as

a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Willardson v. Industrial Commission, 216 U.A.R. 12, 13 (Utah App.

16

June 28, 1993), (quoting Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P2d 134,
137 (Utah App. 1992)•
The lack of medical evidence establishing a causal relation
between the August 15, 1988 accident and Petitioner's

alleged

permanent total disability, based upon the medical panel's failure
to comment on the connection between the industrial accident and
Petitioner's permanent total disability, the fact that said injury
did not result in loss of work, any temporary total disability or
the immediate need of medical care (R-82, Appendix B at 19), the
Social Security Administration's decision, which did not attribute
any

portion

injuries

and

of

Petitioner's total

Petitioner's

disability

extensive

injuries, all amount to substantial

history
undisputed

to work
of

related

pre-existing

evidence which

supports the Industrial Commission's ruling that "Applicant has not
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that her disability was
caused by her industrial accident of August 15, 1988

(R-122,

Appendix E at 7 ) .

POINT II
THE ODD LOT DOCTRINE IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.
Petitioner argues that she is entitled to benefits under the
odd

lot doctrine, because permanent total disability

benefits

should be granted when "a relatively small percentage of impairment
17

caused by an industrial accident is combined with other factors to
render

claimant

unable

to

obtain

employment."

Zimmerman

v.

Industrial Commission 785, P2d, 1127, 1131 (Utah App. 1989).
However before the odd lot doctrine can apply,
The Commission must first determine there is medical causation
between the petitioner's... industrial accident and his now
claimed permanent total disability. Zupon, 221 U.A.R. 37, 38
(Utah App., September 14, 1993).
In this case, if the Court affirms the Industrial Commission's
ruling that Petitioner did not show by a preponderance of the
evidence medical causation between the August 15, 1988 accident and
her alleged permanent total disability, then such ci finding would
preclude

application

of

the

compelling the other factors".

odd

lot

doctrine

"no matter

how

Zupon, Id. p.38.

In addition, Petitioner would have to:
Prove that he or she can no longer perform the duties required
in his or her occupation . . . [and] . . . through cooperation with
the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, must establish that
he or she cannot be rehabilitated. Zupon. Id. p. 38.
Petitioner has not presented any evidence that the Division
of Vocation

Rehabilitation

has determined

that

she

cannot

be

rehabilitated and in fact the evidence is that Petitioner can do
light/sedentary work

(R-76, Appendix B at 13).

For the above stated reasons, application in this case of the
odd lot doctrine would not be appropriate.

18

CONCLUSION
The ruling of the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial
Commission that Petitioner "has not proved by a preponderance of
the evidence that her disability was caused by her

industrial

accident of August 15, 1988," and that "Applicant's claim for
permanent total disability benefits under the odd lot doctrine
likewise fails due to the lack of causal connection between the
industrial accident and her permanent total disability" should be
upheld. (R-122, Appendix E at 7 ) .
There is substantial evidence to support the commission's
findings to deny benefits to Petitioner.

Said ruling should be

affirmed based upon the substantial evidence standard of review
that mandates which the Industrial Commission's findings should be
upheld if supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light
of the whole record.
For

all

of

the

foregoing

reasons,

the

decision

Industrial Commission should be affirmed.
DATED this

% rJ^ day of November, 1993.
FAIRBOURN & PESHELL

Rinehart L. Peshell
Attorney for Respondent
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Statutes

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Injury arising out of or in course of employment
"Act of God" is not by implication excluded
in Subdivision (5) of this section. State Rd.
Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 56 Utah 252,
190 P. 544 (1920).
Where mine superintendent was killed by
holdup bandits as he entered store to purchase
cigar for his own use, his death was not compensable as "accidental" injury within this section since in order to recover for accidental injury there must be some causal connection or
relation between act causing injury and employment or duties of injured employee.
Westerdahl v. State Ins. Fund, 60 Utah 325,
208 P. 494 (1922).
Where state road employee while working on
road sought shelterfromstorm and was struck
by lightning, the accident arose out of and in
course of employment State Rd Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 56 Utah 252, 190 P. 544
(1920).
Under Subdivision (5) although an employee
is employed on the day of an accident, it cannot
be said he is in the course of his employment
where he steps aside to engage in an altercation with some third person concerning a personal grievance wholly unrelated to matters
connected with his employment. Wilkerson v.

35-1-45

Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 355, 266 P. 270
(1928).
Wife of deceased drugstore employee was not
entitled to compensation where she did not sustain burden of proving that typhoid fever was
result of injury received in course of his employment Chase v. Industrial Comm'n, 81
Utah 141, 17 P-2d 205 (1932).
Death of beer truck driver after being taken
to the hospital when he had a severe pain in
his chest after making his second morning delivery, did not result from an accident arising
out of or in the course of his employment,
where substance of opinions of medical panel
was that death from coronary thrombosis with
myocardial infarction was not causedfromthe
exertion of deceased's work on that morning.
Burton v. Industrial Comm'n, 13 Utah 2d 353,
S74 P.2d 439 (1962).
Regular course of employment
Bricklayer killed in automobile accident
while returning homefromwork was not killed
in an accident arising out of or in the course of
employment despite fact that decedent's hourly
wage had been increased due to location of construction site, increased hourly wage did not
constitute pay for travel time. Barney v. Industrial Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 179, 506 P-2d 1271
(1973).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C-J.S. — 99 CJS, Workmen's Compensation I 1.
AJLR. — Suicide as compensable under
Workmen's Compensation Act, 15 AXJLSd
616
Workmen's compensation: injury or death
due to storms, 42 ALJLSd 885.
Workmen's compensation: injury sustained
while attending employer-sponsored social affair as arising out of and in the course of employment, 47 AXILSd 566.

Master and servant: employer's liability for
injury caused by food or drink purchased by
employee in plant facilities, 50 AXJt 3d 505.
Workers' compensation law as precluding
employee's suit against employer for third person's criminal attack, 49 A U U t h 926
Workers' compensation: sexual assaults as
compensable, 52 AI*H4th 731.
Key Numbers, — Workers' Compensation
••47.

35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid.
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment, wherever such ixyury occurred, if the accident was
not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on
account of the injury or death, and such amoimt for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee.
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35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments.
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident,
the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a finding by the
commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of the sequential
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20
of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission shall adopt
rules that conform to the substance of the sequential decision-making process
of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520
(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) (1) and (2), as revised.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312week entitlement, compensation shall be 662/3% of the employee's average
weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows:
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury.
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per
week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor
children, but not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (a)
nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the
injury.
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation
rate under Subsection (b) shall be 36% of the current state average
weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar.
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks
of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section
35-1-69. The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in
this section and Sections 354-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent
total disability compensation rate under Subsection (2) Any overpayment of
this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier
by the Employers* Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers*
Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund
shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers*
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer
or its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69. Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection
(2), the compensation payable by the Employers* Reinsurance Fund shall be
reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the
Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same
period.
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all
cases be tentative and not final until all of the following proceedings have
occurred:
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(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and
totally disabled, the commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, refer the employee to the vocational rehabilitation agency under
the State Board of Education for rehabilitation training. The commission
shall order that an amount be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for use in the rehabilitation
and training of the employee.
(b) If the vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of
Education certifies to the commission in writing that the employee has
fully cooperated with that agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the employee is not able to be
rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a
hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other Evidence regarding rehabilitation. The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a
preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not
possible, the commission shall order that the employee be paid weekly
permanent total disability compensation benefits. The period of benefits
commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence,
and ends with the death of the employee or when the employee is capable
of returning to regular, steady work. In any case where an employee has
been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible, but where
the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for
permanent partial disability. An employee is not entitled to compensation, unless the employee filly cooperates with any rehabilitation effort
under this section.
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both
arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body
members, constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total disability is
required in any such instance.
History: C. 1953, 85-1-67, enacted by L.
1988, cb. 116, $ 4.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1988,
ch 116, § 4 repeals former § 35-1-67, as last
amended by Laws 1985, ch 160, § 1, relating
to permanent total disability, effective July 1,
1988, and enacts the present section
Amendment Notes. - The 1985 amend-

ment substituted *$120M for "$ 110" in the first
sentence of the second paragraph.
Effective Dates. — Section 2 of Laws 1985,
ch 160 provided This act takes effect upon
approval by the governor, or the day following
***« constitutional time limit of Article VD,
&*• 8 without the governor's signature, or in
* e CML°lf v ? ° ; * ? £ * of veU) o v e m d e
Approved March 18, 1985.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Arm injuries
Commencement of benefits
Determination of character of disability.
Estoppel
Eye injuries
Findings
Law in effect
Maximum benefits
Multiple injuries.
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Administrative Law Judges Order

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 92000255
*

CLAUDIA COX,
*

Applicant,

it

FINDINGS OF FACT

it
it

vs.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

it

UTAH POWER AND LIGHT/
ENERGY MUTUAL INSURANCE and
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND,

it

AND ORDER

it
it
it

Defendants.

it

*
* *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on August
5, 1992 at 1:00 o'clock p.m.
Said hearing was
pursuant to Order and notice of the Coinmission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES J

The applicant was present and was represented by
Edward B. Havas, Attorney,
The defendants were
Peshell, Attorney.

represented

by

Rinehart

The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by
Erie Boorman, Attorney/Administrator.

This case involves a claim for permanent total disability
benefits in relation to 3 industrial incidents occurring while the
applicant was employed by Utah Power and Light (one in December of
1987, and two others that the applicant feels caused her permanent
total disability, one on August 15, 1988 and one on July 9, 1990).
No application for hearing was filed with resepct to the December
1987 incident, but it has been dealt with through out the
litigation in this matter.
The carrier and the Employers
Reinsurance Fund deny that the applicant is permanently totally
disabled as a result of any of her work injuries. The carrier
argues that the 1988 and 1990 incidents contributed little to the
applicant's already impaired <~arvical and lumbar spine and the
carrier argues that the 1990 incident may be non-compensable. In
support of this argument, the carrier points out that the applicant
had all her spinal surgeries prior to the 1988 industrial incident
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and the carrier notes that the applicant continued to work until
July 1990. The applicant counters that the 1988 accident did
indeed significantly worsen her condition and that she continued to
work thereafter only because she maintained herself on pain
medication. Both the carrier and the Employers Reinsurance Fund
also question whether the applicant is truly unable to work at any
job. At the time of the hearing, the applicant was in the process
of appealing a denial of Social Security Disability benefits and
the Social Security Disability records and oth€>r vocational
assessment included in the medical record exhibit at the time of
the hearing suggested that the applicant could possibly still work.
However, just after the medical panel submitted its report to the
Commission, the applicant was awarded Social Security'Disability
benefits pursuant to an order dated December 21, 1992. The order
was presented to the ALJ on January 20, 1993.
At hearing, a joint medical record exhibit was not ready for
submission and instead a partial group of records were admitted
into evidence after much argument as to what records were
admissable.
The ALJ gave the parties an extension of time posthearing to submit the rest of the joint exhibit, but confusion
ensued when additional records were submitted by the applicant
without an indication as to whether the records were duplicative of
records already admitted and without an indication as to whether
the additional submissions had been agreed to by the carrier and
the Employers Reinsurance Fund. Finally, per a conference call in
early October 1992, the parties confirmed that all records that the
Commission had at that time were to be considered the joint exhibit
and the ALJ was informed at that time that there might be
duplicates in the records that had been submitted. Rather than
return the records to the parties to prepare an acceptable exhibit
without duplicates, the ALJ decided to weed out the duplicates
herself and after doing so, the ALJ admitted the medical record
exhibit and marked it as Exhibit A-l. The records reflected a
medical controversy regarding what portion of the applicant's
impairment was related to the industrial incidents. Therefore, the
ALJ determined that the matter would be referred to a medical panel
for additional input.
The medical panel report was received at the Industrial
Commission on December 16, 1992 and was distributed to the parties
on December 17, 1992, with 15 days allowed for objections. Counsel
for the applicant filed objections and/or argument regarding the
report on January 4, 1993 and counsel for the defendant filed a
response to this on January 8, 1993. Counsel for the applicant
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filed a reply to the response and the Social Security Disability
award information on January 20, 1993. The matter was considered
ready for order on Jaunary 20, 1993.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
Although the first relevant industrial event that is
involved in this claim did not occur until December 1987, the
applicant had a significant non-industrial injury to both her
lumbar and cervical spine in October of 1986 and did have back
treatment and possibly neck treatment by a chiropractor prior to
1986. A good portion of the medical records submitted deal with
the applicant's medical status prior to 1986 and the ALJ will
briefly review this chronologically.
The applicant began having unexplained right upper quadrant
pain as early as 1963 and she was finally hospitalized for this and
associated back pain in 1973. Through that time, it was thought to
be related to gastro-intestinal or gall bladder problems, but the
testing during the hospitalization failed to confirm any problem in
the stomachf kidneys, gall bladder or intestines.
From 1972
forward, the applicant's regular family physician or physicians
practiced at the Emery Medical Clinic in Castledale, Utah. The
records from that clinic note that she was seen for
fatigue/anemia/depression and allergic rhinitits in 1973. In 1974,
she was seen for phlebitis and heart palpitations with chest pain.
In 1975, ovarian cysts were diagnosed and in 1977 the applicant
began to have excessive or unusual uterine bleeding. Additional
assessment and testing in 1982 and 1983 confirmed bilateral ovarian
cysts and continued prolonged bleeding. In 1977, the applicant
began working for Utah Power and Light in a clerical/accounting
position. In 1978, the applicant began to see a chiropractor at
Castle Chiropractic Center in Castledale, Utah. The chiropractor's
records note that the applicant first came in in September 1978 due
to a traumatic lumbo-sacral strain. She was seen approximately 2
times per week in September and October of 1978. She again sought
out chiropractic care in July of 1979 (once or twice per week) and
in late August of 1979 (almost daily). In October of 1979, the
applicant
was
seen
at the
Emery
Medical
Clinic
for
anxiety/depression and she was prescribed limbitrol.
The applicant was seen at Castle Chiropractic Center in late
August 1980, almost daily, and again in late 1981 almost daily,
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tapering off in October and November of 1981. in September of
1981, the Emery Medical Center diagnosed acute otitis media with
perforation and the applicant was seen by Dr. G. Lund for a patch
on the perforation. From April of 1982 through October of 1982,
the applicant went to the chiropractor 2 to 4 times per month. In
1983, she was seen 2 to 4 times per month in February, June, July
and December. In 1984, the applicant was seen by Dr. C. Null, a
cardiologist, and he diagnosed a slight heart murmur.
The
applicant underwent breast reconstruction surgery in 1984. She saw
the chiropractor from mid-May 1984 through mid-June 1984, 3 times
per week, and then again in August of 1984, 2 times per week. In
October of 1984, the applicant had a complete hysterectomy and
oopherectomy at Holy Cross Hospital in Salt Lake City. At hearing,
the applicant recalled that she did not see the* chiropractor for
back pain after her hysterectomy, but the records do indicate that
the applicant saw the chiropractor almost daily in late August of
1986, tapering off in September in 1986. In October of 1986, she
had her first significant cervical/lumbar injury.
On October 4, 1986, the applicant was in Albuquerque, New
Mexico on vacation at the hot air balloon festival. She was riding
in the back of a pick-up truck, on a gravel road, chasing a hot air
balloon when the truck hit a dip in the road. The applicant stated
that the truck was not going very fast and she was seated with her
legs straight out in front of her leaning on the the side of the
truck bed. As the truck hit the dip in the road, the applicant was
bounced up off the bed of the truck and she came down hard, still
in a seated position* The applicant described the effect on her as
a heavy impact and a very severe jolt. That afternoon or evening,
the applicant called a local chiropractor in Albuquerque and he
treated the applicant on an emergency basis, also providing her
with a back brace and a heel lift.
When the applicant returned to Utah, she went to see Dr. R.
Sanders at the Castle Chiropractic Center on October 9, 1986. Dr.
Sanders felt she had sustained multiple strains of the lumbar,
thoracic and cervical spine.
He began treating her with
chiropractic treatments.
The next doctor she saw for the
Albuquerque injury was Dr. G. Momberger, a Salt Lake City
orthopedist. She saw Dr. Momberger on October 28, 1986 and on an
intake form it is noted that she had injured her neck, spine, low
back, shoulders, Tcnee and elbow. Responding to the cause of the
problem, the form indicates that the applicant was picking up a
suitcase and was bumped on August 16, 1986 (this incident was not
discussed at hearing), with the truck incident occurring 6 weeks
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later. The intake form also notes that BEFORE 1976 a Dr. Kazarian
had recommended surgery and Dr. Lamb had recommended exercise only.
There are no records from Dr. Kazarian or Dr. Lamb in the medical
record exhibit. The same form indicates that the applicant's low
back pain had begun in 1959. Dr. Momberger's notes indicate midthoracic pain and he referred the applicant to Dr. Ward at the
University to determine if possibly she had a connective tissue
disorder.
The next physician visit was on November 6, 1986, when the
applicant was seen at the Emery Medical Clinic for depression. It
was noted that the applicant had been followed weekly ht a menta-1
health clinic for the last 6 months for depression which was
situational and related to various life set-backs. Desyrel was
prescribed. The applicant continued with chiropractic treatments
from Dr. Sanders through November 24, 1986# receiving an overall
total of 14 treatments between October 9, 1986 and November 24,
1986.
Dr. Sanders's records indicate that he referred the
applicant to Dr. L. Gaufin, at the Utah Neurological Clinc in
Provo, Utah, on November 24, 1986 and that Dr. Gaufin had a CT scan
done. This may be an error, because there is no record of a CT
scan in Dr. Gaufin's records or in the Utah Valley Regional Medical
Center records, the hospital at which Dr. Gaufin normally gets his
films. Dr. Gaufin did admit the applicant to Utah Valley Regional
Medical Center on December 2, 1986 for a myelogram and Dr. Sanders
may be referring to this film when he states a CT scan was
performed. After reviewing the myleogram results, Dr. Gaufin's
final diagnoses were: 1) acute and chronic lumbar radiculopathy
secondary to centrally herniated L4-5 disc, 2) mild disc bulge L34, 3) cervical radiculopathy secondary to encroachment upon the
nerve roots C4-5 and C5-6 bilaterally. Upon discharge, on Decmeber
4, 1986, Dr. Gaufin prescribed tylenol #3. The applicant was seen
at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center several days later for what
Dr. Gaufin describes as a post-myelogram headache with neck pain.
The applicant was given dalmane and tylenol #3.
On January 5, 1987, Dr. L. Gaufin performed a semi-hemi
laminotomy, formainotomy and nerve root decompression at L4-5 on
the right at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center. In February of
1986, Dr. Gaufin wrote Dr. Sanders that the applicant had improved
symptoms as a result of the surgery, but that she was still
protective and cautious about her back and used an L5 corset for
traveling.
He noted that he would consider operating on her
herniated cervical disc as soon as she stabilized from the lumbar
surgery. On March 4, 1987, Dr. Gaufin wrote State Farm Insurance,

00 3S8

ORDER
RE: CLAUDIA COX
PAGE 6

indicating that the October 4, 1986 truck accident had produced an
acute vertical load on the applicant's spine and subsequent
pressure on the discs which was totally compatible with the
symptoms she later suffered and the herniated lumbar and cervical
discs. He states in the letter that he did not operate on the L3-4
level because the applicant wanted to get as much wear out of that
level as she could before proceeding with surgery. He noted that
the applicant continued with neck, shoulder and arm symptoms and
with headaches when she was in a vertical position. He noted that
these symptoms were associated with the C4-5 and C5-6 discs and
that he had scheduled her for neck surgery. The applicant was
admitted to Utah Valley Regional Medical Center on March 9, 1987
and on March 10, 1987, Dr. Gaufin performed an anterior cervical
disectomy with nerve root decompression and interbody fusion C4-5
and C5-6.
The applicant recuperated from March of 1987 until August
5, 1987 when Dr. Gaufin released her to return to work. During
recuperation, Dr. Gaufin prescribed soma and tylenol /3 and the
applicant went to the Emery Medical Clinic for estrogen supplements
and allergy medications. The applicant testified that she had
difficulty the first couple weeks back at work, but then got better
and had no problems doing her work duties.
Upon releasing the
applicant to return to work, Dr. Gaufin recommended that she
follow-up with her family physician for any medication refills she
might need. There are almost no doctor visits except for those
associated with medication refills at Emery Medical Clinic from the
date of release (August 5, 1987) until December 14, 1987 when the
applicant saw Dr. C. Null, a cardiologist, for lab tests.
Apparently, the applicant was concerned with fatigue or low energy
and Dr. Null confirmed with her that her test results were normal
and that he believed her energy level was being effected by her
recent surgeries and illnesses and that she should take vitamins.
It was during this same month, December 1987, that the
applicant had the first of her industrial injuries. The applicant
stated that she was at work and that she was wearing a long skirt
with a slippery slip underneath it. As she went to sit on her
chair, that had rollers on the legs, she caught just the edge of
the chair seat and then the chair rolled back and away from her as
she slid off the end of the seat. She apparently fell to the floor
on her bjuttocks and had resulting back pain and right leg pain with
muscle spasms. However, she had no doctor visits associated with
this incident. She did get a refill of soma on December 29, 1987
at Emery Medical Center, but there are no actual examinations or
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treatments for this injury. The applicant also missed no work time
and there is no Employers First Report of Work Injury for this
incident.

The applicant continued to work and was able to return to
most all activities after the 1987 surgeries. She stated that she
did avoid very jarring type activities, like aerobics and 3wheelers per Dr. Gaufin's instructions. She did all her housework
and she could drive, but she did avoid mowing the lawn per her
testimony. She had only 4 or 5 visits or calls to Emery Medical
Center from December of 1987 until August of 1988 and these were
for prescription refills, only one of which was for soma. On
August 15, 1988, the applicant had her second industrial incident.
She was working quickly as she was filling in for several other
workers that were off work at the time.
She was doing Carma
O'Brien's work for her and had to get into one of her file drawers.
The relevant drawer was the bottom drawer of a file cabinet and was
the largest drawer in the cabinet. The drawer was filled with
paper and books, but the applicant did not know this. She was
bending over and pulling on the drawer handle, which was about a
foot off the floor, with her right hand, when the drawer partially
opened and then stopped abruptly like it was stuck. The applicant
stated that she felt something give in the middle of her back and
her neck, shoulder and right arm felt wrenched. She also stated
that she felt her neck pop or give way, but that she was more
concerned at the time regarding her low back. She stated that
there was no one at work to fill in for her, so she remained at
work the remainder of the shift. She stated she continued to work
in pain and discomfort after the incident and just tried to ignore
••it." She testified that she took pain medications and muscle
relaxers daily and would go straight to bed after getting off work.
Once again, there are no immediate doctor visits associated
with this injury. The applicant testified at hearing that she did
not want to see a doctor because she was afraid to find out that
she had made her condition worse once again. The nearest-in-time
medical record is a refill of estrogen at Emery Medical Center on
August 30, 1988. The next doctor visit, on September 29, 1988,
relates to the need for mammography and the fact that the applicant
wanted her cholesterol checked. The office note for this visit
does mention that the applicant had reinjured her neck "+\e other
day" and needed a soma refill.
Fioricet was presjribed on
September 30, 1988. The first mention in the records of the
December 1987 injury and the August 15, 1988 injury is in Dr.
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Gaufin's office note dated October 3, 1988. In that note, he
refers to the sliding-off-the-chair incident (he indicates this was
in October of 1987 as opposed to December 1987) and the August 15,
1988 injury opening a heavy file drawer. The first incident he
notes gradually resolved, but he noted that the applicant continued
to have pain in the neck, shoulders and arms and numbness in the
first, second and third digits of both hands (right greater than
left) related to the August 15, 1988 incident* Some pain in the
lumbar area was also noted.
Dr. Gaufin wanted to rule out a
recurrent disc herniation in the cervical spine, and carpal tunnel
and thus he referred the applicant for an MRI and nerve conduction
velocity tests and an EMG of the right upper extremity. On October
7, 1988, that applicant had an MRI of both the cervical and lumbar
spine. The cervical film was read to show a stable fusion at C4-5
and C5-6, but degenerative disc disease at C6-7, producing a bartype defect obliterating the thecal sac and impinging the nerve
roots bilaterally, right greater than left. The lumbar film was
read to show no evidence of recurrent disc injury, with a mild
bulge at L5-S1 which did not significantly impinge on the nerve
root or thecal sac. The nerve tests done at Western Neurological
Associates on October 7, 1988 were read as normal by Dr. J.
Andrews.
The applicant got refills of soma and tylenol #3 at Emery
Medical Center on November 19, 1988. On November 23, 1988, Dr.
Gaufin wrote Dr. Kotrady at Emery Medical Center indicating that he
did not recommend surgery at that time for either the neck or back.
He stated that he felt the applicant's 2 industrial injuries
(December 1987 and August 15, 1988) had agrravated a pre-existing
mild degenerative change at C6-7 and had created a mild bulge at
L5-S1.
He noted that the applicant might need surgery in the
future, but for the time being he recommended anti-inflammatory
medication, muscle relaxants and physical therapy as needed. In
December of 1988, the applicant got refills of fioricet, tylenol #3
"and lomatil.
In January 1989, she was referred for physical
therapy, which she attended 5 times between January 19, 1989 and
February 9, 1989. In March of 1989, the applicant got refills of
fioricet and seldane and there is an Emery Medical Center office
note dated April 13, 1989 that indicates that the physical therapy
had helped, but that the applicant wanted a soft cervical collar
and a lumbar support.
It was also noted that the physical
therapist had recommended a TENS unit and the applicant was fitted
for one in May of 1989. At hearing, the applicant testified that
the physical therapy made her feel sicker. She indicated that the
TENS unit helped sometimes. Although she continued to work, the
applicant stated that she had her daughter do her housework for
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her. She felt that she could not engage in her hobby of cake
decorating and recalls needing to lay down in order to have her
nails done, as this takes 2 hours. She stated that she tried to
strengthen her back by walking while wearing her neck brace and
that she tried to adjust her computer screen at work to make it
more comfortable for her. She also indicated that she needed to
lay down periodically at work.
Beginning in mid-May 1989, the applicant began to see an
acupuncturist, Kris Ahshi. Based on the brief handwritten notes of
the acupuncturist, the visits were not primarily for the neck or
back (these were mentioned in the notes for just one visit) , but
rather were for a host of other non-industrial problems including
fatigue, bloating/edema/water retention, sinus headaches, ear pain
and constipation. She had 6 or 7 treatments per month from June
1989 through September of 1989 (in July only one treatment) with
almost double that number of visits in October of 1989. During
that period, in addition to her acupuncture treatments, the
applicant was seen for various things at the Emery Medical Center
including assessment for hypothyroidism in June 1989 (unconfirmed),
for refills of tylenol #3, fioricet and soma in July 1989, for
fioricet and naprosyn in September 1989 and for fioricet in October
1989, and for cholesterol lab tests in September 1989. In November
of 1989, she was seen at Emery Medical Center for neck pain and
right arm pain and it was noted that she had been using a neck
brace for 2 months. It was recommended that she continue using the
brace and going to acupuncture. The 4 visits to the acupuncturist
in November 1989 are accompanied by notes indicating treatment for
cervical pain, tingling and numbness. The applicant got refills of
fioricet, naprosyn and soma on November 20, 1989 at Emery Medical
Center.
On Decmeber 1, 1989, the applicant was seen at the Salt Lake
Clinic by some physician for 1) hot flashes, 2) headaches, 3)
fatigue, 4) allergies and 5) left upper chest pain. The physician
noted that he would take some tests and he recommended that the
applicant cut her premarin intake in half and that she quit taking
provera altogether. From December 1989 through June of 1990, the
applicant went to the acupuncturist only twice (once in March 1990
and once in June 1990) and apparently got prescription refills only
at Emery Medical Center. Prescription refills included Zovirax,
fioricet (6 times), tylenol #3, naldicon, estrogen, soma (2 times)
naprosyn, amitriptyline and prozac. The applicant testified that
she actually worked overtime from January of 1990 through April of
1990 as another employee failed to return from maternity leave.
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She indicated that this extra effort caused her to take more
medication and to use her neck brace again so that she could keep
up with the work. In May of 1990, a visit to Emery Medical Center
notes pain down the right arm with numbness in the right digits,
constant headache, and pain in the right leg with parasthesias in
the toes after walking. Her visit to the acupuncturist in June of
1990 was for leg swelling and pain. On July 2, 1990, Dr. Kotrady
of the Emery Medical Center wrote Dr. Gaufin, recommending that the
applicant be reevaluated by Gaufin. In that letter, he notes that
the applicant had persisting neck pain and that at one point she
had become dependent on fioricet, soma and tylenol #3. He notes
that she had been intolerant to prozac and amitriptyline and that
he recommended a pain clinic if surgery was not recommended. He
noted that he felt there was an emotional stress component that was
blocking any successful treatment.
On July 9, 1990, just one week after Dr. Kotrady sent his
letter to Dr. Gaufin, the applicant had her final industrial
incident. The applicant stated at hearing that she was seated at
her desk and merely turned her head with resultant neck spasm and
symptoms on down her spine. It is somewhat unclear what exactly
happened at work after she turned her head.
There are some
references in the medical records regarding the applicant
collapsing on this date, but it is unclear whether she did any more
than just lay down. She did go to the Emery Medical Center on the
same day and a cervical spine X-ray was done, which showed the
prior fusion and the C6-7 degeneration.
An acute strain was
diagnosed and soma and lortab were prescribed. Several days later
she was referred to physical therapy, but the applicant called to
tell the therapist she was to wait with the physical therapy until
she saw Dr. Gaufin per Gaufin's instructions. On August 6, 1990,
the applicant went to see family practitioner, Dr. S. Potter, in
Price, Utah for hot flushes and headaches. He recommended a trial
of prozac and some lab tests. Apparently, she thereafter made Dr.
Potter her family doctor, but through the end of 1990 she continued
to get prescription refills at Emery Medical Center for both her
spinal problems (fioricet, soma, naprosyn, tyleonl #3) and for
other things like anti-depressants (prozac and provera).
The applicant had a repeat cervical MRI done at Utah Valley
Regional Medical Center on August 9, 1990 per Dr. Gaufin's
referral. This was read to show no major changes since the one
done on October 7, 1988. Dr. Gaufin saw her on August 15, 1990 and
he noted that she continued to have chronic neck, shoulder and arm
pain, with the pain being better when she was laying down and worse
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when she was sitting at work. He noted that she continued to use
the neck collar and his impression was acute chronic cervical
radiculopathy secondary to spondylosis and protrusion of the disc
at C6-7 bilaterally. He recommended surgery to decompress the
nerve roots, but he noted that the applicant would need to be very
careful in the future due to the propensity of deterioration of the
discs caused by stress on the joints due to a 3-level fusion. His
office note for October 7, 1988 indicates that the applicant would
consider whether to have the additional surgery. Dr. Gaufin's
letter to the carrier dated October 1, 1990 indicates that the
applicant opted to avoid surgery and he therefore recommended: 1)
avoiding jolting or jarring the neck, 2) use of a soft cervical
collar, 3) cervical traction taught by a physical therapist and 4)
anti-inflammatory medication and muscle relaxants with avoidance of
narcotics.
In December 1990, Dr. Taylor at the Emery Medical Center
wrote Dr. Gaufin requesting that he Mdo a disabilty determination"
on the applicant as he believed the applicant would not be a
dependable future employee. In response to this, the applicant saw
Dr. Gaufin again on January 9, 1991 and Dr. Gaufin wrote Dr. Taylor
a letter indicating that the applicant was at that time in such
intense pain that she could not tolerate sitting in a chair in
front of a table or a desk with her head flexed for 8 hours. He
noted that her care options were surgery or conservative care, but
that nothing was going to totally Mget rid,f of the pain. He noted
that there was a general reduced success rate for 3rd surgeries and
that the applicant would experience a continued wearing out process
with age. He states in the letter that there would be a point at
which surgery would not help.
He found that the applicant
continued to be termporarily totally disabled and that she would
continue to use traction and see if she got her better enough to
return to work.
In January.1991, Dr. Taylor again wrote Dr.
Gaufin asking him to rate the applicant. The applicant applied for
Social Security Disability on January 28, 1991 and got refills of
prozac, tylenol #3, soma, fioricet and naprosyn at the Emery
Medical Center on January 31, 1991. Dr. Gaufin saw the applicant
for the last time on March 18, 1991 when he rated her as having a
33% whole person impairment due to her industrial injuries, a
combined rating of 20% lumbar and 16% cervical impairment. Not
included in his rating was a 7% whole person rating for the neck
and 8% for the lumbar spine due to the surgeries in 1987.
On April 29, 1991, Dr. P. Harris performed an examination
of the applicant at the request of the carrier. He noted that the
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applicant's two major complaints were: 1) constant neck pain with
numbness and tingling made worse by sitting, standing in one spot
and walking and made better by laying down with pillows under the
neck, pain medications and muscle relaxers and 2) constant back
pain from the mid-back to the low back radiating down her leg to
her toe, better when she was laying down, walking or taking
medication and generally more tolerable than the neck pain. He
found that the applicant was medically stable and that surgery was
advisable only if muscle atrophy occurred, muscle we^akness became
progressive or a free fragment was discovered* He found surgery
was not advisable if the applicant merely had progressive pain
symptoms.
He found that the applicant had a combined total
impairment from both the lumbar and cervical spine of 34%. He
breaks this rating down, but his breakdown is a little confusing.
Nonetheless it does appear that he feels that the* vast majority of
the rating was caused by the 1986 injury and ensuing 1987
surgeries.
In June and July 1991, the applicant saw Dr. S. Potter for
depression and headaches and in July of 1991 th€> applicant returned
to Dr. C. Null for increasing symptoms of precordial pressure,
aching and tightness seeming to occur with activity. His diagnoses
were: 1) mitral valve prolapse syndrome, 2) anginal syndrome, 3)
intermittent episodes of arterial hypertension in the past, 4)
prior spine injuries and 5) prior hysterectomy. Dr. Null noted
that the applicant needed to get her cholesterol level down. The
applicant saw Dr. J. Heiner in August 1991, apparently to get a
second opinion regarding her neck and low back symptoms. His
office note from this visit makes some observations, but there are
no real conclusions stated in the note. He did take lumbar and
cervical X-rays. Dr. Potter referred the applicant for acupuncture
again in September of 1991 and the applicant had 5 treatments in a
2-month period from mid-September 1991 through mid-November 1991.
On October 25, 1991, Social Security issued its initial decision
denying the applicant disability benefits. The order notes that it
was determined that the applicant could work an 8-hour day with
normal breaks.
On November 7, 1991, the applicant saw Dr. S. Potter and he
noted a new symptom. The applicant was having difficulty closing
her hands. He referred the applicant for a rheumatoid factor lab
test and his November 21, 1991 office note inddicates that this
came back negative. He prescribed fioricet, physical therapy and
a nerve conduction velocity test. The applicant had 10 acupuncture
treatments from November 29, 1991 through December 27, 1991. On
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December 20, 1991 Dr. J. Watkins, a nerurologist, wrote Dr. L.
Gaufin indicating that he had seen the applicant for a tingling
sensation in both hands and in the right arm along with
intermittent loss of grip and tingling in front of her left ear
which all began as of July 9, 1990.
Numbness in the first 3
digits of the hands was also reported along with occasional
drooling from the right side of the mouth. Dr. Watkins recommended
nerve conduction velocity tests, EMGs of both upper extremities and
an MRI of the brain. He wrote Dr. Gaufin on January 22, 1992 that
these tests came back normal. Dr. Potter refilled the applicant's
fioricet, tylenol #3, feldene, prozac and soma in January of 1992.
On February 6, 1992, Dr. Potter also prescribed desyrel for neck
symptoms and emotional stress and he informed the applicant's
attorney that the desyrel was related to her industrial injuries.
On March 1, 1992, he wrote the applicant's attorney and notified
him that the medications that he was refilling (prozac, feldene,
tylenol #3, fioricet and naprosyn) were all necessary due -to the
applicant's industrial injuries.
On March 5, 1992, Dr. Watkins wrote Dr. Gaufin and noted
that the applicant had also developed dizzy symptoms and that she
had gone off all medications and was trying meclizine for the
dizziness. On March 30, 1992, Delvin McFarlane, LCSW, wrote a
letter to-whom-it-may concern noting that he had seen the applicant
10 times in counseling and that the applicant had experienced some
improvement as a result, but continued to grieve over the loss of
her job and health.
He concluded that it was difficult to
accomplish much in therapy until the issue regarding her Social
Security Disability was settled. He stated that he could see no
way that she would be able to return to work and he recommended a
speedy disability retirement. On March 31, 1992, a functional
capacity evaluation was done through Carbon Emery Physical
Therapy/Alta Health Services and this resulted in a classification
for the applicant of light/sedentary work. It was noted that ±he
applicant did not have good control of her pain and that she was
limited by this and her fear of reinjury.
On April 6, 1992, the applicant saw Dr. J. Matthews who
diagnosed her as having fibromyalgia syndrome and inflammatory
polyarthritis.
He noted that he wanted to rule out multiple
sclerosis, lyme disease and hypothryroidism.
He referred the
applicant for lab tests and he did X-rays of her hands. He gave he
an injection of adlone and prescribed cyclobenzodrine. Dr. Potter
saw the applicant again on May 19, 1992 and he noted hand pain and
leg swelling and he noted a possible diagnosis of fibromyacitis and
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fatigue. He prescribed amitriptylline. The appliccint was seen in
the emergency room of Castleview Hospital on May 31, 1992 for neck
and back pain and she was given an injection of demerol/phenergan
and was sent home with percocet. Dr. Matthews's office note for
June 1, 1992 adds two other diagnoses: hypothryroidism and chronic
pain. He prescribed synthroid in addition to the cyclobenzodrine
and indicated he would recheck her in 3 months. On June 29, 1992,
the applicant requested a hearing with Social Security in order to
reassess her entitlement to disability benefits.
There is a Career Guidcance Center report dated June 15,
1992 which concludes that there are jobs available for which the
applicant is trained, but that she may have difficulty finding "an
employer willing to make the accommodations that are necessary in
order for her to tolerate the workplace. The applicant has been
receiving long term disability benefits since shortly after the
July 9, 1990 incident but it is unclear in what amount and how long
the benefits will continue. As of October of 1992, the Social
Security Disability litigation was still in progress with no final
result made known to the ALJ.
The applicant testified that since the July 9, 1990
incident, she was reduced to even less activity than she performed
after the August 15, 1988 accident. She characterized her activity
level as "totally down." She stated that she had a hard time even
walking and could do no housework. She stated that she wore her
neck brace for traveling and when she was unable to lay down. She
stated that she was unable to drive for one year as she could not
turn her head. At the time of the hearing, the applicant stated
that she had constant pain in her neck (she wore her cervical
collar at the hearing) and that she had reduced range of motion in
the neck due to pain when she tried to turn her head. She stated
that she had to lay still in the morning for a couple of hours
before she could move her head. She stated that she no longer
walks to help her back pain because this jars her neck. She stated
that she can sit or stand for only 30 minutes at a time before the
pain gets bad and then she needs to lay back, put her legs up or
use her neck brace. She stated that it is painful to have her neck
bent over looking at her desk or keyboard.
With respect to education ahd work experience, the applicant
stated that she graduated from South Emery Highschool in Ferron,
Utah and had only typing classes thereafter. She stated that she
worked for 20 years, initially as a retail sales clerk in a women's
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apparel store and later in several accounting/clerical positions.
She feels that her limited ability to sit with her neck bent over
a
desk
or
keyboard
prevents
her
from
returning
to
clerical/accounting work and she feels that she can no longer do
the bending, lifting, reaching and work on her feet that is
required in a retail sales clerk position.

The medical panel consisted of Chairman, Dr. Madison Thomas,
a neurologist and panel member Dr. B. Holbrook, an orthopedist.
Their report was received at the Commission on December 16, 1992.
The panel report concludes that there is a causal connection
between the applicant's symptoms and the three industrial injuries
at issue as well as a connection between her symptoms and preexisting conditions or injuries. The panel is not specific about
what symptoms it refers to, but the panel specifically talks about
neck symptoms with radiation and problems in the right upper
extremity and low back symptoms radiating into the right lower
extremity. The panel found that the applicant's December 1987 work
injury and the August 15, 1988 work injury did not result in any
temporary total disability, with the July 9, 1990 work injury
resulting in 3 or 4 weeks of temporary disability. With respect to
impairment, the panel apportioned the applicant's impairment as
follows:
prior to
1986

10-4-86

12-87

8-15-88

7-9-90

cervical
spine-17%

1.70%

11.90%

0.85%

2.55%

0.00%

lumbar
spine-14%

3.50%

9.80%

0.42%

0.28%

0.00%

hypothyroidism

5.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

10.20%

21.70%

1.27%

2.83%

0.00%

TOTAL

The panel concluded that the treatment that the applicant has had
was attributable to the accidents in the proportion represented by
the impairment percentages and that the applicant's psychological
status (depression with pre-existing personality disorder) was the
result of multiple non-industrial factors.
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On January 4, 1993, the ALJ received objections/argument
from counsel for the applicant. In that filing, counsel objects to
the panel's finding that no temporary total disability was
attributable to the 1988 accident and that only 3 weeks of
temporary total disability was attibutable to the 1990 accident.
Counsel cites the indications of inability to return to work made
by Dr. Gaufin and Delvin McFarlane, LCSW, in 1991 and 1992 as
support for this objection. Counsel also notes that the panel did
attribute some impairment to the 1987 and 1988 injuries and
suggests that temporary disability should be proportional to the
impairment noted by the panel. Counsel also argues that the panel
should have attributed at least some of the applicant's depression
to the industrial injuries since the social disruption that is
cited as part of the cause of the depression resulted due to the
applicant's loss of her job. Counsel for the defendants filed a
response to these objections on January 8, 1993 pointing out that
the July 9, 1990 injury is non-compensable as a result of the Allen
case and since the applicant discontinued work due to this noncompensable incident, any depression resulting therefrom is also
non-compensable.
On January 20, 1993, counsel for the applicant filed a reply
to the response filed by counsel for the defendants. That reply
indicates that the applicant is no longer contending that the July
9, 1990 injury is a separate compensable accident, but rather just
the date when the applicant discontinued work as a result of
injuries incurred in the 1987 and 19£8 accidents. Attahced to the
reply of counsel for the applicant is the December 21, 1992 award
of Social Security Disability benefits. The decision notes that
the applicant was found to be first disabled as of July 9, 1990,
when she discontinued her work with Utah% Power and Light. The
findings of the ALJ who issued the decision cite the following
impairments as the impairments that were relevant to the award of
disability benefits:
[A] history of lumbar disk surgery in January 1987,
and cervical disk surgery in March 1987; post
traumatic right, greater than left hand numbness
with decreased grip and intermittent hand pain;
fibromyalgia syndrome; inflammatory polyarthritis;
polypharmacy; hypothyroidism; degenereitive joint
disease; degenerative disc disease; depression; and
passive dependent personality disorder.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Adoption of Medical Panel Report;
The ALJ adopts the medical panel report to resolve the
issues of causation and impairment in this matter* The panel alone
has had access to all the applicant's medical records and thus the
panel report is the only expert medical evidence in this case that
is based on a complete medical history, as well as the applicant's
hearing testimony. Although some of the applicant's medical care
providers have pointed to the applicant's back and neck problelns
and her loss of her job as causes of her current disability, none
have indicated clearly that the industrial injuries are the sole
cause of her back and neck problems and the loss of her job.
Therefore, there is no medical evidence that specifically refutes
the panel's findings. As it is the best founded and most complete
medical analysis in this case and as it is not specifically refuted
by any other evidence, the ALT adopts the medical panel conclusions
as her own.

Compensability/Relevancy of the 3 Industrial Accidents;
The applicant did not file an application for hearing
regarding the December 1987 industrial accident. Technically, this
means that this accident is not part of the litigation that has
gone forward in this case. The applicant missed no time from work
as a result of this injury and saw no doctor specifically for this
injury. The panel found a .85 % whole person cervical impairment
and a .42% whole person low back impairment, or less than 2% whole
person impairment, resulting from this injury. Clearly, it is not
a significant injury and the applicant has not claimed it as having
caused her permanent total disability. As such, the ALJ will
consider the injury irrelevant for purposes of analyzing the
permanent total disability claim.
The 1990 injury must be considered non-compensable. Per the
medical panel report, the applicant clearly had significant
permanent impairment to her cervical and lumbar spine at the time
of this injury. Therefore, per the legal causation requirements
outlined in the case Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15
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(Utah 1986), in order for the 1990 injury to be compensable, the
applicant must be able to show that the July 9, 1990 injury was
incurred pursuant to exertion greater than what is expended in nonemployment life by individuals in the latter part of the 20th
century. Since the description of the accident amounts to merely
turning her head, the injury is not a separate compensable
industrial accident.
In addition, the panel attributed no
impairment whatsoever to this incident. However, the ALJ should
note that the applicant appears to now indicate that she is not
claiming the July 9, 1990 incident as a separate compensable
accident (per counsel for the applicant's January 12, 1993 letter
to the ALJ) , but rather that it is merely the date when she
discontinued working due to her earlier industrial accidents. In
essence, the applicant has withdrawn her claim that the July 9,
1990 incident is the cause of her permanent total disability. As
such, the ALJ will not consider the July 9, 1990 incident in
analyzing the applicant's claim for permanent total disability.
Based on the foregoing two paragraphs, only the August 15,
1988 accident is left as a possible industrial cause of the
applicant's claimed permanent total disability. There has been no
argument by the carrier that this incident was not a compensable
industrial accident and thus the ALJ finds that this case boils
down to a determination as to whether the August 15, 1988
compensable industrial injury is the cause of the applicant's
current permanent total disability.
The Cause of the Applicant's Permanent Total Disability;
In order to be entitled to permanent total disability
benefits, the applicant must be able to show that the industrial
injury at issue actually caused the permanent total disability.
Hodges v. Western Piling and Sheeting Co.. 717 P.2d 713 (Utah
1986), Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App.
1988-) . The applicant's testimony, taken by itself, states that she
recovered, returned to work and to most activities after her 1986
non-industrial injury and her two 1987 surgeries that followed.
The applicant testified that after the August 15, 1988 industrial
injury, she became considerably worse and was forced to work in
pain with the assistance of medication. She indicated that she
needed to lay down periodically during the day, and especially
after work. Per the applicant, she needed help with her housework
and needed to use a neck brace in order to walk for exercise. All
of these things the applicant attributes to the effects of the
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August 15, 1988 injury, as she was not experiencing these
limitations just prior to the August 15, 1988 injury* In addition,
the applicant claims that her limitations actually became more
severe after the July 9, 1990 incident where she turned her head at
work. The applicant's testimony that she was worse after the
August 15, 1988 injury is supported in the medical records by an
indication of increase medication usage after that injury. Also,
the records suggest increased complaints of neck and arm symptoms
in late 1988 and in 1989.
Looking at just the applicant's testimony, there is
certainly an argument that the applicant's disabling symptoms
gradually increased after the August 15, 1988 injury, thus strongly
suggesting that the August 15, 1988 injury was the cause of her
eventual complete disability beginning in July of 1990. However,
there is alot of other evidence that leads one to the conclusion
that the August 15, 1988 injury only minimally contributed to the
applicant's overall disability. First, following the 1986 nonindustrial injury at the balloon show in New Mexico, the applicant
had two separate surgeries on her spine and was off work for a
total of 7 to 8 months. In contrast, neither the 1987 nor the 1988
injury resulted in any immediate need for medical care and both
involved no lost work time. No new objective findings on the
applicant's X-rays were noted as a result of these two injuries.
Also, the applicant was working overtime as late as 1990. The
obvious conclusion from this comparison is that the 1986 nonindustrial injury was much more significant medically than were the
1987 and 1988 industrial injuries. The minimal significance of the
two industrial injuries is also supported by the medical panel
impairment ratings, which attribute 80% of the applicant's neck
impairment and 95% of the applicant's low back impairment to causes
other than the industrial injuries.
Secondly, the medical records reflect a number of nonindustrial medical problems that the applicant was experiencing in
1988, 1989 and 1990. These other problems, some of which required
significant treatment, could have affected the applicant's ability
and motivation to continue working.
The applicant saw the
acupuncturist, Dr. Kotrady and Dr. Potter for fagtiue, bloating,
s^-us headaches, ear problems, hot flushes, drug dependency and
high cholesterol.
In addition, Dr. Matthews diagnosed
fibromyalgia, polyarthritis and hypothroidism in 1992 and he did
not mention that any of these were related to the applicant's
industrial injuries.
Finally, the applicant was treated
sporadically both before and after the industrial injuries for
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depression/anxiety.
Certainly, this condition must effect the
applicant's motivation to continue working. There is no medical
opinion that this problem is solely caused by the industrial
injuries. The medical panel found that the applicant may need
psychiatric care at this point, but that this is the result of
multiple non-industrial factors.
Lastly, there is the Social Security Disability decision to
consider. This decision lists 10 separate medical problems that
contribute to the applicant's disability status (see quote in
Findings of Fact). Four of the problems are clearly unrelated to
the industrial injuries (the 1987 surgeries, hypothyroidism,
depression and passive dependent personality disorder) . There is
a possiblity that the industrial injuries may have contributed in
some degree to the remaining 6 problems listed, but there is no
medical evidence that in fact this is the case.
The medical
records simply do not resolve what has caused or even aggravated
the hand problems, the fibromyalgia, the polyarthritis, the
polypharmacy, the degenerative joint disease or the degenerative
disc disease. Even if one presumed that all of these conditions
were aggravated by the industrial injuries, the medical panel
report indicates that the medical care for thes€i problems is
attributed to the industrial injuries in the same percentages that
is reflected by the impairment percentages.
Once again, even
making a presumption heavily in favor of the applicant, without any
real supporting evidence for such a presumption, the result is that
the industrial injuries contributed little to the need for medical
care related to these problems.
The ALJ feels that there are cases where industrial injuries
involving minimal impairment aggravate pre-existing medical
problems sufficiently to support a finding that the injuries caused
the permanent total disability. There is certainly some merit to
the "straw-that-broke-the-camel's-back" theory.
However, there
needs to be more than just the applicant/s testimony to support
such a theory.
If one can show that there was an need for
increased immediate medical care or a clear period of disability
and inability to work that followed the industrial injury, then the
actual impairment percentage attributed to the industrial injury
takes on less significance. In this case, cis discussed above,
those other factors are not present so as to allow the ALJ to
discount the minimal impairment that the industrial injury or
injuries caused. In addition, the applicant had significant preexisting impairment in the same areas of the body that the
applicant currently indicates are the source of her disaiblity and
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there are many non-industrial injuries that appear to be
influencing her overall disability.
The ALJ finds that the
preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that the
August 15, 1988 injury is the cause of her current permanent total
disability.
The Objections to the Medical Panel Report:
The applicant's attorney objects to the panel's finding that
no temporary total disability (TTD) is attributable to the 1987 or
1988 injuries. Counsel suggests that the panel should' have found
TTD in proportion to the impairment rated by the panel for the
industrial injuries. However, the ALJ believes the panel found no
TTD related to these injuries simply because the facts of the case
reflect that the applicant just kept working after both the 1987
and 1988 injuries. The panel felt there was only TTD of 3 or 4
weeks following the July 9, 1990 incident and the panel was
unwilling to consider this as caused by the 1987 or 1988 injuries.
There is certainly nothing inconsistent in stating that the 3 or 4
weeks of disability following the July 9, 1990 incident was caused
by the July 9, 1990 incident. To the ALJ, the panel's findings
related to the TTD are entirely consistent and logical. Finally,
it is true that Dr. Gaufin and Delvin McFarlane felt the applicant
was disabled in 1991 and 1992, but neither definitively states this
was due to the only compensable injury at issue, the August 15,
1988 accident. As such, the panel's conclusions regarding the TTD
are not refuted by either Dr. Gaufin or Delvin McFarlane.
Counsel for the applicant argues that some portion of the
applicant's depression must be attributed to the applicant's August
15, 1988 industrial injury, because the panel admitted that social
disruption caused by loss of her job was contributing to her
depression.
However, it has not been established that the
applicant lost her job due to the August 15, 1988 industrial
injury. She worked for nearly 2 years following that injury and
thus there is not even a temporal inference that can be made with
respect to the 1988 injury causing the discontinuance of work. The
ALJ finds that the applicant may have stopped working due to the
July 9, 1990 injury, but this is not clearly established as counsel
for the defendants suggests in his response to the applicant's
objections
More than likely, there are a number of reasons for
the applicant's decision to stop working in July of 1990. As the
applicant was being treated for depression as early as 1973, and as
her cessation of work has not been clearly linked to the 1988
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accident, the ALJ does not find inconsistent the panel's conclusion
that the depression is the result on multiple non-industrial
factors.
Concluding Remarks;
The ALJ makes no separate finding with respect to the
applicant's ability to work at this point* It is unnecessary to
rule on this issue since the ALJ finds that any disability that may
exist is not attributable to the August 15, 1988 industrial
accident. However, just as commentary, it does appear that the
applicant is probably totally disabled due to multiple factors as
noted in the Social Security decision.
Because the ALJ feels
sympathy for the applicant and the difficult time she has had, the
ALJ wishes she could just accept the applicant's testimony and
award benefits. Unfortunately, the ALJ feels she cannot ignore the
other substantial evidence that does not support the applicant's
theory of the cause of her disability. The ALJ considered awarding
the applicant just the very minimal permanent partial impairment
(PPI) that is supported by the medical panel report, but it appears
that the carrier has paid alot more TTC (from July 10, 1990 through
March 4, 1991) than is supported by the panel report and this
completely offsets any PPI that would be payable.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for
permanent total disability benefits and any alternative claim for
temporary total compensation or permanent impairment benefits
associated with the industrial injuries of August 15, 1988 and July
9, 1990 is dismissed with prejudice.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and
subject to review or appeal.

the
the
and
not

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge

Certified by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City* Utah, this
^ ^
day of z^£s/*As**^f
.1993.
ATTEST:
/

Patricia O. Ashby /
Commission Secretary

L^
(f
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Appendix C:
Report of Medical Panel

MADISON H. THOMAS. M.D.
• TH A V E N U E & C STREET
SALT LAKE C I T Y . UTAH 84143

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 R 300 SO./P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615
Date of Panel: 27 November 1992
Re: Claudia Cox
Inj:
8-15-88 & 7-9-90
Emp: Utah Power & Light

REPORT OF MEDICAL PANEL
A medical panel consisting of Drs. Wallace E. Hess and Madison H. Thomas, with the latter
as chairman, met to evaluate the case of Claudia Cox, with reference to an injuiy reported to
have occurred on 15 August 1988 and 9 July 1990.
The extensive Summary of Medical Records and Testimony was used as a general guide in
reviewing her case. The file was reviewed by the panel members, and she was examined by
them. X-rays were reviewed.
The applicant indicates that her current symptoms are principally in her neck and back. She
reports that she is never free of pain in the neck. This averages about a 6 on a scale from 1 to
10, and at times goes to a 10. She points to approximately the cervicodorsal junction and
indicates that the pain radiates like a "dagger" to her neck and to the base of her head, which
feels as if it is in a vice-like grip. The pain spreads down her back and to her right shoulder and
to the right shoulder blade and under her arm on the right. The pain is associated with a
tingling, numbing feeling as well. Recently, she indicates the pain has gone towards the left side
of her neck also.
The pain is increased by simply carrying the weight of her head, which feels to her like a 16
pound bowling ball. The pain is increased by sitting. Walking seems to jar her neck and head.
Sitting seems to cause the pain to go up her spine from her back and leaning forward or
standing seems to increase the pain. The pain seems to be increased also by bending or doing
her hair, etc.
The applicant indicates that the pain is helped by her medications. She takes two or three
Fioricets per day. She also takes Soma 350 mg two or three times a day, but indicates she has
not had these paid for for most of the past year. She takes Tylenol # 4 three or four times a
week to relieve pain in other parts of her body, but not particularly pain in her neck. She has
a traction ujiit that sometimes helps, but at other times seems to pull on her shoulders too
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much. She wears a neck collar for walking and sitting, which tends at times to cause muscle
spasm in her better muscles. She often leans against a wall to get relief.
She indicates that she feels discomfort in the thumb and index finger on the right. She feels
she has some decreased feeling in the right hand, so that she occasionally will drop an item such
as a cup. She feels she has a slightly less loss of feeling on the left side, as well. There is a
feeling going from the shoulder down the arm as if she had wrenched it. She is aware that an
EMG was normal. Most of her limited activities are because of her neck problems.
She indicates she gets to bed about 11 p.m., but she does not sleep well. After she awakens in
the morning, it takes about two hours before she can get up and start moving. She then takes
medications and lies on the couch for a time, after which she cleans up the house. Her
daughter comes in to do the vacuuming, sweeping and making the beds. She does her own
cooking in the microwave and uses the dishwasher. She drives her car and shops. She feels that
lifting a quart of milk is about her limit She eats and writes using the right hand.
The applicant indicates her back is her next difficulty. She has pain when she lifts or sits veiy
long. She describes this as at about a 5 or 6 level, increasing at times to a 10. The pain in the
lower back seems to go up towards her neck, and at these times, she has made occasional visits
to the emergency room for pain relief. Her pain increases if she sits for as long as 30 minutes.
She tries to sit through church meetings, but goes home after the first meeting. She lies down
to watch television. She feels that changes in barometric pressure or weather changes may
cause increased back difficulty. She is more miserable in cold weather. She lias not noticed any
effects from coughing or sneezing. She feels as if there is a knot in her lower back, which then
spreads to the right hip region and to her right leg like an electric cord She has continued to
have some numbness in the ball of the right foot, which she indicates has been present since
1988.
The applicant's various symptoms with reference to her neck and back in relation to other
health problems were reviewed with her. It is noted that in Dr. Mombergefs records, there is
a report of low back pain in 1959. The applicant indicates that this related to her having a
spinal anesthetic for delivery of her first son. She reports the pain was low in the pelvic area
and tended to go down towards one spot in her lower back. This gradually cleared In 1962
and 1963, she recalls having back pain and understood that her back would "go crooked," and
she had chiropractic treatments for this.
In 1964, she had a problem with bleeding when she had tonsils and adenoids removed. In 1973
and 74, she recalls having anxiety and depression symptoms and relates this was in a background
of contemplating a divorce. She recalls she cried a great deal for four or five months. She is
noted as having fatigue, anemia, and depression, in a background of phlebitis, chest pain and
palpitations.
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She recalls that sometime before 1976, she went into the hospital for bladder problems, and the
opening was found to be too small, so that this was operated on. She understands Dr. Kezerian
recommended surgery, but Dr. Lamb did not, so that she did exercises instead.
In 1977, she began working at Utah Power.
In 1978, she saw a chiropractor for treatment of her low back problems and continued this for
several years. She recalls that her back would seem to go crooked and one shoulder and hip
would be higher. She understands she had an L4 disc. She recalls lying down on the floor for
relief.
In 1981, she had an otitis media with a perforation. During this time, she continued to see a
chiropractor intermittently.
In 1984, she had a slight heart murmur detected and had breast reconstruction surgery and a
hysterectomy for fibroids.
In 1984, she recalls putting on a stocking when she heard a pop in her back. The pain did not
last long, but she was told that an X-ray showed disc wedging at L4 and 5.
In August 1986, she was bent over when she was lifting up a suitcase and someone bumped into
her. This caused low back pain for a couple of weeks. She continued with chiropractic
treatment during these times.
The applicant reports that on 4 October 1986, she was vacationing in New Mexico at a hot air
balloon festival. She was involved in riding in the back of a pick-up truck in following the
balloon. She was sitting in the back of the truck near the tail gate, leaning against the side of
the truck with her feet extended straight out on the bed of the truck. When the truck hit a dip
in the road, she was bounced upward and then landed back on the bed of the truck again. She
recalls immediate pain in her lower back. She noted pain near the bottom of her spine which
went all the way up to her head, including her neck. In spite of the pain, she helped with
loading up the balloon and indicates partying that night and thinks she may have taken some
alcohol to help control the pain. On the following day, she could scarcely walk. She consulted
a chiropractor who worked on her for about an hour and a half. She used a back brace to ride
in the car to return to Utah. She returned to work. She saw Dr. Sanders for further
chiropractic treatment and then saw Dr. Momberger who suggested Dr. Ward see her for
possible more wide-spread disorder. She continued to be seen at the Mental Health Clinic for
depression while continuing to have chiropractic treatment.
She was then sent to Dr. Gaufin who did a myelogram which caused a severe headache and
kept her in the hospital for two or three days.
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Dr. Gaufin opeiated on her lower back on 5 January 1987 with a foraminotomy and
decompression at L4-5 on the right. The applicant recalled that this relieved her'symptoms for
a time, perhaps up to two months before she began having additional difficulties. He continued
to follow her for her neck symptoms, and on 10 March 1987 did an anterior cervical discectomy
with decompression and interbody fusion at two levels, C4-5 and C5-6. The applicant recalls
that this seemed to relieve the more serious symptoms of her neck and back as well. She did
not seem to have a feeling of bouncing as she did before. She was released for work in August
1987 and returned to work.
In December 1987, the applicant was seen by Dr. Null regarding her symptoms of fatigue. She
understood from him that she had simply been pushing herself too much and feeling stressed
out, trying to work at decorating cakes, in addition to her regular job.
In December 1987, she was at work when she went to sit down on a chair that rolled out from
under her. She fell flat on her buttocks and felt feelings of shock, spasm and nausea at the
time. She felt that she panicked because she thought she might have hurt herself seriously, but
there is no evidence that she was examined or had any special treatment for this at the time,
although she did have a refill of her Soma on 29 December. After this, she recalls she resumed
most of her activities including cake decorating, social dancing, and walking two to three miles
a day. She belonged to an association and other groups and felt she continued to do hard work
at that time. She continued to refill her Soma during this time.
She continued at work and on 15 August 1988, she went to pull out a bottom file drawer with
her right hand while bending over. She got it partly out when it seemed to jam. She felt a
sudden pain in the right arm, shoulder, neck and back. She felt a popping; sensation and had
a sense of nausea. She believes she reported the injury but kept on working because the
staffing was light. She continued to have discomfort but ignored it all until about October when
her neck and head began hurting her more at nighttime. She recalls she saw her doctors about
other things, such as an estrogen refill, a routine mammography, a check of her cholesterol and
for her Soma refills.
She confirmed the fact that she saw Dr. Gaufin on 3 October 1988. He noted that the MRI
showed a stable fusion but with degenerative changes at C6-7. An EMG was noted as normal,
and a lumbar spine film showed a mild bulge at L5-S1 without impingement on nerve roots.
He did not recommend surgery. She continued on with her work, and had physical therapy
during the winter months, which made her sometimes feel better and sometimes feel sick for
a few days. In May 1989, she began having some acupuncture treatments which were sometimes
helpful and sometimes not helpful. She felt she was being treated for every organ in her body.
In November 1989, she had cervical pain and tingling and numbness. In December, she saw Dr.
Towner at Salt Lake Clinic and described a "very active life style." Beginning in December
1989, she had to fill in for a co-worker who was off to have a baby. She had extensive overtime
work and had increasing symptoms during this time. She recalled that Dr. Kotrady had raised
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the question of a pain clinic, but she felt she could not take time off for the two weeks that
would be required.
On 9 July 1990, she had an incident while working at her desk. She turned her head to speak
to someone and developed neck spasms and symptoms spreading down her spine. She
understands that X-rays were unchanged. She checked at the clinic the same day. She also saw
Dr. Potter regarding hot flashes and headaches, and he gave her Prozac. She was seen in
August by Dr. Gaufin, and an MRI showed no major changes. He understands that she was
scheduled for surgery again in April 1991, but since Dr. Gaufin could not guarantee any definite
results, she has been reluctant to consider this. She has continued using her neck brace and
using physical therapy and continuing to take her medications. She underwent various
evaluations and in June and July saw Dr. Potter and Null regarding her various symptoms. She
saw Dr. Heiner for a Social Security evaluation and continued seeing Dr. Potter and it was
noted she had a sensation of drooling from the right side of the mouth, but the applicant can't
recall anything about this.
In November 1991, she reported difficulty closing her hands and additional tests were made.
Studies were normal, as was an MRI of the brain. In March 1992, she developed symptoms of
dizziness and went off medication for a time. She was seen by Delvin McFarlane regarding
counseling, and he felt she had shown some improvement. In April 1992, Dr. Matthews
suggested fibromyalgia syndrome and inflammatory polyarthritis. She was noted to have
hypothyroidism, and this has been treated
The applicant indicates her past general health has been good, and she has a good attendance
record at work. She believes she fractured a clavicle before she started school. She did not
have an appendectomy in 1954, as the reference to this is from someone else's records. She
understands that her thyroid was normal in 1989. She recalled varicose veins and thrombophlebitis in 1974, but has no problems now. She has no further symptoms of pulmonary embolus
and no bladder symptoms. She understands she was checked out for multiple sclerosis or a
brain tumor, and no signs of these were found. She has had variable symptoms of an allergic
rhinitis. She had a perforated ear drum, but feels her hearing is all right now. Her blood
pressure has generally been low in the 100-110 systolic level, but understands a recent reading
was 140/90. She has no impairment of vision and is able to smell without difficulty. In 1983,
she had a tennis elbow, with recovery.
She indicates she currently weighs 150 pounds and was previously 125-130. Height is 5 feet 4
inches. She has an occasional social cocktail but has never smoked and has had no drug
involvement. She has been divorced for the past ten years. She graduated from high school
and had a one quarter course in college when she learned to type. She has had ballet in the
past. She has not worked since July 1990 and was compensated up until March 4, 1991. She
has been denied by Social Security, but understands from some comments made after a recent
meeting, she expects to receive these benefits. She confirmed her past history of periods of
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depression. She recalls particular difficulties when her husband filed for bankruptcy and left
her in 1982. Since then, her job has been her whole social life and she feds it 6ecame too
important to her. She indicates that on holidays when payrolls were due, she would offer to
work holiday time to accomplish this for the company. She sums thus up as "my job was my
life." She has in the past considered suicide, but not currently. In the vrinter of 1991, she
sometimes would sit in the dark. In May of 1991, she cried at night for almost three day.
Reference is made to the psychologic evaluation done in a Dr. Ravsten (Ph.D.) on 12
November 1992. After testing, he indicated his diagnosis of depression in a passive-dependent
personality disorderEXAMINATION:
Examination reveals this 52-year-old female to appear in a good general state of health. She
walks and stands without difficulty, but sits in an unusual position while being interviewed. She
sits tilting back on the chair and tilting her head to the right and backward to rest it on the wall
behind her. She appeared to get up from the examining table in a sideways fashion. When
observed using her soft neck collar, she turned her head and flexed and extended the head
much more freely than was apparent during the formal examination of range of motion, during
which time she performed more like a mannikin. She had a 2 inch lumbar scar and a transverse
hysterectomy scar. She has a posterior cervical laminectomy scar which is well healed
The head showed no abnormality. She has upper and lower dentures. Cranial nerve survey was
not remarkable. Blood pressure was 150/100 and pulse 86 and regular. The heart showed a
mild systolic murmur and lung sounds were normal. Chest expansion was 1 inch.
Examination of the upper extremity showed full range of motion of the shoulders, elbows,
wrists, hands and fingers. There was no atrophy in the hands. The grip was about 50% of
normal strength with hooking the finger muscles to test individual muscles showing at least 90%
on the right and 100% on the left. Ulnar, radial and median nerve function showed normal
function in each of these. The nails were normal and pulse was normal. The upper arm
measured 10 1/4 on the right and 10 1/8 on the left. Forearm measured 9 on each side.
The cervical spine showed 4+ midline tenderness from the occiput to about T3. Lateral
bending was 30 on each side. Flexion was 10*, extension 25° and rotation 35* to the right and
30° to the left. Upward traction tended to relieve her discomfort, but was a<xompanied by pain
in the upper trapezius area. Compression resulted in 4+ report of pain in the neck. There was
1+ tenderness in the right occipital area and 2+ tenderness in the upper trapezius areas
bilaterally.
The dorsal spine showed no abnormal configuration or limitation.
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Lumbosacral spine showed 2+ tenderness in the midline from L4 to S3. There was 1+
tenderness on the right in the superspinatus insertion and sciatic areas. Buttocks tone was good.
Flexion and extension could not be adequately tested because of marked restriction of efforts
to move. Rotation was 35° in each direction and lateral bending was 35° in each direction.
Straight leg raising was 45° on the right, with tightness in the posterior thigh spreading to the
back. The left leg was 50° with no referred limitation. Testing was cog-wheel in its pattern.
The hip showed resistance toflexionabove 75° on theright,with referred pain to the back. The
left showed fullflexion,with variable resistance. External rotation, abduction, internal rotation
and adduction were normal, and strength in all directions was normal.
The knees showed normal configuration, range of motion and strength. The feet and ankles
showed a limitation of dorsiflexion on the right to 70°, with a giveway pattern. The left was
normal. The right big toe showed a 60-100% giveway pattern, and the left showed a 90%, with
similar characteristics. Eversion and inversion were normal on both sides. There was good
plantar flexion. The right leg measured 1/4 inch shorter than the other. The peripheral pulses
were good. The toes and fingers were relatively cool. The legs were well shaved. The thigh
measured 19 3/8 on the right and 18 on the left. The calf measured 13 5/8 on the right and 13
1/2 on the left. She could stand on heels or toes without difficulty and squatting was done
satisfactorily.
Biceps, triceps, knee jerks and ankle jerks were in the hyperactive-normal range and
symmetrical. Babinskis were down. She reported pain on the right Achilles on palpation, with
less on the left.
Sensory examination showed her able to perceive the cotton throughout all areas, except for
reported subjective hypesthesia over the right fifth toe. With cotton, she reported subjective
decrease from the mid palm and wrist downward, including the index finger and thumb, which
were hyperesthetic to a variable degree. The radial 2/3 of the forearm and the lateral half of
the upper arm up to the mid portion of the upper arm was reported subjectively as diminished.
There was a report of decreased sharpness reaching the midline on the face and extending from
the chin to the hairline, as well as over the anterior chest, abdomen and the neck on the right.
This included these areas anteriorly as well as posteriorly, including a midline diminution
involving the entire posterior shoulder area, the right scalp and posterior neck area including
the parietal occipital area. The right ear was reported as dull on the right side, representing
a whole right forequarter subjective diminution. Tuning fork and position sense were
symmetrical and within normal limits. There was subjective diminution of the sharp object to
the upper calf and just above the elbow on the left. There was a variable report of the sharp
object being sharper on the left in the area of the foot extending to the carpal metaphalangeal
area on the right up to the mid foot. She reported the sharp object was duller on the bottom
of both feet.
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Assuming but not deciding that the applicant was involved in circumstances as outlined, the
panel concludes in terms of reasonable medical probability as follows:
1)

There is a medically demonstrable causal connection between symptoms or problems
experienced by the applicant as noted in the Summary and the conditions or injuries
existing prior to October 4,1986 incident, the October 4, 1986 incident, the December
1987 incident, the 15 August 1988 incident, and the 9 July 1990 incident.
We have interpreted, the question as applying to symptoms throughout the course of the
applicant's history which were aggravations of an underlying condition and caused
increased symptomatology for a time, at least, in relationship to the incidents.

2)

The period of time during which the applicant has been temporarily totally disabled as
a result of the above incidents is as follows:
December 1987 - None.
15 August 1987 - None.
9 July 1990 - Three or four weeks resulting from the aggravation of her underlying
difficulties.

3)

The applicant's condition has stabilized sufficiently that a percentage of permanent
impairment can be determined

4)

The percentage of permanent impairment attributable to the various pre-existing and
other incidents is as shown on the following table:
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% WHOLE PERSON IMPAIRMENT

1

Prior to
Oct
\ Whole
; Person '
1986
!

Cervical spine: surgically treated
disc lesion, with multiple levels
(9+2+6 ROM = 17% WP)
Lower back: surgically treated
disc lesion, with residual pain
I and limitation of ROM
(9+5 = 14% WP)
Hypothyroidism: treated, not
related to injuries

5)

%

4
Oct
1986

Dec
1987

15 : ^ 9
Aug • Jul
1988 \ 1990

17%

10%

70%

5%

15%

0% J

14%

25%

70% , 3%

2%

0%

-

-

5%

-

-

-

A- Impairment assignable to conditions prevailing prior to 1986 and to the October 4,
1986 accident were symptomatic.
Comment: It is quite clear that the applicant solicited extensive chiropractic help for
both of these circumstances.
B. The impairment was permanently aggravated by the occurrences of 1987,1988 and
1990.

6)

The medical care the applicant has received since December 1987 has been necessitated
by the three industrial incidents in proportion to the reported contribution to the
impairment.

7)

The proposed cervical surgery previously recommended by Dr. Gaufin does not seem
likely to be considered necessary in view of the total status of the applicant at this time,
but should a future event suggest it should be carried out, it would be necessitated by
Vae more recent of the incidents noted in the above table. It seems reasonable the
proportion should be distributed in proportion to the present impairment as indicated
in the above table.
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8)

Future medical treatment reasonably required in treating the applicant's problems
resulting from the industrial accidents is infrequent orthopedic or neurosurgical followup with counsel with reference to her continuing exercise programs, appropriate
activities, etc*
Comment: The panel agrees with the recent clinical psychologic evaluation that the
applicant's present major symptoms of depression in a background of pre-existing
personality disorder were not caused primarily by any of the industrial or non-industrial
injuries, except to the extent that the social disruption of limited social activities is
involved. Her symptoms do not appear to stem directly from any injury, itself, but from
the natural consequences of loss of work and other restrictions which are social rather
than physical injury based. While she may need access to psychiatric treatment,
counseling and medications for her depression, it is felt this is a result of multiple nonindustrial factors influencing her.
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Members of the panel will be happy to try and respond to any additional qi^tidns if it would
be helpful.
Respectfully submitted,

Madison H. Thomas, M.D.
Panel Chairman

Wallace E. Hess, M.D.
Panel Member
MHTxsw
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(801)748-2127
NOTE TO PROCESSING CENTER
FURTHER ACTION N2CES5ARY
DEPARTMENT OP
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Social Security Administration
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
Refer to : 528-74-9096
Claudia A. Cox
P.O. Box 273
Orangeville, UT 84537
NOTICE OF FAVORABLE DECISION - PLEASE READ CAREFULLY
This Decision Is Favorable To You
• Another office will process the decision.
notice from that office.

You will receive a

• Your local Social Security office or another office may ask
you to give more information before you receive the notice. If
so, please answer promptly.
• If you hear nothing about this decision for 60 days, please
contact your local Social Security office.
If You Think the Decision is Wrong
• You have the right to appeal. You must file your appeal
within 60 days from the date you receive this notice. (It will
be presumed that you received the notice within 5 days after the
date shown below, unless you show us that you did not receive it
within the 5-day period.)
• When you appeal, you request the Appeals Council to review the
decision. If the Appeals Council grants your request, it~will
review the entire record in your case. It will review those
parts of the decision which you think are wrong. It will also
review those parts which you think are correct and may make them
unfavorable or less favorable to you. You will receive a new
decision.
• You (or your representative) have to ask for the appeal in
writing. You may sign a form HA-520, called "Request for Review
by the Appeals Council," or write a letter.
• You may submit your appeal to your local Social Security
office, a hearing office, or mail it directly to the Appeals
Council, Office of Hearings and Appeals, P.O. Box 3200,
Arlington, VA 22203.

OCOol

2

The Appeals Council Kay Review the Decision on it? Own Motion
• Within 60 days f\ urn the date shown below, the Appeals Council
may review the decision on its own motion. This could change the
decision.
• After the 60-day period, the Appeals Council may reopen and
revise the decision in certain situations.
• The Appeals Council will notify you if it decides to review
the decision on its own motion or to reopen and revise the
decision.
Unless you request review or the Appeals Council reviews the
decision on its own motion, you may not obtain ci court review of
your case (sections 205(g), 1631(c)(3) or 1869(b) of the Social
Security Act).
This notice and the enclosed copy of
decision mailed
December 21, 1992

cc:
Name and Address of Representative
•

Chon Kandaris
Utah Legal Services
23 S. Carbon Ave., Suite 4
Price, UT 84501
(801)637-3049
Replaces Form HA-L502-U7
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NOTE TO PROCESSING CFNTFR
FURTHER ACTION N3CE-3SAR*
DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Social Security Administration
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
DECISION
IN THE CASE OF

Claudia A. Cox
(Claimant)
(Wage Earner)

CLAIM FOR

Period of Disability and
Disability Insurance Benefits
528-74-9096
(Social Security Number)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case is before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a
request for hearing filed by the claimant, who is dissatisfied
with the previous determinations finding that she is not
disabled.
The claimant appeared and testified at the hearing, represented
by Chon Kandaris, a non-attorney representative. At the request
of the ALJ, G. Barrie Nielson appeared and testified as a
vocational expert.
ISSUES
The issues in this case are whether the claimant is under a
disability as defined by the Social Security Act and if so, when
her disability commenced, the duration of the disability, and
whether the insured status requirements of the Act are met for
the purpose of entitlement to a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits.
EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE
After a thorough evaluation of the entire record, it is concluded
that the claimant has been disabled since July 9, 1990, and met
the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on
that date and thereafter, through December 31, 1995.
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The claimant was 50 years old on the date her disability began.
The claimant has a 12th grade education. The claimant has not
engaged in any substantial gainful activity since the disability
onset date.
The claimant has the following impairments which are considered
to be "severe11 under the Social Security Act and Regulations: a
history of lumbar disk surgery in January 1987, and cervical disc
surgery in March 1987; post traumatic right, greater than left,
hand numbness with decreased grip and intermittent hand pain;
fibromyalgia syndrome;" inflammatory polyarthritis; polypharmacy;
hypothyroidism; degenerative joint disease; degenerative disc
disease; depression; and passive dependant personality disorder.
These impairments prevent the claimant from sustaining work
activities. The claimant's condition fluctuates. She has some
good days but the bad days out number the good days. Overall,
she has a residual functional capacity for less than a full range
of sedentary work.
The claimant's description of her limitations is
the record when considered in its entirety. The
perform her past relevant work and does not have
skills to perform other work within her residual
capacity.

consistent with
claimant cannot
transferable
functional

Given the claimant's residual functional capacity, and the
vocational factors of her age, education and past relevant work
experience, there are no jobs existing in significant numbers
that the claimant is capable of performing. The claimant is
under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act and
Regulations.
FINDINGS
After consideration of the entire record, the Administrative Law
Judge makes the following findings:
1.

The claimant met the insured status requirements of the Act
on July 9, 1990. The claimant has not performed any
substantial gainful activity since July 9, 1990.

2.

The claimant's impairments which are considered to be
"severe" under the.Social Security Act are a history of
lumbar disk surgery in January 1987, and cervical disc
surgery in March 1987; post traumatic right, greater than
left, hand numbness with decreased grip and intermittent
hand pain; fibromyalgia syndrome; inflammatory
polyarthritis; polypharmacy; hypothyroidism; degenerative
joint disease; degenerative disc disease; depression; and
passive dependant personality disorder.
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3.

The claimant's impairments do not meet or equal in severity
the appropriate medical findings contained in 20 CFR Part
404, Appendix 1 to Subpart P (Listing of Impairments).

4.

The claimant's allegations are found to be credible.

5.

The claimant's impairments prevent her from sustaining work
activities. The claimant's condition fluctuates. She has
some good days but the bad days out number the good days.

6.

The claimant is unable to perform her past relevant work.

7.

The claimant was 50 years old on the date disability began,
which is defined as closely approaching advanced age. The
claimant has a high school education.

8.

The claimant does not have transferable skills to perform
other work within her physical and mental residual
functional capacity.

9.

Based upon the claimant's residual functional capacity, and
vocational factors, there are no jobs existing in
significant numbers which she can perform. This finding is
based upon the framework of Medical-Vocational Rule 201.14,
2 0 CFR Part 4 04, Appendix 2 to Subpart P, and the testimony
of the Vocational Expert.

10.

The claimant has been under a disability as defined by the
Social Security Act and Regulations since July 9, 1990.
DECISION

Based on the Title II application filed on April 9, 1991, the
claimant is entitled to a period of disability beginning on July
9, 1990, and to disability insurance benefits under sections
216(i) and 223, respectively, of the Social Security Act,-and the
claimant's disability has continued through at least the date of
this decision.

Robin L.Uterine
Administrative Law Judge

December 21, 1992
Date
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2

4
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3
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Request for Hearing, filed 7-7-92
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7
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8

8
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6

10
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1
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14

23
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Appendix E:
Industrial Commission Order

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6600
CLAUDIA COX,

*
Applicant,

*
*

v.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT, ENERGY
MUTUAL INSURANCE and EMPLOYERS'
REINSURANCE FUND,
Respondents.

*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*
*
*

Case No. 92000255

*

?-l6

c?

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) reviews the
motion for review of respondent in the above captioned matter,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63
-46b-12.
The provisions of U.C.A. Sections 35-1-1 et. seq. are
applicable in this case.
The order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) is presumed to
be lawful and reasonable "until it is found otherwise in an action
brought for that purpose, or until altered or revoked by the
commission." U.C.A. Section 35-1-20 (1953).
The statutes further provide that:
A substantial compliance with the requirements of
this title [Title 35] shall be sufficient to give
effect to the orders of the commission, and they
shall not be declared inoperative, illegal or void
for any omission of a technical nature.
U.C.A. Section 35-1-33 (1953).
The Commission has "the duty ... and ... full power,
jurisdiction, and authority to ... administer and enforce all laws
for the protection of life, health, safety, and welfare of
employees," U.C.A. Section 35-1-16(1)(a)(1953), and to "consider
and determine" the matters in issue, U.C.A. Section 35-1-24 (1953).
Additional evidence that the Commission has been granted
discretion in its determinations is shown by U.C.A. Section 35-1-88
(1965) which provides:
...The commission may make its investigation in
such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the
parties and to carry out justly the spirit of
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the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The preceding statute relates to matters at hearing, and
shows the extent to which the legislature desired to provide the
Commission with the necessary discretion to reach a decision. This
statute also provides the authority for the Commission to deviate
from common-law rules, statutory rules of evidence, technical or
formal rules of procedure, unless provided for in the workers'
compensation act, or unless otherwise adopted by Commission rules.
Id.
Thus, the statutes expressly and impliedly give the
Commission, commensurate with its statutory duty, broad authority
and discretion to interpret, construe, consider, and determine the
matters before it in the workers' compensation arena.
The applicant filed this motion for review challenging the
ALJ's ruling that she failed to prove that her permanent total
disability ("PTD") was caused by her industrial accident of August
15, 1988. The applicant argues that she is entitled to benefits
because she showed a "medically demonstrable causal link11 under
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986) between
her August 15, 1988 industrial accident and her disability. The
respondent asserts that Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d
954 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988) requires that a claimant "prove medically
that his disability was caused by an industrial accident."
Finally, the applicant asserts that under the odd-lot doctrine, she
is entitled to PTD benefits.
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, the Utah Supreme Court held
that a claimant for workers' compensation benefits who has a preexisting condition must prove both legal and medical causation1
before he is entitled to benefits. The Court discussed the causal
connection required to sustain a claim for permanent total
disability benefits in Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheeting Co.. 717
P.2d 718 (Utah 1986). Hodges requires that a claimant for
permanent total disability benefits prove that his disability was
caused by an industrial accident. Id. at 721. The Utah Court of
Appeals applied Allen and Hodges to sustain the commission's denial
of benefits to a PTD claimant whose disability was determined to be
the result of pre-existing conditions and not an industrial
1

Legal causation requires a showing that the employment
contributed something substantial to increase the risk he already
faced in everyday life because of his pre-existing condition.
Medical causation requires a showing that the disability is
medically the result of an exertion or injury that occurred during
work related activity. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d
15, 27 (Utah 1986).
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accident. Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Ut. Ct.
App. 1988).
It is important to note that there is a distinction between
the terms "impairment" and "disability." "Impairment" is a medical
appraisal of the "nature and extent of the patient's illness or
injury as it affects his personal efficiency in one or more of the
activities of daily living." "Disability" is the worker's
impairment of earning capacity. Northwest Carriers, Inc. v.
Industrial Commission, 639 P.2d 138, 140, n. 3 (Utah 1951). A
determination of whether a claimant is permanently and totally
disabled is a question of fact.
On review, an ALJ's
determination of factual issues must be supported by substantial
evidence in the record. Grace Drilling v. Board of Review. 776
P.2d 63 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). We will review the record to
determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the ALJ's finding that the applicant did not become
permanently and totally disabled as a result of her August 15, 1988
industrial injury.
Review of the medical records shows that the applicant first
sought chiropractic care from Castle Chiropractic for lumbo-sacral
strain in September 1978. She continued to see her chiropractor as
needed through November 1991. In October 1986, the applicant was
riding in the back of a pickup truck chasing a hot air balloon in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, when the truck hit a dip in the road which
caused her to bounce up off the bed of the truck and land hard on
her buttocks in a seated position. She sought emergency
chiropractic care that evening at Care More Chiropractic in
Albuquerque, and was provided a back brace for her trip home to
Utah.
Upon her return, the applicant was treated by Dr. R. Sanders
at Castle Chiropractic Center. Dr. Sanders referred her to Dr.
Gaufin at the Utah Neurological Clinic on November 24, 1986. Dr.
Gaufin diagnosed acute and chronic lumbar radiculopathy secondary
to a centrally herniated L4-5 disc, mild disc bulge L3-4, cervical
radiculopathy secondary to encroachment upon the nerve roots at C45 and C5-6 bilaterally and prescribed pain medication. Dr. Gaufin
performed a semi-hemi laminotomy, foraminotomy and nerve root
decompression at L4-5 on the right at Utah Valley Regional Medical
Center on January 5, 1987. He performed an anterior cervical
discectomy with nerve root decompression and interbody fusion at
C4-5 and C5-6 on March 10, 1987.
The applicant was released to return to work on August 5, 1987
and sought follow up care with her family physician at Emery
Medic 1 Clinic. The medical records show that the applicant saw
her doctor primarily for medication refills during the period from
August 5, 1987 to December 14, 1987.

001*8

Claudia Cox
Order
Page four
Sometime during December 1987, the exact date is not noted in
the record, the applicant suffered the first of three alleged
industrial injuries. As she attempted to sit at her desk, her
chair which was equipped with wheels, rolled away and she fell to
the floor landing on her buttocks. The applicant sought no
immediate medical care as a result of this fall, but did refill her
prescription for Soma on December 29, 1987. The applicant missed
no work and no Employer's First Report of Injury was filed for this
incident. The application for a hearing alleged that the applicant
suffered industrial accidents on August 15, 1988 and July 9, 1990.
The ALJ considered the December 1987 injury irrelevant to the
applicant's PTD claim.
A second industrial incident occurred on August 15, 1988. The
applicant was doing work for one of her co-workers, Carma O'Brien,
who was off that day. As the applicant attempted to open the
bottom drawer of Ms. O'Brien's file cabinet, the drawer stuck and
the applicant felt something give in the middle of her back, and
her neck, shoulder and right arm felt wrenched. She completed her
shift on August 15, 1988 and continued to work thereafter. The
applicant testified that, following this accident, she took pain
medications and muscle relaxants daily and went straight to bed
after work. There were no immediate doctor's visits associated
with the August 15, 1988 injury.
The first mention of the December 1987 and August 15, 1988
accidents in the medical records was in Dr. Gaufin's office note
dated October 3, 1988. Dr. Gaufin referred the applicant for an
MRI of her cervical and lumbar spine. The cervical films were read
to show a stable fusion at C4-5 and C5-6, and degenerative disc
disease at C6-7, producing a bar type defect obliterating the
thecal sac and impinging on the nerve roots bilaterally, greater on
the right than the left. The lumbar films showed no evidence of a
recurrent disc injury, but a mild bulge not impinging on the nerve
root or thecal sac was noted at L5-S1. Nerve conduction tests
performed on October 7, 1988 were read as normal by Dr. J. Andrews
at Western Neurological Associates. In a November 23, 1988 letter
to Dr. Kotrady at Emery Medical Center, Dr. Gaufin opined that the
applicant's industrial accidents had aggravated a pre-existing mild
degenerative change at C6-7 and created a mild bulge at L5-S1.
Conservative treatment was recommended.
The applicant continued to use pain medications and muscle
relaxants. She also tried physical therapy and acupuncture for
pain control. The applicant continued to work, although she
testified that her daughter helped with housework and she was
unable to engage in her hobby of cake decorating. However, the
applicant worked overtime between January and April of 1990 after a
co-worker failed to return from maternity leave. In May 1990, the
applicant complained of pain down her right arm, numbness in her
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right hand, constant headaches, and pain in the right leg with
parasthesias in the toes after walking. Dr. Kotrady wrote Dr.
Gaufin on July 2, 1990 recommending that the applicant be
reevaluated by Gaufin. Kotrady stated that he would recommend a
pain clinic if Gaufin determined that surgery was not the
recommended course of treatment. Dr. Kotrady believed that there
was an emotional stress component blocking successful treatment of
the applicant's symptoms.
On July 9, 1990, the applicant suffered her final industrial
incident. She was sitting at her desk and turned her head,
bringing on muscle spasms in her neck and spine. The applicant
went to the Emery Medical Center that day and a cervical X-ray was
made which showed no changes from previous studies. An acute
strain was diagnosed and Soma and Lortab were prescribed. Physical
therapy was postponed until after the applicant saw Dr. Gaufin.^ An
MRI was done on at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center on August 9,
1990. The MRI showed no major changes since the previous MRI
performed on October 7, 1988. This incident is not a compensable
industrial accident under Allen, because the applicant's employment
did not contribute anything substantial to increase the risk she
already faced in nonemployment life.
Dr. Gaufin examined the applicant on August 15, 1990. He
opined that the applicant had acute chronic cervical radiculopathy
secondary to spondylosis and protrusion of the disc at C6-7
bilaterally. He recommended surgery to decompress the nerve roots,
but the applicant did not want surgery at that time. Dr. Gaufin
recommended that the applicant avoid jolting or jarring the neck#
use of a soft cervical collar, cervical traction taught by a
physical therapist, and anti-inflammatory and muscle relaxants. In
January 1991, Dr. Gaufin gave the applicant a 33% whole person
impairment rating due to her industrial injuries.
On April 29, 1991 Dr. Harris examined the applicant upon the
insurance carrier's request. He gave the applicant a 34%
impairment rating, but apportioned the majority of the rating to
1986 nonindustrial injury and subsequent surgeries.
The applicant saw Dr. Potter for depression and headaches in
June and July 1991. On October 25, 1991 the applicant's request
for Social Security disability benefits was denied. The Social
Security Administration determined in an order dated October 25,
1991, that the applicant could work an 8-hour day with normal
breaks. The applicant saw Dr. Potter on November 7, 1991, and he
noted that the applicant was having problems closing her hands.
Dr. Watkins, r neurologist, saw the applicant on December 20, 1991.
He ordered a nerve conduction velocity test, EMG's of both arms and
a MRI of the Drain, all of which were within normal limits. On
March 5, 1992, Dr. Watkins reported that the applicant had
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developed dizziness, had gone off all medications, and was taking
meclizine for the dizziness.
A March 31, 1992 functional capacity evaluation at Carbon
Emery Physical Therapy classified the applicant for light/sedentary
work. The report noted that the applicant was not in control of
her pain and was limited by her fear of reinjury. Dr. Matthews
diagnosed the applicant with fibromyalgia syndrome and inflammatory
polyarthritis on April 6, 1992. He also tested her for multiple
sclerosis, lyme disease and hypothyroidism. He returned a
diagnosis of hypothyroidism and chronic pain on June 1, 1992. Dr.
Potter, on May 19# 1992, noted hand pain, leg swelling and
diagnosed possible fibromyacitis and fatigue.
A Career Guidance Center report dated June 15, 1992 concluded
that there were jobs available for which the applicant was trained,
but that it might be difficult for the applicant to find an
employer willing to accommodate her disabilities. The applicant is
a high school graduate with a 20 year work history in retail sales,
accounting and clerical positions. She believes that she can no
longer perform these types of work due to her inability to sit and
work for long periods at a desk or to bend, lift, reach and stand
as required in retail sales.
The ALJ referred this matter to a medical panel for an
apportionment of the applicant's impairment among several possible
causes. The medical panel attributed 1.27 % of the applicant's
permanent impairment to her December 1987 accident, 2.83% of the
applicant's permanent impairment to her August 15, 1988 accident,
and 33.17% to various pre-existing causes. No permanent impairment
was attributed to the July 9, 1990 incident. The medical panel
further concluded that the applicant's depression and pre-existing
personality disorder were caused by non-industrial factors.
The applicant received Social Security disability benefits
pursuant to a decision dated December 21, 1992. The decision
stated that the following impairments were relevant to the award of
disability benefits:
[A] history of lumbar disc surgery in January
1987, and cervical disc surgery in March 1987;
post traumatic right, greater than left, hand
numbness with decreased grip and intermittent
hand pain; fibromyalgia syndrome; inflammatory
polyarthritis; polypharmacy; hypothyroidism;
degenerative joint disease; degenerative disc
disease; depression; and passive dependent
personality disorder.
The Social Security Administration decision lists 10 separate
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medical problems which contribute to the applicant's disability
status. Four of those medical problems are clearly unrelated to
the applicant's industrial injuries (the 1987 surgeries,
hypothyroidism, depression and passive dependant personality
disorder). The industrial injuries may have contributed to the
other six conditions, but the medical evidence does not show a
causal connection between the applicant's hand problems,
fibromyalgia, polyarthritis, polypharmacy, degenerative joint
disease, and degenerative disc disease and the applicant's
industrial accident of August 15, 1988. The medical panel assigned
95% of the applicant's 14% lower back impairment and 80% of the
applicant's 17% cervical spine impairment to the applicant's
balloon chasing accident and other pre-existing impairments. The
relatively small proportion of the applicant's impairment that was
attributed to the industrial accident of August 15, 1988, is, in
our view, insufficient to support a finding that the applicant's
permanent total disability was caused by that industrial accident.
Therefore, the applicant has not proved by a preponderance of
the evidence that her disability was caused by her industrial
accident of August 15, 1988. Therefore, under Hodges and Large,
she is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits. The
applicant's claim for permanent total disability benefits under the
odd-lot doctrine likewise fails due to the lack of a causal
connection between the industrial accident and her permanent total
disability. We therefore, find that the ALJ's finding that the
applicant is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits is
supported by substantial evidence in the record.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the Order of the administrative law judge
dated February 4, 1993 is hereby affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days from the date of this order,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86,
and 63-46b-16, and Couriers v. Dept. of Employment Security, 201
Ut. Adv. Rep. 79 (CA 12/04/92). The requesting party shall bear
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all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals
purposes.

S t e p h e n M. Had1ey_
CJtiair^nan
0 /
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Commissioner
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Commission Secretary
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ALLEN v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N
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Cite as 729 P2A 15 (Utah 1986)

Robert A. ALLEN, Plaintiff,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Board of
Review, Jer Ken, Inc., State Insurance
Fund and Second Injury Fund, Defendants.
No. 20026.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 14, 1986.
Worker, who sustained lower back injuries while stacking milk crates containing
four to six gallons of milk, sought review
of an order of the Industrial Commission,
denying his motion for review of an order
of an administrative law judge denying his
workers' compensation claim. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1)
finding that worker's injury was not "by
accident" was not based on the evidence
and, thus, was erroneous, but (2) worker's
claim would be remanded for further fact
finding as to whether action of worker,
who had previous back problems, in lifting
several piles of milk crates exceeded exertion which average person typically undertook in nonemployment life and whether
medically demonstrable causal link existed
between worker's lifting and injury to his
back.
Vacated and remanded.
Hall, CJ., filed opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part, with Stewart,
Associate C J., joining in the dissent
Stewart, Associate CJ., dissented and
filed opinion.
1. Evidence ^=»I8
Supreme Court took judicial notice that
liquid milk weighs about the same as liquid
water or approximately eight and one-third
pounds per gallon; thus, four gallons of
milk weigh about S3 pounds without the
containers and crate, and six gallons of
milk weigh about 50 pounds without containers and crate.

2. Workers* Compensation *»515
For purposes of workers' compensation, key requirement of an "accident" is
that occurrence be unanticipated, unplanned, and unintended; where either
cause of injury or result of exertion is
different from what would normally be expected to occur, occurrence is unplanned,
unforeseen, and unintended and, thus, by
"accident"; clarifying Catling v. Industrial Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d
202. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Workers' Compensation e=»515
For purposes of workers' compensation, proof of unusual event may be" helpful
in determining causal connection between
injury and employment; however, proof of
unusual event is not required as an element
of requirement that injury be "by accident" U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
4. Workers* Compensation *=»515
An "accident," for purposes of requirement that injury be "by accident" to be
compensable under Workers' Compensation
Act, is an unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be either the cause or the
result of an injury; abandoning Redman
Warehousing
Corp.
v.
Industrial
Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283;
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590
P.2d 328 (Utah); Farmer's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah);
Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722
(Utah); Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah). U.C.A.1953,
35-1-45.
5. Workers' Compensation fc=*568
Key question in workers' compensation
case in determining causation is whether,
given worker's body and worker's exertion,
the exertion in fact contributed to the injury. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
6. Workers' Compensation e»552, 568
Only those injuries which occur because some condition or exertion required
by employment increases risk of injury
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which worker normally faces in his everyday life is compensable under Workers
Compensation Act; injuries which coincidentally occur at work because preexist*' .b
condition results in symptoms which appear
during work hours without any enhancement from the work place are not compensable. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
7. Workers' Compensation ®»597
For purposes of workers' compensation, two-part causation test, requiring consideration of legal cause and medical cause
of injury, is required in determining whether causal connection exists between injury
and worker's employment; abandoning
Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674
P.2d 104 (Utah); Sabo's Elec. Serv. v.
Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah), Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Indiestrial Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah);
IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828
(Utah); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144
(Utah); Jones v. California Packing
Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640; Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109 Utah
25, 163 P.2d 331; Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Assfn v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d 233; Kaiser
Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888
(Utah); Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah); Residential and
Commercial Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah);
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19
Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740; Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405
P.2d 613; Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961.
U.C.A.1953, 3&-1-45.
8. Workers' Compensation &=>55Z
Where claimant suffers from preexisting condition which contributes to injury,
unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove "legal causation," for purposes of two-part causation test for determining whether causal connection exists
between claimant's injury and claimant's
employment; where there is no preexisting
condition, a usual or an ordinary exertion is

sufficient to prove legal causation. U.C.A.
1953, 35-1-45.
9. Workers' Compensation <*=>597
For purposes of legal causation element of two-part test for determining
whether causal connection erists between
claimant's injury and claimant's employment, precipitating exertion must be compared with usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life of people in
general, not nonemployment life of the particular claimant in question. U.C.A.1953,
35-1-45.
10. Workers' Compensation £»597
Under medical causation portion of
two-part test for determining whether
causal connection exists between claimant's
injury and claimant's employment, claimant
must show by evidence, opinion, or otherwise that stress, strain, or exertion required by his or her occupation led to resulting injury or disability. U.C.A.1953,
35-1-45.
1J. Workers' Compensation <*=>1390
Evidence of ordinariness or usualness
of employee's exertions may be relevant to
medical conclusion of causal connection between claimant's injury and claimant's employment U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45.
12. Workers' Compensation <*=>1533
Finding that claimant's lower back injury was not "by accident" as claimant was
stacking milk crates was not based on the
evidence and, thus, was erroneous; claimant experienced unexpected and unanticipated injury to his back as he lifted crate
of milk in cramped area of cooler, claimant
had not complained of pain or limitations at
his job, and no evidence indicated that injury was predictable or developed gradually
as with occupational disease or progressive
back disorder. U.C.A.1953, 35--1-45.
13. Workers' Compensation «==1950
Compensation claim of worker, who
had preexisting back problems and sustained lower back injuries while stacking
crates containing four to six gallons of
milk, was remanded for further fact finding on issue as to whether moving and
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lifting several piles of crates wei,ghin£ 30 ment of bed rest and medication, A myeloto 50 pounds in confined area of cooler gram finally revealed a herniated disc, and
exceeded exertion average person typically the claimant spent ten days in traction in
undertook in nonemployment life and the hospital in early January. He did not
whether there was medically demonstrable •return to work.
causal link between worker's action in liftThe claimant also testified he had a histoing milk crates and injury to his back and, ry of prior back injuries, including a fall
thus, ultimately, whether his injury "arose from a telephone pole at age fourteen
out of or in the course of employment." which required him to wear a back brace
ILC.A.1953, 35-1-45.
for several months, a back injury in 1977
while lifting sand bags for the Logan
Michael E. Bulson, Ogden, for plaintiff. School District, and another fall while
working for that employer when he slipped
Gilbert Martinez, Salt Lake City, for Sec- on a slick concrete ramp and broke his
ond Injury.
coccyx. None of the prior injuries resulted
Fred R. Silvester, James R. Black, Salt in prolonged absences from work.
Lake City, for State Ins. Fund.
The testimony from other sources varied
slightly from the report given by the claimDURHAM, Justice:
ant The employer's report of injury deClaimant Robert A. Allen seeks a review scribes the accident as "picking up freight
from the Industrial Commission's denial of and stocking it on shelves, lifting boxes
his motion for review of an administrative and stacking them from truck." No speciflaw judge order denying him compensation ic event was mentioned in the employer's
for a back injury sustained at work. For report. The medical records of treating
the reasons stated below, we reverse and physicians described the claimant's previremand.
ous injuries, but omitted any reference to a
[1] On November 23, 1982, the claim- specific incident in the cooler. Dr. Hannan,
ant, aged 36, was employed as night man- who examined the claimant on December
ager of Kent's Foods. The claimant testi- 81, 1982, wrote, "He does not remember
fied to the following version of events at a any distinct episode as having precipitated
hearing before an administrative law his current problem, however." And in a
judge. The claimant was working in a letter from Dr. Bryner to Dr. Wright dated
confined cooler in the store stacking crates, January 13, 1983, the claimant's history
containing four to six gallons1 of milk, was related as follows: "About six weeks
from the floor onto a cooler shelf. While ago, however, he was lifting material at
lifting one crate to about chest level, he work, and recalls no specific injury or
suddenly felt a sharp pain in his lower stress but developed discomfort in his left
back. He immediately set down the crate groin area which ultimately extended into
and asked another employee to continue his big toe."
stocking the shelves. The claimant completed the one-half hour remaining in his
shift doimj desk work. That night the pain
increased, and by morning his left leg felt
numb. Four or five days later, he saw Dr.
Ivan Wright about his back problem. Initial doctor visits during December were
followed through with the prescribed treat-

The administrative law judge found that
the claimant's injury to his back on November 23, 1982, was not "an injury by accident arising out of or in the course of
employment" It is apparent that the administrative law judge, using a specific episode analysis, concluded there was no "accident" because there was no identifiable

1. We take judicial notice that liquid milk weighs
about the same as liquid water or approximately
8V3 pounds per gallon. Thus, four gallons of
milk weigh about 33 pounds without the con-

tainers and crate. Six gallons of milk weigh
approximately 50 pounds without the containers
and crfete.
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event that caused the injury and because
lifting the crates of milk was a routine and
commonplace exertion expected of the job.
The administrative law judge analogized
the facts of this case to Farmer's Grain
Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah
1980), where a gradually developed back
injury was held to be not compensable
where the condition worsened without the
intervention of any external occurrence or
trauma.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the
claimant, who had suffered preexisting
back problems and was injured as the result of an exertion usual and typical for his
job, was injured "by accident arising out of
or in the course of employment" as required by the Workers' Compensation Act,
U.C.A., 1953, § 3&-1-45 (Supp.1986). That
Act, in pertinent part, provides:
Every employee . . . who is injured . . .
by accident arising out of or in the
course of his employment . . . shall be
paid compensation for loss sustained on
account of the injury
Id This statute creates two prerequisites
for a finding of a compensable injury.
First, the injury must be "by accident"
Second, the language "arising out of or in
the course of employment'' requires that
there be a causal connection between the
injury and the employment. See Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657
P.2d 1367, 1370 (Utah 1983). Prior decisions by this Court have often failed to
distinguish the analysis of the accident
question from the discussion of causation
elements.2 As a result, this Court and the
Commission are faced with confusing and
often inconsistent precedent For this rea-

son we now undertake a fresh look at the
policy ard historical background of the
workers' compensation statute in an attempt \r )rovide a clear and workable rule
for future application by the Commission.
I.
The term "by accident" is not defined in
the workers' compensation statutes. The
most frequently referenced authority for
the definition of "'by accident" is the case
of Carting v. Industrial Commission, 16
Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (] 965), where the
term was defined as follows:
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated,
unintended occurrence different from
what would normally be expected to occur in the usual course of events
[Tjhis is not necessarily restricted to
some single incident which happened suddenly at one particular time and does not
preclude the possibility that due to exertion, stress or other repetitive cause, a
climax might be reached in such manner
as to properly fall within 1-he definition of
an accident as just stated above. However, such an occurrence must be distinguished from gradually developing conditions which are classified as occupational
diseases
Id at 261-62, 399 VM at 203 (citing Jones
v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah
612, 616, 244 P.2d 640, €42 (1952), and
Purity Biscuit Co v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949)).
Some confusion hits developed as to whether "by accident" requires proof of an unusual event This issue frequently arises
when the employee suffers an internal failure* brought about by exertions in the

2. We note that many of our prior opinions so
stantive support in the record." Id. at 726 (footintermingled the causation and accident analynotes omitted). See also Chutch of Jesus Christ
ses that it is impossible to segregate them and
of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm'n, 590
determine the basis for the Court's decision.
P.2d 328. 329-30 (Utah 1979); Pmtar v. IndustriFor example, the opinion in Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. al Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 276, 382 P.2d 414 (1963).
Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982). mixes the acciFor an example of an opinion which does sepadent and causation elements in the following
rate the accident and causation analysis, see
language I t appears to be mere coincidence
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
that defendant's injury . . occurred at work.
Industrial Comm'n, 590 P.2d 328, 330-31 (Utah
Defendant bears the burden of showing other1979) (Wilkms. J., dissenting).
wise. Proof of the causal relationship of duties
of employment to unexpected injury is simply 3. An "internal failure" refers to a category of
injuries that arise from general organ or struclacking
[T]he Commission's conclusion
tural failure brought alwut by an exertion in the
that an accident occurred is without any sub-
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workplace. It is clear, however, that our
cases have defined "by accident" to include
internal failures resulting from both usual
and unusual exertions. See Schmidt v.
Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695
(Utah 1980).
This Court first discussed the term "by
accident" in Tintic Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 14, 206 P. 278
(1922), where an accident was said to be
"something out of the ordinary, unexpected, and definitely located as to time
and place." 60 Utah at 22, 206 P. at 281.
This definition was used to distinguish injuries which occurred gradually and were
covered under statutory provisions for occupational disease. Id. The Court in Tintic Milling also acknowledged that where
the claimant suffers an internal failure the
"unexpected result" rule of the seminal
English case of Fenton v. Thorley, [1903]
A.C. 443, 72 LJ.K. 789, 5 W.C.C. 1, is
appropriate. The Court in Tintic Milling
observed:
"Since the case of Fenton v. Thorley,
nothing more is required than that the
harm that the plaintiff has sustained
shall be unexpected
It is enough
that the causes, themselves known and
usual, should produce a result which on
a particular occasion is neither designed
nor expected. The test as to whether an
injury is unexpected, and so, if received
on a single occasion, occurs *by accident/
is that the sufferer did not intend or
expect that injury would on that particular occasion result from what he was
doing."
60 Utah at 26, 206 P. at 282 (quoting Bohlen, A Problem in The Drafting of Workmen '8 Compensation Acts, 25 Harv.L.Rev.
828, 340 (1912) (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the Court in Tintic affirmed a finding that the employee, whose previous respiratory problems were aggravated by entering a roasting flue, had suffered a compensable accident.

After Tintic Milling, the Court temporarily rejected the "unexpected result" definition of Fenton v. Thorley in internal
failure cases on the ground that the definition of "by accident" required an unusual
occurrence or exertion. In Bamberger v.
Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 203, 240
P. 1103 (1925), the Court denied compensation to a worker who unexpectedly suffered a heart attack while manually unloading a railroad car of coal on the ground
that no overexertion occurred during the
work. 66 Utah at 208, 240 P. at 1104.
That decision was apparently overruled,
however, when the Court embraced the
"unexpected result" rule and awarded compensation to an employee who suffered a
heart attack after overexertions while routinely cleaning the weirs to a city reservoir.
Hammond v. Industrial Commission, 84
Utah 67, 87, 34 P.2d 687, 695 (1934) (Moffat, J., concurring). Hammond was followed in Columbia Steel Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 92 Utah 72, 66 P.2d 124
(1937), where a unanimous Court held that
the employee, who had suffered a ruptured
aorta from riding a caterpillar tractor over
rough ground, suffered an injury "by accident" since the result was "an unusual,
unforeseen, and unexpected event or occurrence" and definite as to time and place.
Id. at 92, 66 P.2d at 134. And, in Thomas
D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass 'n. v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d
233 (1943), the Court sustained an award of
benefits to a claimant who had suffered
from heart disease and experienced a heart
attack shortly after moving 52 boxes
weighing 50 to 100 pounds and 28 sacks of
fire clay—work that was unusually heavy
and greatly in excess of his ordinary
duties. The Court pointed out, in dicta,
that the English common law would have
awarded compensation even if the exertions were ordinary and usually required as
part of the job. 104 Utah at 67-71, 138
P.2d at 235-39. Quoting from the Bohlen
article, supra, the Court observed:

ty under Utah Workers Compensation Law: A
workplace. Internal failure claims evaluated by
this Court include heart attacks, hernias, and
Just Result or Just Another "Living Corpse"?,
back injuries. See generally, Note, Schmidt v.
1981 Utah LRev. 393.
Industrial Commission and Injury Compensabih-
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"[N]othing more is required than that
the harm that the plaintiff has sustained
shall be unexpected
The element of
unexpectedness inherent in the word 'accident* is sufficiently supplied . . . if,
though the act is usual and the conditions normal, it causes a harm unforeseen by him who suffers it"
104 Utah at 70, 138 P.2d at 237.
Six years later in Purity Biscuit Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201
P.2d 961 (1949), this Court explicitly
adopted the English rule for the definition
of an accident and awarded benefits to a
claimant who unexpectedly injured his back
while stepping on the brake pedal of a
delivery truck—a usual and ordinary activity. See 115 Utah 14-20, 201 P.2d 967-70.
After summarizing early Utah cases interpreting "by accident" the Court concluded
that "since 1922 this court has uniformly
held that an unexpected internal failure
meets the requirements of ["by accident"]

and the legislature by failing to amend has
acquiesced in that construction." 115 Utah
at 15, 201 P.2d at 968.
The holding of Purity Biscuit also
squarely embraced th<* concept that an ordinary or usual exertion that results in an
unexpected injury is compensable. See 115
Utah at 18-19, 201 P. at 969-70. After
carefully considering the legislative purpose of the workers' compensation statute,
prior precedent, and public policy, the
Court rejected the requirement that proof
of an unusual activity or exertion be a
required element of the "by accident" definition. 115 Utah at 14-20, 201 P.2d at
967-70. The Court concluded that "there
is nothing in the statute which would justify a holding that an injury is compensable
where overexertion is shown but is not
compensable where only ordinary exertion
is shown, provided that in both cases it is
shown that the exertion causes the injury."4 115 Utah at 19, 201 P.2d at 970.

4. The holding of Purity Biscuit was questioned
in Mellen v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 373,
431 P.2d 798 (1967), where the opinion erroneously stated that Purity Biscuit l i a s never been
cited by this or any other court to support the
law of that case/' 19 Utah 2d at 375, 431 P.2d at
799. In fact, by 1967 Purity Biscuit had been
relied upon in decisions from the courts of nine
other states. Alabama Textiles Prods. Corp. v.
Grantham, 263 Ala. 179. 183-84, 82 So.2d 204,
208 (1955) (finding of unusual strain or exertion
unnecessary to support conclusion that claimant
suffered injury by accident); Bryant Stave &
Heading Co. v. White, 227 Ark. 147, 151-52, 296
S.W.2d 436, 439-40 (1956) (Purity Biscuit cited
as stating majority position that usual exertion
causing an internal failure may be by accident);
Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
231 Cal.App.2d 111, 41 Cal.Rptr. 628, 635 (1964)
(relying upon causation rule of Purity Biscuit);
Spivey v. Battagha Fruit Co., 138 So.2d 308, 314
(Fla 1962) (back herniation from rupture of intervertebral disc satisfies statutory requirement
of suddenness); Roman v. Minneapolis St. Ry.,
268 Minn. 367, 380, 129 N.W.2d 550, 559 (1964)
(calls Purity Biscuit "a well-considered workmen's compensation case" that supported an
award where many factors led to the disability);
Murphy v. Anaconda Co., 133 Mont. 198, 208,
321 P.2d 1094, 1100 (1958) (quoting favorably
the reliance on Purity Biscuit in Bryant Stave,
227 Ark. at 151-52, 296 S.W.2d at 439-40, and
holding that a usual exertion may lead to a
compensable injury where the causal relationship is established), Neylon v. Ford Motor Co.,
10 N J. 325, 327-28, 91 A.2d 569, 570 (1952) (Pu-

rity Biscuit cited in support of rule that internal
failure from ordinary or usual exertion is an
"injury by accidenf); Olson v. State Indust
Accident Comm'n, 222 Or. 407, 416-17, 352 P.2d
1096, 1101 (1960) (O'Connell, J., specially concurring) (dissenl to Purity Biscuit quoted); Cooper v. Vinatieri, 73 S.D. 418, 424, 43 N.W^d 747,
750-51 (1950) (Purity Biscuit cited as an example of the divergent viewpoints for defining a
compensable accident).
In addition, the decision in Purity Biscuit was
relied upon by the majority in three Utah cases.
See Jones v. California Packing Co., 121 Utah
612, 244 P2d 640, 642; Carling v. Industrial
Commission, 16 ULih 2d 260, 399 PJ2d 202;
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d
140, 427 P.2d 740. Despite this support for the
decision in Purity Biscuit, the Court in Mellen
concluded without further discussion that M[t]he
Purity Biscuit decision certainly needs a healthy
reappraisement." 19 Utah 2d at 376, 431 P.2d at
800. Two years later in Redman Warehousing
Corp v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454
P.2d 283 (1969), the Court again questioned the
Purity Biscuit decision in a superficial analysis
that concluded: "Purity enjoys the unique and
doubtful distinction of being a living corpse."
22 Utah 2d at 403, 454 T2d at 286. After
considering those cases from Utah and other
jurisdictions that have relied on Purity Biscuit,
we now cannot agree that it was a l i v i n g
corpse." Moreover, even if Purity Biscuit lay
dormant, it was resurrected by Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 ?2d 693, 695 (Utah
1980).
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Since Purity Biscuit, numerous cases
have held that an internal injury may be
compensable if it results from either a
usual or unusual exertion in the course of
employment. See, e.g., Champion Home
Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703
P.2d 306 (Utah 1985) (perforated ulcer
caused by lifting an unusually heavy
beam); Pittsburg Testing Laboratories v.
Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367 (unforeseen and
unanticipated heart attack resulting from
exertion while inspecting roof structure);
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d
888 (Utah 1981) (back injury resulting from
shoveling coal compensable despite usualness of activity and presence of preexisting
conditions); Painter Motor v. Ostler, 617
P.2d 975 (Utah 1980) (back injury resulting
from moving heavy boxes and installing
electrical equipment); Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980)
(back injury resulting from carrying steel
plates compensable despite prior history of
back disorders and ordinary activity);
United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, 613
P.2d 508 (Utah 1980) (heart attack resulting from exertion while rushing to drowning accident); IGA Food Fair v. Martin,
584 P.2d 828 (Utah 1978) (heart attack resulting from heavy lifting); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction & Mining Corp.,
665 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977) (truck driver
suffered heart attack after repeatedly
climbing long steps); Residential & Commercial Construction Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974)
(back injury resulting from moving lumber); Powers v. Industrial Commission,
19 Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740 (1967) (heart
distress occurring over a period of several
months compensable despite preexisting
conditions); Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965)
(back injury resulting from filing papers in
lower drawer compensable).
Despite the strong precedential support
for applying the "unexpected result" rule
of Purity Biscuit to internal failure cases,
a separate line of opposing authority has
developed which requires overexertion or
an unusual event to prove an injury occurred "by accident." Typically, these

cases denied compensation because the
claimants' ordinary work duties precipitated the injury. Consequently, there were no
events or exertions that were unusual or
extraordinary to qualify as "by accident."
See, e.g., Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983) (compensation for knee injury denied where circumstances precipitating the injury were commonplace and usual); Sabo's Electronic
Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982)
(back injury from loading box of twelve
radios into van not compensable); Farmer's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d
237 (Utah 1980) (back injury to claimant
with preexisting condition resulting from
delivery of 100-pound sacks not compensable since the activity was not unusual or
unexpected); Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979) (back injury
suffered by janitor upon standing up not
compensable without evidence that activities were unusual); Redman Warehousing
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 22 Utah
2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969) (back injury
precipitated by sitting and driving a moving van not compensable without proof of
an unusual event). These cases will not be
collectively referred to as the Redman line
of cases.
[2] We are now convinced that the Redman line of cases has misconstrued the
historical and logical definition of "by accident." The Redman line of cases relied on
the following abridged version of the definition of an accident found in Carting v.
Industrial Commission: "[Accident] connotes an unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from what would normally be expected to occur in the usual
course of events.91 16 Utah at 261, 399
P.2d at 203 (emphasis added; footnotes
omitted). In Redman, the highlighted
phrase was interpreted to require an unusual event before there can be an accident This interpretation misconstrues the
Carting decision itself and is inconsistent
with the English definition of "by accident"
used by this Court since 1922. The key
requirement of an accident under the Car-
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ling decision, as well as prior decisions,
was that the occurrence be unanticipated,
unplanned and unintended. The highlighted phrase emphasized that where either the
cause of the injury or the result of an
exertion was different from what would
normally be expected to occur, the occurrence was unplanned, unforeseen, unintended and therefore "by accident"
Policy considerations also militate in favor of rejecting the notion that the phrase
"by accident" requires an unusual event.
There is nothing in the term "accident"
that suggests that only that which is unusual is accidental See Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109 Utah at 33, 40,
163 P.2d at 335, 338 (Wade, J., concurring;
Wolfe, J., dissenting). An accident does
not occur simply because a worker is injured during an unusual activity. This argument is illustrated by Professor Larson
in his treatise on workmen's compensation
with the following example:
If an employee intentionally and knowingly undertakes to lift an unusual load,
the cause (i.e., the lifting) is no more
accidental than if he deliberately lifted a
normal load. Or if a gardener deliberately continues to mow the lawn in the rain,
a passerby observing him would not say
that he was undergoing an accident
merely because it is unusual to mow
lawns in the rain.
Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 38.62, at 7-162 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
Larson also criticizes the usual-unusual
distinction as being unworkable in practice.
Realistically, it is impossible to determine
what are the usual and normal requirements of a job. People work in good
weather and bad, lift heavy items as well
as light ones, and work for long hours as
well as short ones. None of these activities may be unusual or unexpected. Id.
§ 38.63 at 7-164 to -168.
The unworkability of the usual-unusual
event requirement is further evidenced by
comparing seemingly irreconcilable decisions by this Court. Compare Kaiser
Steel v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (back injury to miner with previous back problems

held to be a comj)ensable accr'snt despite
being caused by slioveling coal m the usual
course of employment), with Farmer's
Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237
(no accident where worker with previous
back problems sustained back injury while
delivering 100-pound bags of whey); compare Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17
Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (compensable
accident for back injury resulting from filing paper in lower drawer) with Billings
Computer Corp, v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104
(no accident where worker sustained knee
injury resulting from bending to pick up
small parts).
[3,4] We believe that the Court's real
concern in the Redman line of cases was
the presence or absence of proof of causation to support an award of compensation.
See generally Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, 590 P.2d at 332 (Wilkins, J., dissenting). As will be discussed
in the next section, the Court has developed
two parallel lines of authority on the causation issue, one of which requires an unusual event in order to meet the statutory
causation requirement. Although proof of
an unusual event may be helpful in determining causation, it is not required as an
element of "by accident" in section 35-145. "[T]he basic and indispensable ingredient of 'accident* is unexpectedness."
Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 696 (Wilkins, J., concurring) (quoting IB Larson, Workmen's
Compensation, at 7-5 (1980). We therefore reaffirm these cases which hold that
an accident is an unexpected or unintended
occurrence that may be either the cause or
the result of an injury. We thus necessarily abandon the analysis of "by accident" in
the Redman line of cases which predicates
the "accident" determination upon the occurrence of an unusual event
II.
The second element of a compensable
accident requires proof of a causal connection between the injury and the worker's
employment duties. Pittsburg Testing
Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 1370
(Utah 1983). In workers' compensation
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cases involving internal failures, the key
issue is usually one of causation. Ordinarily, causation is proved by the production
and interpretation of medical evidence either alone or together with other evidence.
See Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367, 1370;
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617
P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980). Because of the
difficulties of diagnosis of internal failures
and because of the possibility that a preexisting condition may have contributed to
the injury, special causation rules have
been developed for internal failure cases.
See Larson, supra, § 38.81, at 7-269; Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 20-21, 201 P.2d 970-71
(Wolfe, J., concurring specially).
This Court initially responded to the
problem of causation in internal failure
cases by suggesting that the Commission
use a clear and convincing evidence standard when an internal failure was caused
by an exertion in the workplace.6 See
Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n.
v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61,
74, 138 P.2d 233, 238 (1943). The clear and
convincing evidence standard was rejected,
however, in Lipman v. Industrial Commission, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1979),
with the rationale that such a standard
would make workers' compensation benefits nearly impossible to recover where the
deceased suffered from a preexisting condition. Accordingly, the standard to prove
causal connection is preponderance of the
evidence. Id.
The second method that has been used to
ensure causal connection in internal failure
cases is to require proof that an unusual
event or activity precipitated the injury.
Presumably, this requirement was used to
prevent compensating a person predisposed
to internal failure where the preexisting
condition contributed more to the injury
than his usual work activity. The following internal failure cases illustrate that evidence of an unusual event or activity is
necessary to prove causation. Billings
6, In Nebraska, an enhanced standard of proof is
still used where the employee suffers from a
preexisting condition. See Mann v. City of

Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104,
106-07 (Utah 1983); Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722, 726 n. 12 (Utah
1982); Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints v. Industrial Commission,
590 P.2d 328, 329 (Utah 1979); IGA Food
Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 829 (Utah
1978); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction & Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144, 1146
(Utah 1977); Jones v. California Packing
Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640 (1952);
Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109
Utah 25, 163 P.2d 331 (1945); Thomas D.
Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d at
233; see Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 697-99
(Crockett, J., dissenting); Farmer's Grain
Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237, 23839 (Utah 1980); Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 373, 374, 431 P.2d 798,
799 (1967); Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at 30,
201 P.2d at 975 (Latimer, J., dissenting).
Defendants argue that any rule that
awards compensation based on usual exertion will open the floodgates for payment
of benefits for all internal injuries that
coincidentally occur at work. They claim
that the unusual exertion requirement is
necessary to prevent the employer from
becoming a general insurer. They argue
that without the unusual exertion rule, employment opportunities for persons with a
history or indication of physical disability
or handicap will be reduced.
Despite precedent supporting the "unusual exertion" rule, the claimant urges us
to follow a separate line of authority that
awards compensation for injuries that occur during usual and ordinary workplace
activity. These cases typically award compensation where the claimant was engaged
in a workplace activity and where there is
adequate evidence of medical causation.
See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi,
631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981) (award for compensation affirmed for a coal miner's back
injury despite absence of unusual incident);
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617
P.2d at 695 (compensation awarded for
Omaha, 211 Neb. 583, 592, 319 NAOd 454, 458
(1982).
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back injuries arising from ordinary duties
upon proof of medical causal connection
between workplace exertions and the injury); Residential and Commercial Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission,
529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974) (carpenter's back
injury from lifting, bending, and twisting in
the ordinary course of work compensable);
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19
Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740, 742 (1967)
(awarding compensation to fireman for exertions in the normal course of employment—the Court rejecting the unusual exertion test in favor of ordinary exertion);
Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah
2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965) (back injury
from filing papers in lower drawer of cabinet compensable); Purity Biscuit Co. v.
Industrial Commissiori, 115 Utah 1, 201
P.2d 961 (1949). Although the usual exertion rule was questioned in Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d at 37576, 431 P.2d at 800, that decision failed to
explicitly overrule the usual exertion line of
cases. Moreover, Residential and Commercial Construction Co., Schmidt, and
Kaiser Steel have awarded compensation
for usual workplace activity after the Mellen decision. Clearly, the usual exertion
rule is not simply an aberration in Utah
law.
When read in chronological sequence,
our opinions demonstrate an inconsistent
and confused approach to determining
when an accident arose out of or in the
course of employment. Much of this confusion can be traced to fundamental problems stemming from the use of the usualunusual distinction as a means of proving
causation. Larson criticizes the unusual
exertion requirement by itself as a "clumsy
and ill-fitting device with which to ensure
causal connection." Larson, supra, § 38.81, at 7-270. The problems in determining
what activities were usual or unusual were
6. Larson's observation is consistent with this
Court's rationale for rejecting the unusual exertion requirement in Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at
16, 201 P.2d at 968:
[I]f [overexertion! is the test no one will ever
know what this court will consider sufficient
overexertion. Also under that test if the work

recognized as long ago as 1949 when Justice Wolfe wrote that a "Pandora's box of
difficulties . . . may be opened by the refinements between usual and unusual, exertion and overexertion, ordinary and extraordinary exertion measured by the individual involved or by the industrial function performed by him or both." Purity
Biscuit, 115 Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972
(Wolfe, J., concurring specially). The contents of the Pandora's box feared by Justice Wolfe are now evident in the plethora
of our cases struggling with a definition of
a compensable accident based upon the
usualness or ordinariness of an activity.
professor Larson has also criticized the
usual-unusual distinction because the ordinariness of the activity fails to consider
that some occupations routinely require a
usual exertion capable of causing injury,
likewise, other occupations, such as deskwork, require so little physical effort that
an "unusual exertion" may be insufficient
to prove that the resulting accident arose
out of the employment. Larson, supra,
§ 38.81, at 7-270.*
{5] Because we find the present use of
the usual-unusual distinction unhelpful and
our prior precedent inconsistent, we take
this opportunity to examine an alternative
causation analysis that may better meet
the objectives of the workers' compensation laws. We are mindful that the key
question in determining causation is whether, given this body and this exertion, the
exertion in fact contributed to the injury.
Id. § 38.82, at 7-271; Purity Biscuit, 115
Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972 (Wolfe, J.,
concurring specially).
[6] The language "arising out of or in
the course of his employment" found in
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Supp.1986), was
apparently intended to ensure that compensation is only awarded where there is a
usually required by the job is so great that it
would break the strongest man even he will
not be able to recover. But if it is more than
usual exertion which causes the injury the
employee can recover no matter how light the
work is which causes the injury.

Id.
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sufficient causal connection between the
disability and the working conditions. The
causation requirement makes it necessary
to distinguish those injuries which (a) coincidentally occur at work because a preexisting condition results in symptoms which
appear during work hours without any enhancement from the workplace, and (b)
those injuries which occur because some
condition or exertion required by the employment increases the risk of injury which
the worker normally faces in his everyday
life. See Bryant v. Masters Machine Co.,
444 A.2d 329, 337 (Me.1982). Only the
latter type of injury is compensable under
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45. There is no fixed
formula by which the causation issue may
be resolved, and the issue must be determined on the facts of each case.
[7] Professor Larson has suggested a
two-part causation test which is consistent
with the purpose of our workers' compensation laws and helpful in determining causation. We therefore adopt that test. Larson suggests that compensable injuries can
best be identified by first considering the
legal cause of the injury and then its medical cause. Larson, supra, § 38.83(a), at
7-273. "Under the legal test, the law must
define what kind of exertion satisfies the
test of 'arising out of the employment* . . .
[then] the doctors must say whether the
exertion (having been held legally sufficient to support compensation) in fact
7. Cases from other jurisdictions which have accepted the dual-causation standard suggested by
Larson include Market Foods Distribs, Inc. v.
Levenson, 383 So.2d 726 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1980)
(claimant with preexisting spinal disease denied
compensation where injury could have been
triggered at any time during normal movement
and exertion at work not greater than typical
nonemployment exertion); Guidry v. Shne Indus. Painters, Inc., 418 So.2d 626 (La.1982)
(claimant granted compensation where injury
resulted from stress, exertion, and strain greater
than that in everyday nonemployment life);
Bryant v. Masters Mack Co., 444 A.2d 329 (Me.
1982) (claimant with preexisting condition
awarded compe **tion for back injury resulting
from fall from his stool at work because of
increased risk of falling where employees
moved around aim at work), Barrett v. Herbert
Eng'g, Inc., 371 A.2d 633 (Me.1977) (claimant
with preexisting back condition denied compen-

caused this [injury]."7 Larson, supra,
§ 38.83(a), at 7-276 to -277.
[8] 1. Legal Cause—Whether an injury arose out of or in the course of employment is difficult to determine where the
employee brings to the workplace a personal element of risk such as a preexisting
condition. Just because a person suffers a
preexisting condition, he or she is not disqualified from obtaining compensation.
Our cases make clear that "the aggravation or lighting up of a pre-existing disease
by an industrial accident is compensable
" Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140,143-44, 427 P.2d 740,
743 (1967) (footnote omitted). To meet the
legal causation requirement, a claimant
with a preexisting condition must show
that the employment contributed something substantial to increase the risk he
already faced in everyday life because of
his condition. This additional element of
risk in the workplace is usually supplied by
an exertion greater than that undertaken in
normal, everyday life. This extra exertion
serves to offset the preexisting condition of
the employee as a likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for impairments resulting from a personal risk rather
than exertions at work. Larson, supra,
§ 38.83(b), at 7-278. Larson summarized
how the legal cause rule would work in
practice as follows:
sation for injury resulting from working at normal gait since there was no work-related enhancement of personal risk), Mann v. City of
Omaha, 211 Neb 583, 319 N.W.2d 454 (1982)
(policeman with history of heart disease awarded compensation for heart attack at home
where claimant's physician testified that attack
was caused by stress of police work rather than
personal risk factors); Sellens v. Allen Prods.
Co., 206 Neb. 506, 293 N.W^d 415 (1980)
(claimant with preexisting heart problems denied compensation for heart attack suffered
while unloading 28-pound cases from truck
trailer despite sedentary nonworking lifestyle
using objective standard of average worker in
nonemployment life); Couture v. Mammoth
Groceries, Inc., 116 N.H. 181, 355 A.2d 421
(1976) (claimant with no preexisting heart problems awarded benefits upon proof that lifting
beef medically caused the fatal heart attack).
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If there is some personal causal contribution in the form of a [preexisting condition], the employment contribution
must take the form of an exertion greater than that of nonemployment life
If there is no personal causal contribution, that is, if there is no prior weakness
or disease, any exertion connected with
the employment and causally connected
with the [injury] as a matter of medical
fact is adequate to satisfy the legal test
of causation.
Id. Thus, where the claimant suffers from
a preexisting condition which contributes to
the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove legal causation.
Where there is no preexisting condition, a
usua\ or ordinary exertion is sufficient*
[9] We also accept Larson's suggestion
that the comparison between the usual and
unusual exertion be defined according to an
objective standard. ''Note that the comparison is not with this employee's usual
exertion in his employment but with the
exertions of normal nonemployment life of
this or any other person." Larson, supra,
§ 38.83(b), at 7-279 (emphasis in original).
See also Johns-Manville Products v. Industrial Commission, 78 IU.2d 171,178, 35
Ill.Dec. 540, 544, 399 N.E.2d 606, 610 (1979)
(compensation denied where the risk of the
employment activity "is no greater than
that to which he would have been exposed
had he not been so employed"); Strickland

v. National Gypsum Co., 348 So.2d 497,
499 (Ala.Civ.App.1977) (employment risk
must be " 'a danger or risk materially in
excess of that to which people not so employed are exposed—'" Quoting from
City of Tuscaloosa v. Howard, 55 Ala.App.
701, 705-06, 318 So.2d 729, 732 (1975)).
But see Market Foods Distributors, Inc. v.
Levenson, 383 So.2d 726, 727 (Fla.DistCt
ApP-1980) (subjective test "the employment must involve an exertion greater than
that normally performed by the employee
during his non-employment life"). Thus,
the precipitating exertion must be compared with the usual wear and tear and
exertions of nonemployment life, not the
nonemployment life of the particular worker.
We believe an objective standard of comparison will provide a more consistent and
predictable standard for the Commission
and this Court to follow. In evaluating
typical nonemployment activity, the focus
is on what typical nonemployment activities
are generally expected of people in today's
society, not what this particular claimant is
accustomed to doing. Typical activities
and exertions expected of men and women
in the latter part of the 20th century, for
example, include taking full garbage cans
to the street, lifting and carrying baggage
for travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small child to chest height,
and climbing the stains in buildings. By

8. Larson highlights the difference between the
unusual-usual exertion test with the rule we
today adopt with the following examples of extreme cases in the heart attack area:
Suppose X s job involves frequent lifting or
200-pound bags, and one such 200-pound lift
medically produces a heart attack. Under the
old unusual-exertion rule there would be no
compensation, regardless of previous heart
condition. Under the suggested rule there
would be compensation, even in the presence
of a history of heart disease, because people
generally do not lift 200-pound weights as a
part of nonemployment life, and therefore
this episode cannot be ascribed to the ordinary wear and tear of life.
Suppose Y*s job involves no lifting. Suppose he lifts a 20-pound weight on the job,
and suppose there is medical testimony that
this lift caused his heart attack. Under the
old test, exclusively concerned with the com-

parison between this employee's usual exertions and the precipitating exertion, there
would be compensation. Under the suggested
rule the result would! depend on whether
there was a personal causal element in the
form of a previously weakened heart. If
there was not, compensation would be awarded, since the employment contributed something and trie employee's personal life nothing
to the cause of the collapse. If there was [a
previously weakened heart], compensation
would be denied in spite of the medical causal
contribution, because legally the personal
causal contribution wa:; substantial, while the
employment added nothing to the usual wear
and tear of life—which certainly includes lifting objects weighing 20 pounds such as bags
of golf club 5, minnow ]>ails, and step ladders.
Larson, supra, § 38.83, at 7-280-81 (footnote
omitted).
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using an objective standard, the case law
will eventually define a standard for typical
"nonemployment activity" in much the way
case law has developed the standard of
care for the reasonable man in tort law.
[10] 2. Medical Cause-—The second
part of Larson's dual-causation test requires that the claimant prove the disability
is medically the result of an exertion or
injury that occurred during a work-related
activity^ The purpose of the medical cause
test is to ensure that there is a medically
demonstrable causal link between the
work-related exertions and the unexpected
injuries that resulted from those strains.
The medical causal requirement will prevent an employer from becoming a general
insurer of his employees and discourage
fraudulent claims.
With the issue being one primarily of
causation, the importance of the . . .
medical panel becomes manifest It is
through the expertise of the medical panel that the Commission should be able to
make the determination of whether the
injury sustained by a claimant is causally
connected or contributed to by the claimant's employment.
Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 697 (Wilkins, J., con"
curring). Under the medical cause test, the
claimant must show by evidence, opinion,
or otherwise that the stress, strain, or exertion required by his or her occupation led to
the resulting injury or disability. In the
event the claimant cannot show a medical
causal connection, compensation should be
denied.*
III.
[11] We now undertake to apply the
foregoing analysis to the case before us.
In reviewing findings of fact of the Industrial Commission, we determine whether
there is substantial evidence to support the
Commission's findings. Champion Home
9. Evidence of the ordinariness or usualness of
the employee's exertions may be relevant to the
medical conclusion of causal connection.
Where the injury results from latent symptoms
with an illness such as hear disease, proof of
medical causation may be especially difficult
Larson's treatise cites many examples of cases

Guilders v. Industrial Commission, 70S
P*2d 306, 307 (Utah 1985).
[121 We have previously stated that the
key element of whether an injury occurred
"by accident" is whether the injury was
unexpected. After reviewing the record,
we find no substantial evidence that the
injury was not unexpected. It is clear
from the uncontradicted testimony of the
claimant that he experienced an unexpected
&ud unanticipated injury to his back as he
lifted a crate of milk in the cramped area of
the cooler. Although the claimant had injured his back on prior jobs, he had not
complained of pain or limitations at his job
with Kent's Foods. There is no evidence
which indicates that this injury was predictable or that it developed gradually as witfi
a& occupational disease or progressive back
disorder. While the employer's report of
injury and the medical records do not corroborate that a sudden and identifiable injury occurred in the cooler, the reports are
unhelpful in determining whether the injury was unexpected.
It appears that the administrative law
judge applied the "unusual event or trauma" rule in defining an accident We have
ejected that test in lieu of a test based on
unexpectedness. Moreover, the administrative law judge's emphasis on prior injuries is not determinative of whether an
accident occurred. We have previously
held that the aggravation or "lighting up"
of a preexisting condition by an internal
failure is a compensable accident Pouters
t>. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140,
143, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967). We conclude
therefore that the decision of the Commission that the claimant's injury was not 'lay
accident" was not based on the evidence,
ahd that decision is, therefore, erroneous.
[13] The key issue in this case, like
n\ost internal failure cases, is whether the
injury "arose out of or in the course of
where compensation claims were defeated because of inadequate proof of medical causation.
See Larson, supra, § 38.83(i), at 7-319 to -321.
Compare Guidry v. Sline Indus Painters, Inc.,
418 So.2d 626 (La. 1982) (heart attack triggered
by stress, exertion, and strain greater than sedentary life of average worker compensable).
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employment." Since the claimant had pre
vious back problems, to meet the legal causation requirement he must show that moving and lifting several piles of dairy products weighing thirty to fifty pounds in the
confined area of the cooler exceeded the
exertion that the average person typically
undertakes in nonemployment life. The evidence presented by the claimant was insufficient for us to make a determination regarding legal causation. It is unclear from
the record how many crates were moved by
the claimant, the distance the crates were
moved, the precise weight of the crates,
and the size of the area in which the lifting
and moving took place. Because the claimant did not have the benefit of the foregoing opinion, we remand for further factfinding on this issue.
Moreover, the record is insufficient to
show medical causation. It is unclear from
the medical reports whether the doctors
were aware of the specific incident in the
cooler. Further, the case was not submitted to a medical panel for its evaluation.
Without sufficient evidence of medical causation, we are unable to determine whether
there is a medically demonstrable causal
link between the lift in the cooler and the
injury to the claimant's back. We therefore remand to the Industrial Commission
for additional evidence and findings on the
question of medical causation.
The decision of the Commission is vacated and remanded.
HOWE and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
HALL, Chief Justice: (concurring and
dissenting).
I concur in remanding this case to the
Gommv&sioiv for the purpose of detertamitvg
1. Powers v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 140,
143-44, 427 ?2d 740, 743 (1967).
2. 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949).

whether the work incident aggravated a
preexisting condition such as would warrant an award of compensation.1 However,
I do not join the Court in adopting an
"unexpected result" standard to be applied
in determining the existence of a compensable accident.
I do not believe that this Court has "misconstrued the historical and logical" definition of "by accident" in the bulk of its
recent cases concerning the issue at bar.
The majority's reliance upon Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission1 is
misplaced. The holding therein is without
precedential value because it has been simply ignored* The only case in which this
Court followed Purity Biscuit is Schmidt
v. Industrial Commission, 4 which support
is similarly without precedential value because it has also been ignored beginning
with Painter Motor Co. v. Ostler* the very
next accident case handed down. In that
case, the Court cited and relied upon Carling v. Industrial Commission • and again
defined "accident" as an unanticipated,
unintended occurrence different from what
would normally be exacted to occur in the
usual course of events. In my view, Purity Biscuit and Schmidt emerge as aberrations in our post-war case law.
The majority opinion holds that henceforth an injury by accident "is an unexpected or unintended occurrence that may
be either the cause or the result of an
injury." (Emphasis in original.) However,
the legislature, whose prerogative it is to
establish policy, has chosen wording which
precludes such an interpretation. The reasoning of Justice Latimer'* di&sent in Pvxison, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 1980); Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm'n,
590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979); Redman Warehousing
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454
P.2d 283 (1969), Carlmg v. Industrial Comm'n,
16 Utah 2d 260, 399 V2<\ 202 (1965).

3. Emery Mining Corp. v. DeFriez. 694 P.2d 606
(Utah 1984); Giles v. Industrial Comm'n, 692
P.2d 743 (Utah 1984); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Jacobs,
689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984); Billings Computer 4. 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980).
Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983),
Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah §. 617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980).
1982), Kaiser Steel v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888
(Utah 1981); Farmers Grain Cooperative v. Ma- *. 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965).
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ty Biscuit illustrates the shortcomings of
the majority's interpretation. The word
"accident," when viewed in isolation, may
be used to denote both an unexpected occurrence which produces injury as well as
an unexpected injury. The word "injury,"
on the other hand, denotes a result and not
a cause. Had the legislature only used the
word "injury" in section 35-1-45 (U.C.A.,
1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl. Vol. 4B, 1974 ed.,
Supp.1986)), then that statute would cover
all results regardless of the cause. Had
the legislature only used the word "accident," then I would agree with the majority's holding today that the legislature intended to cover both the cause and the
result. In fact, however, the legislature
has used both words "injury" and "accident." It follows that the word "accident"
must be interpreted as focusing upon the
cause and not the result. In short, the
majority's interpretation writes the word
"injury" out of the statute. Such a decision is unwarranted in my view.
The legislature recently amended section
35-1-45,7 but chose to leave intact the standard which limits the payment of compensation to those injured "by accident arising
out of or in the course of . . . employment." 8 Moreover, the singular "injury by
accident" standard has not been altered or
amended since its inception in 1917.f The
legislature thus being satisfied with the
Court's interpretation of the term "accident" in the long line of cases beginning
with Carting v. Industrial Commission,10
I decline to embark upon a new effort to
redefine that term.

impose legal and medical causation requirements. See U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45.
Curiously, the requirement of "legal causation" has two different meanings, depending upon the physical condition of the
worker at the time he is injured. A worker
having no preexisting medical condition or
handicap need only prove that the accident
was caused by a "usual or ordinary exertion." But for congenitally handicapped
persons and for persons who have suffered
preexisting industrial injuries (which presumably have left the worker with some
physical weakness or deterioration), legal
causation has a different meaning. Such a
worker may receive compensation only if
the "employment contribution" to the internal breakdown is "greater than that of
nonemployment life." According to the
majority, such a worker must now prove
that his internal breakdown was caused by
"an unusual or extraordinary exertion"
in order to establish the requisite legal
causation, even though the majority opinion itself criticizes at length the "usual-unusual distinction as a means of proving
causation." How the majority can reject
that standard for persons having no preexisting condition, yet embrace that standard
for persons with preexisting conditions, is
baffling.

STEWART, Justice: (dissenting).
I dissent. The majority defines the statutory term "accident" to mean "unexpected result," regardless of whether it is
produced by a usual or an unusual event.
The majority also defines the term "arising
out of or in the course of employment" to

Furthermore, the difference between the
"unusual or extraordinary exertion" which
a worker with a preexisting condition must
demonstrate and the "usual exertion"
which a person with no preexisting condition must demonstrate is far from clear.
The latter standard is to be judged with
respect to the " 'normal nonemployment
life of this or any other person.'" The
Court emphasizes that the "precipitating
exertion must be compared with the usual
wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life, not the nonemployment life
of the particular worker." What the term
"usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment" means is not defined by the

7. Act of Jan. 27, 1984, ch. 75, § 1, 1984 Utah
Laws 610, 610.

9. Act of March 18, 1917, ch. 100, § 52a, 1917
Utah Laws 306, 322-23.

8. U.CJL, 1953, § 35-1-45 (Rcpl.Vol. 4B, 1974
cd., Supp.1986).
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- 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P^d 202 (1965).
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majority. The few examples set out do
little to explain the concept aimed at, other
than to suggest that the term means something more than simple, life-sustaining activities.
I wholly fail to understand why persons
who have a preexisting condition should be
placed in the disadvantaged position, indeed the near-remediless position, that the
majority opinion imposes upon them. The
purpose of the Second Injury Fund is to
provide compensation for workers who
have preexisting medical conditions and
therefore run a greater risk of injury when
they expose themselves to the hazards of
the work place. But the law should encourage such persons to work rather than
encouraging them to abandon the work
force for some kind of unearned support.
This Court has repeatedly stated that the
Second Injury Fund was designed to encourage employers to hire persons with
preexisting conditions by spreading the
risk throughout the industry to assure such
persons that their injuries will be cared for
without imposing extraordinary liabilities
on the employers who hire them. Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano,
610 P.2d 334, 337 (Utah 1980); McPhie v.
United States Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504,
505 (Utah 1976). Society certainly ought to
favor those policies which encourage people to work, rather than policies that deter
employers from offering gainful employment to those who have a higher risk of
work-related injury. There is little personal or social benefit from a policy that tends
to discourage persons from working because of prior injuries or disabilities.
Further, it is fundamentally unfair and
flatly inconsistent with the basic purposes
of the workmen's compensation laws to
impose higher standards for compensation
on those with preexisting medical conditions than on those without Tort law generally does not do so. A defendant in a
negligence action is required to take the
victim as the defendant finds him; whatever unusual vulnerabilities the victim may
have are disregarded. That principle
should not be, and until now has not been,

different in workmen's compensation law,
which is really a substitute for tort law
remedies. In short, handicapped or previously injured persons who are injured by
an industrial accident are simply discriminated against by having to meet the majority's rigorous legal cause requirement.
I am also unable to understand how an
administrative law judge, the Industrial
Commission, or an appellate court is supposed to determine what "typical nonemployment activities" are "in today's society," as they now must do for the purpose
of determining legal causation for workers
with preexisting medical conditions. Does
that mean what a typical sixty-five-year-old
does or a typical twenty-one-year-old does
during his or her nonemployment activities? Is it whait a professional football
player does in his leistire time or what a
ballet dancer does? Is it what a sedentary
worker does in his or her off-hours or what
a forest ranger does?
Instead of defining a meaningful standard, the majority provides examples which
supposedly illustrate the unarticulated
principle. The examples "include taking
full garbage cans* to the street, lifting and
carrying baggage for travel, changing a
flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small
child to chest height, and climbing the
stairs in buildings." These few examples,
which I find to be arguable in any event
since they reflect only what some people
may do from time to time, do not substitute
for a legal standard. ][ seriously wonder
whether changing a flat tire on an automobile is a typical activity in today's society,
and I do not know how much luggage the
"typical" individual lifts or how far he or
she carries it. The point is that the majority has not set forth a workable standard at
all. In fact, I have serious doubt that such
an artificial construct as "typical nonemployment activities" will produce more fair
and rational decisions than our past cases.
The majority simply assumes a "typical"
individual for the purpose of establishing a
rational standard. Unfortunately, disabilities happen to real people, not to "average"
people, and the law has always recognized
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as much. In short, I do not think that the
majority's newly established standard will
produce decisions one whit more consistent
or rational than those produced in the
past.1
The majority also holds that an injured
person must prove that the disability is
"medically the result of an exertion or injury that occurred during a work-related activity." With a degree of hope that I think
is unwarranted, the majority states that
"[t]he medical causal requirement will prevent an employer from becoming a general
insurer of his employees and discourage
fraudulent claims." I am fearful that that
hope is seriously misplaced.
Certainly Professor Larson, largely the
source of the Court's new standards and
analysis, is highly acclaimed in this field of
law, but there is much to be said for the
case-by-case approach in hammering out
legal doctrine, even if it does on occasion
produce inconsistencies. I readily concede
that present law needs to be rationalized
and that some cases should be overruled
because they are hopelessly inconsistent
with other cases, but I do not believe that
the law needs to be revolutionized in such a
manner as to defeat those humane policies
intended to allow for the injuries of workers who come to the work place in an
impaired condition.
I also join the Chief Justice's dissent.
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Richard E. HOLLOWAY, Plaintiff,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the
STATE OF UTAH, Richard E. Holloway Trucking [Employer], and the
State Insurance Fund [Insurance carrier for the Employer], Defendants.
No. 20621.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 21, 1986.
Virginius Dabney, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., James R.
Black, Mary A. Rudolph, Salt Lake City,
for defendants.
STEWART, Justice:
Plaintiff Richard E. Holloway is a selfemployed truck driver. On July 11, 1984,
after driving for about six hours, he
stopped at a rest stop. He claims that he
slipped while walking across an oil spill on
his way to the restroom and that the slip
caused him to jerk to regain his balance. After returning from the restroom, Holloway
bent over to inspect one of his truck tires.
While crouching, he experienced an immediate sharp pain in his back which made
him fall to the ground, landing on his arms
and jaw. His wife, also a truck driver,
drove for the rest of the trip. Two days
after the incident Holloway consulted a chiropractor in Georgia. He consulted another chiropractor on returning to Salt Lake
City. The slip on the oil spill was not
mentioned in the reports of the chiropractors
who examined Holloway, in the First Report of Injury, or in the claimant's report
of how the injury occurred.
The Commission denied review of the
administrative law judge's order. The
judge ruled that *\e plaintiffs injury was
not the result of an "accident" as that term

1. In my view, the decisions of this Court are
generally reconcilable with only a few glaring
exceptions and most of them prior to 1980
That there are more inconsistencies the further

back one goes in our body of law is not particularly unexpected In any event, I doubt that the
new approach will produce unwavering consistency over the years.
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Robert C. LARGE, Plaintiff,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Howard Trucking of Utah, Inc., and/or
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah
and the Second Injury Fund, Defendants.

Jack C. Helgesen (argued), Helgesen &
Waterfall, Ogden, for plaintiff.
James R. Black (argued), Wendy B.
Moseley, Black & Moore, Salt Lake City,
for defendants.
Barbara Elicerio, Legal Counsel, Industrial Com'n, Salt Lake City, for Industrial
Com'n of Utah.

No. 870437-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.

Before GREENWOOD, BILLINGS
and DAVIDSON, JJ.

Aug. 3, 1988.
OPINION
Plaintiff was injured when applying
for job and sought permanent total disability benefits for his injury. The Industrial
Commission denied him benefits, and plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Greenwood, J., held that (1) finding that
injury sustained while applying for job was
not the medical cause of plaintiffs permanent total disability status was supported
by substantial evidence, and (2) claimant
was not entitled to disability benefits, since
his disability was the result of preexisting
conditions and not an industrial accident
Affirmed.
1. Workers' Compensation *=>6
Proximate cause analysis primarily
used in tort law and involving analysis of
foreseeability, negligence and intervening
causes, is not appropriate in workers* compensation cases.
2. Workers* Compensation *=>1533
Finding that worker's back injury sustained during job application process, upon
stepping off truck, was not medical cause
of worker's permanent total disability status was supported by substantial evidence,
which indicated that worker had sustained
prior back injury, had difficulty walking
due to obesity, and lacked transferable job
skills.
3. Workers' Compensation *=»554
Where a disability is the result of
preexisting conditions and not an industrial
accident, a claimant is not entitled to disability benefits.

GREENWOOD, Judge:
Robert C. Large appeals an Industrial
Commission order which denied him permanent total disability benefits. We affirm.
On March 25, 1985, Large applied for a
job as a truck driver with Howard Trucking. For about two and one-half years
before applying for the job, Large was
self-employed. Prior to that time, he had
been a truck driver for forty years.
As part of the job application process,
Large was required to take a driving test.
He climbed into a truck but discovered the
truck's clutch was not working properly.
As Large stepped out of the truck, he
slipped and fell on his back. At the time of
the accident, Large was sixty-one years
old, about six feet two and one-half inches
tall and weighed S76 pounds. He was
transported to Dixie Medical Center where
X-rays were taken. The X-rays did not
reveal a fracture, and the emergency room
physician prescribed twenty-four hours bed
rest. Large drove to his home in Phoenix,
Arizona the following day and made an
appointment with Dr. Delbridge, an osteopathic physician. Dr. Delbridge had seen
Large sue months earlier and had noted at
that time that Large's past history included
back problems. Dr. Delbridge examined
Large and diagnosed his condition as acute
lumbosacral sprain and arthritis and fibrositis of the lumbosacral spine. Dr. Delbridge stated that Lar
had difficulty
walking due to his weight and back injuries
and that, in his opinion, Large was unem-
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ployable but might be trainable for work
he could perform while sitting. In April
1985, Dr. Ditchek examined Large and stated that "tractive sclerosis is present and
suggests that this may be of some age, but
the possibility of new compression superimposed on old changes must be considered."
In December 1985, Large saw Dr. Robert
S. Barbosa who reported that Large's Xrays revealed evidence of advanced arthrosis and a suggestion of a compression fracture. Dr. Barbosa attributed 5% of
Large's disability to his previous injury and
5% to the present injury. Dr. Barbosa also
recommended that Large undergo a CT
scan to determine the extent of the fracture and if it extended into the spinal canal.
On April 22,1986, an Administrative Law
Judge (A.LJ.) held a hearing on Large's
application for temporary benefits. After
the hearing, the A.LJ. wrote to Dr. Barbosa and asked if the 10% permanent physical
impairment was attributable to the March
25, 1985 injury, if that injury aggravated
Large's pre-existing condition and what
percentage impairment rating he would assign to Large's condition prior to March 25,
1985. Dr. Barbosa responded, stating:
At this point, to answer your 4 questions,
I feel that the fall in March directly
aggravated the patient's preexisting condition, although, according to his testimony he was quite active. The patient also
has a 10% permanent physical impairment judging from his previous laminectomy surgery which certainly contributes
to what I feel is now a permanent physical impairment since the patient does
have a less of strength, especially of the
right lower extremity, rather severe discomfort extending from the lumbar
spine. I would give it approximately 5%
due to the patient's previous lumbar surgery, performed in 1953. This surgery
was done for herniated lumbar disc.
Based on this letter and the medical reports submitted at the hearing, the A.LJ.
entered findings of fact and conclusions of
law in September 1986 awarding Large
temporary total disability benefits. Specifically, the A.LJ. found that some of Large's
1. This section governs procedures and payments
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impairment* related to an earlier back injury Large sustained in 1953 and that further
medical work was needed to determine the
relationship between the present and the
prior injury. The A.LJ. also stated that
even though no Utah case addressed
whether workers' compensation should cover those injured during a "try-out" period,
the statute should be construed liberally in
favor of coverage. Neither party appealed
the award of temporary total disability benefits.
In April 1987, Large requested permanent total disability benefits. Attached to
his request wais a medical report prepared
by Dr. David Plone. The report, based on
an X-ray examination, noted moderate degenerative changes throughout the lumbar
spine, facet joint hypertrophy and arthritic
disease. Further, the report stated, "There
is compression of the superior vertebral
body plate of L3, but this appears to be an
old compression fracture." Without holding a further hearing, the A.LJ. entered
supplemental findings and conclusions,
stating that Large had a 10% disability, 5%
attributable to the 1953 injury and 5% attributable to the 1985 injury. The A.LJ.
also stated that although Large was an
employee for purposes of temporary total
and permanent partial disability, he was
not an employee for purpeses of permanent
total disability. The A.LJ. then found that
Large's age, obesity, lack of transferable
skills and prior back suigery constituted
the proximate or dominsint cause of his
disability. The A.LJ. concluded that Large
was entitled to permanent partial disability
benefits but not permanent total disability
benefits because the proximate or dominant cause of his unemployability was not
the March 25, 1985 accident Large subsequently filed a motion fcr review, which
the Industrial Commission denied. The
Commission noted that the only issue on
review was whether Large was entitled to
permanent total disability benefits and
agreed with the A.LJ. that Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-457 (1985)' implies a causal connection between the injury and the permanent
total disability. The Commission further
for permanent total disability.
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stated, 'The concept of proximate cause
serves the purpose of allowing those whose
disabilities are truly the result of the industrial injury to be properly compensated."
This appeal followed.
[1] On appeal, Large claims that the
Commission erred in finding that factors
other than the 1985 accident were the proximate or dominant cause of his permanent
total disability, and concluding, as a result
of that finding, that he was not entitled to
permanent total disability benefits. We
agree that a "proximate cause" analysis, as
that term is commonly used, is not appropriate in workers' compensation cases.
Proximate cause is used primarily in tort
law and involves analysis of foreseeability,
negligence and intervening causes. These
factors are not present in the statutory
workers' compensation system, which excludes consideration of fault. A. Larson, 1
Workmen's Compensation Law § 6.60
(1985).
Although proximate cause is not an appropriate standard, the Utah Supreme
Court has, nevertheless, required proof of
a causal relationship as a prerequisite to
awarding workers' compensation benefits.
Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15
(Utah 1986). In Allen, the Utah Supreme
Court interpreted Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-45 (1986) *, and explained that "by
accident arising out of or in the course of
employment" requires: (1) proof that the
injury occurred "by accident"; and (2)
proof of a causal connection between the
accident and the activities or exertions required in the workplace. Id. at 18. In
analyzing the causal connection, the Court
adopted a two-part test which requires a
claimant to establish legal cause and medical cause. Under the legal cause test "a
claimant with a preexisting condition must
show that the employment contributed
something substantial to increase the risk
he already faced in everyday life because
of his condition." Id. at 27. Further, under the medical cause test, the claimant
must prove "the disability is medically the
2. The statute provides that "Every employee ...
who is injured ... by accident arising out of or
in the course of his employment ... shall be

result of an exertion or injury that occurred during a work-related activity." Id.
hi 26. The standard of proof for causation
is by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
at 23. In Hodges v. Western Piling &
Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986), the
Court considered an Industrial Commission
determination which awarded permanent
partial disability benefits but denied permanent total disability benefits to a sixtyeight year old worker who injured his arm
in an industrial accident. The Court affirmed, finding that "[w]hile it is unquestioned that the medical panel found petitioner to be one hundred percent physically
impaired, the panel also found that the
total impairment was due to the onset of
severe arthritic problems." Id. at 721.
The petitioner had a prior asymptomatic
arthritic condition which flared up after the
accident, but which was found to have no
causal relationship to the industrial accident Professor Larson has also observed
that there is a distinction "between a preexisting disability that independently produces all or part of the final disability, and
a pre-existing condition that in some way
combines with or is acted upon by the
industrial injury." A. Larson, 2 Workmen 's Compensation Law § 59.22(b) (1987).
Therefore, a claimant for permanent total
disability benefits must prove medically
that his disability was caused by an industrial accident.
[2] The critical inquiry in this case,
therefore, is whether the Commission's decision should be affirmed because Large
did not prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the industrial accident was
the medical cause of his disability. In reviewing the Industrial Commission's factual findings, we will not disturb those findings unless they are " 'arbitrary and capricious/ or ^wholly without cause/ or 'contrary to the one [inevitable] conclusion
from the evidence/ or Vithout any substantial evidence to support them.'" Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev.t 736 P.2d 237, 238
(Utah 1987) (quoting Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury
"
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Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1981)).
The medical reports in this case indicate
that prior to the accident Large had back
problems relating to a 1953 injury and herniated lumbar disc surgery. In addition,
Dr. Delbridge's letter stated that Large
had difficulty walking due to his weight
and back injuries. Dr. Barbosa's medical
report stated that Large's X-rays suggested
a compression fracture but that a CT scan
was required to determine the extent of the
fracture. Subsequently, Dr. Plone stated
that the compression fracture "appears to
be an old compression fracture." Although the Industrial Commission erroneously applied the proximate cause test rather than the causation test articulated in
Allen and Hodges, we find substantial evidence in the record to support a finding
that the 1985 injury was not the medical
cause of Large's permanent total disability
status and that Large's age, obesity, lack
of transferable skills and prior back surgery resulted in his disability.
Large also asserts that the A.LJ. erred
in finding that he was not an employee for
purposes of permanent total disability benefits. However, the A.LJ.'s findings of fact
and conclusions of law and the Commission's denial of the motion for review are
based on the inadequate causal link between the disability and the injury and not
on Large's employee status. Therefore,
the issue of whether Large was injured "in
the course of his employment," while performing "try-out" tasks, is not before us
and is not addressed in this opinion.

isting injury.3 We disagree Section 35-169 determines the apportionment of compensation between the Second Injury Fund
and the employer or its insurance carrier
and does not address entitlement to permanent total disability benefits. Entitlement
to benefits is a prerequisite to consideration of apportionment. Where the disability is the result of pre-existing conditions
and not an industrial accident, a claimant is
not entitled to disability benefits.
Affirmed.
BILLINGS and DAVIDSON, JJ.,
concur.
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Sharon L. HEATON, Plaintiff,
••

SECOND INJURY FUND, Defendant
No. 870336-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Aug. 8, 1988.
Certiorari Denied Sept 22,1988.

[3] Finally, Large claims that he is entitled to permanent total disability benefits
under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69 (1985)
because the accident aggravated his pre-ex-

Injured worker petitioned for judicial
review of decision of the Industrial Commission that workers permanent total disability benefit should commence only on
date of medical confirmation of worker's
disability. The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that (1) Industrial Commis-

3. The version of section 35-1-69 which was in
effect in 1985 when Large was injured stated:
If any employee who has previously incurred
a permanent incapacity by accidental injury
... sustains an industrial injury for which
either compensation or medical care, or both,
is provided by this chapter that results in
permanent incapacity which is substantially
greater than he would have incurred if he had
not had the pre-existing incapacity, or which
aggravates or is aggravated by such pre-existing incapacity, compensation shall be awarded on the basis of the combined injuries, but
the liability of the employer for such compen-

sation ... shall be for the industrial injury
only. The remainder shall be paid out of the
Second Injury Fund....
The stalute also provides that any aggravation
of a pre-existing condition shall be deemed "substantially greater." Recently, section 35-1-69
was repealed and reenacted. Under the current
version of section 3S-1-69, the test for apportioning liability for compensation is not the
"substantially greater" test. Instead, the statute
requires a 10% pre-oristing whole person permanent impairment l>efore liability for compensation is apportioned.
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has no right to conveyance of the unplatted
property; (6) we reverse the court's conclusion regarding White Pine's liability for
taxes on the unplatted property; (7) we
reverse the court's conclusion that the parties subsequently modified the Contract regarding the Roadway; (8) we remand for
the trial court to order Sharps to convey
the Roadway; (9) we affirm the court's
conclusion that White Pine is not entitled to
benefit of the bargain damages; (10) we
affirm the court's conclusion that evidence
of construction interest is irrelevant; (11)
we remand for the court to determine a
reasonable attorney fee to be paid by
Sharps for amounts reasonably incurred by
White Pine at trial and on appeal as a
result of White Pine's suit for specific performance of the release of Lot 6 and the
Roadway and for other amounts reasonably expended in enforcing the Contract
"or any right arising out of breach or default thereof; (12) we remand for the
court to determine a reasonable attorney
fee incurred by Sharps in pursuing White
Pine for unpaid taxes on Lots 1 to 6 and
the Roadway; and (13) we affirm the restraining order barring Sharps from disposing of the property.
JACKSON, J., concurs.
ORME, J., concurs, except that as to
section VIII I concur only in the result
fO
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Becky LUCKAU, In the Matter of
Rodney Luckau, Deceased,
Petitioner,
• .

BOARD OF REVIEW OF the INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH; Workers' Compensation Fund; and Broadway Shoe Rebuilders, Respondents.
No. 910715-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct 16, 1992.
Claimant appealed from decision of the
Industrial Commission denying occupation-

al disease death benefits. The Court of
Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that Last Injurious Exposure Rule encompasses all situations in which employee is exposed to
material or substances which contribute to
illness from which employee suffers or
which caused employee's death, in amount
sufficient to have caused or contributed to
any degree to that condition; any exposure
which did contribute or could have contributed to condition is sufficient
Reversed and remanded.
Bench, PJ., dissented and filed opinion.

1. Administrative Law and Procedure
*=>800
Where legislature either expressly or
implicitly grants agency discretion to interpret or apply statutory term, Court of Appeals reviews agency's interpretation or application under reasonableness standard.
2. Administrative Law and Procedure
«=>800
In appeals under Utah Administrative
Procedures Act (UAPA) it would be helpful
for parties to distinguish between grants of
discretion to apply the law and grants of
discretion to interpret statute, to specify
whether statute contains explicit or implicit
grant of discretion, and to specifically identify grant of discretion if one is claimed.
U.CJL1953, 63-46b-16(4), (4Xd).
8. Statutes *=»219(9)
Occupational Disease and Disability
Act does not implicitly grant Industrial
Commission discretion to interpret 1988
Last Injurious Exposure Rule. U.C.A.
1953, 85-2-1 et seq., 85-2-14.
4. Administrative Law and Procedure
#=•797
Correction-of-error standard would be
applied by Court of Appeals in reviewing
Industrial Commission's interpretation of
1988 Last Injurious Rule. U.C.A.1953, 352-14.
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5. Constitutional Law *»70.1(2)
In interpreting statute, courts should
avoid addLfe to or deleting from statutory
language unless absolutely necessary to
make it a rational statute.
6. Workers' Compensation *=>201
Prior version of Last Injurious Exposure Rule encompasses all situations in
which employee is exposed to material or
substances which contribute to illness from
which employee suffers or which caused
employee's death, in amount sufficient to
have caused or contributed to any degree
to that condition; any exposure which did
contribute or could have contributed to condition is sufficient U.C.A1953, 3&-213(b), 85-2-14.
7. Statutes *»223.2
Later ^ersioivs of statute do not necessarily reveal intent behind earlier version.
8. Workers' Compensation «»73
Amendment to Occupational Disease
Disability Act, providing that exposure to
hazardous substance must be substantial
contributing medical cause of disease and
that employee must have been employed at
least 12 consecutive months by employer in
order to be compensated, was not merely
explanatory clarifying amendment, but
rather substantively changed Last Injurious Exposure Rule. U.C.A.1953, 35-2-14,
85-2-105.
Edward B. Havas, Salt Lake City, for
petitioner.
Richard 6. Sumsion, Salt Lake City, for
respondents.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and
GREENWOOD, JJ.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Petitioner Becky Luckau appeals the Industrial Commission's denial of occupational disease death benefits. We reverse and
remand.

BACKGROUND
Petitioner's husband, Rodney Luckau
(decedent), died in 1990 of mesothelioma, a
cancer usually caused by asbestos exposure. Petitioner filed a claim with the Industrial Commission alleging that decedent
was exposed to injurious amounts of asbestos while employed at Broadway Shoe Rebuilders (Broadway). She sought occupational disease death benefits under the Occupational Disease Disability Act
Decedent held numerous jobs during his
life. Of relevant to this proceeding are
his jobs in a boiler room in Colorado, where
he removed and installed asbestos pipe lining, and as a sales clerk for Broadway.
Consistent with ihe typical latency period
for mesothelioma, decedent was most likely
to have contracted the cancer while employed in Colorado and/or by Broadway.
He worked in Colorado for fifteen to sixteen montlis in ithe early 1960s, and at
Broadway for six to nine months in 1964.
Petitioner contends that Broadway is liable
for occupational disease death benefits under the Last Injurious Exposure Rule, as
codified in Utah Code Annotated section
35-2-14 (1988).
A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on May 24, 1991.
Petitioner called two witnesses, Kevin
Potts and Jeffrey Throckmorton, both of
whom had inspected Broadway's premises
for asbestos, conducted air sampling tests,
and compiled a rei>ort indicating that they
had found asbestos in the basement and on
a pipe in the shop. Petitioner also introduced depositions of her husband, taken
before his detath, and her husband's doctor.
Respondents also called Potts and
Throckmorton, as well as Joe Bollinger,
President of Broadway, and Dr. Attilio
Renzetti, a mesothelioma expert Dr. Renzetti testified that in his opinion, decedent's
mesothelioma was caused by his exposure
to asbestos while working in Colorado, not
at Broadway. He agreed, however, that
there could have been a cumulative dose
effect between the Colorado and Broadway
exposures.
In his findings of fact, the ALJ stated
that "there is no doubt that [decedent's]
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mesothelioma was caused by asbestos exposure/' and that his exposure both in Colorado and at Broadway "comport well with
the latency period for mesothelia [sic]/1
The ALJ also determined that an injurious
exposure required a "substantial dosage of
exposure, and/or duration of exposure."
He denied petitioner benefits, however, because he concluded that she had failed to
meet her burden of proving that decedent
was exposed to injurious amounts of asbestos at Broadway, as required under Utah
Code Annotated section 85-2-14 (1988).
Petitioner filed a motion for review with
the Board of Review. The Board denied
her motion and this appeal followed. On
appeal, petitioner argues that the Commission erred in determining that she was not
entitled to benefits under section 86-2-14.
Specifically, petitioner claims that the ALJ
erred in interpreting and in applying the
statute.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 63-46b-16(4) (1988) of the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA)
outlines "the circumstances under which a
reviewing court may grant relief from formal agency action." Anderson v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 824 (Utah
1992). "Under [section] 63-46b-16(4)(d),
we may grant relief if 'the agency has
erroneously interpreted or applied the
law.'" Id (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-16(4Xd) (1988)).
[1] " *[A]bsent a grant of discretion, a
correction of error standard is used in reviewing an agency's interpretation or application of a statutory term.'" Stokes v.
Board of Review, 832 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah
App.1992) (quoting Morton lnt% Inc. v.
Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 681, 688 (Utah
1991)). However, where the legislature either expressly or implicitly grants the
agency discretion to interpret or apply a
statutory term, we review the agency's interpretation or application under a reasonableness standard. Anderson, 839 P.2d at
824 (citing Morton, 814 P.2d at 687);
Stokes, 832 P.2d at 68.

[2] Respondents claim the applicable
standard of review is an "[intermediate
standard of reasonableness and rationality
with appropriate deference to the decision
of the administrative agency." Petitioner
contends that this court should apply a
correction of error standard to the ALJ's
interpretation of the law and application of
the facts to the law, and a substantial
evidence test to the ALJ's factual findings.
Neither party provides any detailed discussion or analysis. The disparity between
these claims, however, demonstrates why
"parties would be wise to assist this court
in properly determining our standard of
review." Bhatia v. Department of Employment Security, 834 P.2d 674, 581
(Utah App.1992) (Bench, J., concurring).
In appeals under UAPA, it would be helpful for parties to "distinguish between
grants of discretion to apply the law and
grants of discretion to interpret a statute,"
id, to specify whether the statute contains
an explicit or implicit grant of discretion,
id., and to specifically identify the grant of
discretion if one is claimed.
[3,4] The Occupational Disease and
Disability Act does not expressly grant the
Commission discretion to interpret the 1988
Last Injurious Exposure Rule. The Commission has not articulated any sound reason under Morton why we should find an
implicit grant of discretion. Because we
can ascertain the Rule's meaning by applying traditional rules of statutory construction, we find no implicit grant of discretion.
See Morton, 814 P.2d at 689; Nucor Corp.
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 832 P.2d 1294,
129&-1297 & n. 5 (Utah 1992); Ferro v.
Utah Dep't of Commerce, 828 P.2d 607,
610 (Utah App.1992). We accordingly apply a correction of error standard in reviewing the Commission's interpretation of
this statute.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Petitioner brought her claim under the
Occupational Disease Disability Act which
imposes liability upon an employer to compensate the dependents of an employee
who dies from an occupational disease.
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Utah Code Ann. § 85~2-13(b) 0 r 8). Section 35-2-13(b) states in pertinent part
There is imposed upon every employer a
liability for the payment of compensation
to the dependents of every employee in
cases where death results from an occupational disease.
Section 85-2-14 (1988) contains what is
known as the Last Injurious Exposure
Rule. It states in pertinent part1:
Where compensation is payable for an
occupational disease the only employer
liable shall be the employer in whose
employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such
disease
Petitioner claims that in denying her benefits, the ALT erroneously interpreted the
phrase "injuriously exposed to the hazards
of such disease" to require a "substantial
dosage of exposure, and/or duration of exposure."
The phrase "injuriously exposed to the
hazards of such disease" has been variously interpreted. Although it is clear that
"there must have been some exposure of a
kind contributing to the condition, ... once
the requirement of some contributing exposure has been met, the question remains:
Was this enough of an exposure to be
deemed injurious?" 4 Arthur Larson,
Workmen's Compensation Law } 95.26(a)
(1990). Traditionally, courts
have not gone on past the original finding of some exposure to weigh the relative amount or duration of exposure under various carriers and employers. As
long as there was some exposure of a
kind which could have caused the disease, the last insurer at risk is liable for
1. The Last Injurious Exposure Rule, as stated in
Utah Code Annotated section 35-2-14 (1988)
differs from the version of the rule that is now
in effect The legislature amended section 352-14 (1988) and codified it as section 35-2-105
(1991), effective April 29, 1991. The Rule now
reads:
(1) To the extent compensation is payable under this chapter for an occupational disease
which arises out of and in the course of an
employee's employment for more than one
employer, the only employer liable shall be
the employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the
hazards of the disease if:

all disability from that disease. Thus,
insurers or employee who have been at
risk for relatively brief periods have nevertheless been charged with full liability
for a condition that could only have developed over a numlber of years.
Id. For example, in Meyer v. SAIF, 71
Or-App. 871, 692 P.2d 656 (1984), review
denied, 299 Or. 203, 700 P.2d 251 (1985),
claimant suffered from asbestosis and
sought benefits from his last employer, for
whom he had worked only six days removing asbestos insulation from pipes. He had
been exposed to asbestos throughout his
life as a pipe-fitter and plumber for several
different employers .and had exhibited
signs of the disease for over twelve years.
Medical evidence showed that his exposure
during the six-day employment was not the
actual cause of the disease, but the court
nevertheless held the employer liable for
benefits. The court stated that "the appropriate inquiry under the last injurious exposure rule is not whether the conditions of
the last employment actually caused the
disease, but whether those conditions were
of a kind which could have caused the
disease over some indefinite period of
time." Id. 692 P.2d at 658; see also, Osteen v. AC. £ &, Inc., 209 Neb. 282, 807
N.W.2d 514, 520 (1981) (last of forty employers held liable for claimant's mesothelioma because exposure to asbestos was of
type that could have caused the disease had
he been exposed for a "long time"); Union
Carbide Corp. v Industrial Comm'n, 196
Colo. 56, 581 P.2d 734, 738 (1978) (en banc)
(employer for whom employee worked for
eight days during which he was exposed to
radiation which amounted to one-ten-thou(a) the employee's exposure in the course of
employment with that employer was a substantial contributing medical cause of the alleged occupational disease; and
(b) the employee was employed by the employer for at least 12 consecutive months. (2)
Should the conditions of Subsection (1) not be
met, liability for disability, death, and medical
benefits shall be apportioned between employers based on the involved employers'
causal contribution to the occupational dis-
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sandth of his total exposure during his
mining career was liable for death benefits
on the basis that there was sufficient evidence that, had he worked in those conditions for a year, the concentration would
have exceeded federal exposure standards);
Wood v. Harry Harmon Insulation, 511
So.2d 690, 693 (FlaApp.1987), review denied, 520 So.2d 584 (Fla.1988) (it is not
necessary to prove that the last injurious
exposure actually injured claimant, if it
was of a kind which over time would be
harmful).
Other courts, however, have held that
the exposure "must have been of such
length or degree that it could have actually
caused the disease." Larson, { 95.26(a).
See e.g., Olson v. Federal Am. Partners,
667 ?J2d 710, 718 (Wyo.1977) (claimant denied benefits because she failed to prove a
direct causal connection between work conditions and the disease); Fossum v. SAIF,
52 OrApp. 769, 629 P.2d 857, 860 (1981)
(exposure must be the cause of the disease
for employer to be liable under Last Injurious Exposure Rule), affd on other
grounds, 293 Or. 252, 646 P.2d 1337 (1982).
[5] Because either definition could be
applied to the phrase as used in section 352-14, we turn to traditional rules of statutory construction for assistance in determining the legislature's intended meaning.
Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cos., 608 P.2d 242
(Utah 1980) describes cardinal rules of statutory construction as follows: "[TJf there is
doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or
application of an act, it is appropriate to
analyze the act in its entirety, in the light
of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose/1 Id at 243; see also
Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care,
Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984) (courts
should construe parts of an act so as to
harmonize with the purpose of the whole
act). In interpreting a statute, courts
should avoid adding to or deleting from
statutory language, unless absolutely necessary to "make it a rational statute." 2A
Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory
Construction § 47.38 (5th ed. 1992); see

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Lightfoot, 938
R2d 65, 66-67 (7th Cir.1991).
Neither petitioner nor respondents have
provided us with any legislative history or
other evidence of legislative intent to guide
us in interpreting this statute. However,
we should attempt to construe statutory
words in accordance with their plain meaning, keeping in mind that the "best indication of legislative intent is the statute's
plain language." Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989).
Specific provisions in the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act demonstrate
sound reasoning behind the Utah Supreme
Court's statements concerning the broad"
legislative purpose of the Act For example, for employees who sustain health injuries arising out of the course of employment, compensation pursuant to the provisions of this act is "the exclusive remedy
against the employer/' Utah Code Ann.
§ 85*2-3 (1988), and for dependents, payment under the Act "discharges] all other
claims thereof/' i d at § 85-2-32 (1988).
Furthermore, the legislature instructed the
Commission to determine employer liability
in a manner calculated "to ascertain the
substantial rights of the parties and to
carry out justly the spirit of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law." Id at
{ 35-2-42 (1988). Mindful of the exclusive
nature of the employees' remedy and the
directive to the Commission, the Utah Supreme Court stated that in order to fulfill
the purpose of workers' compensation, "the
Act should be liberally construed and applied to provide coverage" and any doubts
should be resolved in favor of the applicant. State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial
Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984);
see also McPhie v. Industrial Comm'n,
567 P.2d 153,155 (Utah 1977); USX Corp.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 781 P.2d 883, 886
(Utah App.1989). In dealing specifically
with the Occupational Disease Disability
Act, the supreme court also stated that
"[p)olicy considerations . . . dictate that
statutes should be liberally construed in
favor of an award." Ttsco Intermountain
v. Industrial Comm'n, 744 P.2d 1340,1343
(Utah 1987).
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[6-8] Based upon an interpretation consonant with the Act's objectives, with the
plain meaning of the statutory language,
and with the majority view, we conclude
that the 1988 statute encompasses all situations in which an employee is exposed to
material or substances which contribute to
the illness from which the employee suffers or which caused the employee's death,
in an amount sufficient to have caused or
contributed to any degree to that condition.
This interpretation of the phrase in question is consistent with the employer's responsibility to provide employees with a
safe environment in which to work. Although the statute is ambiguous in some
aspects, its plain language does not include
the quantitative or temporal requirements
added in the ALJ's definition. Therefore,
any exposure which did or could have contributed to the condition is sufficient2
This view is also consistent with two early
Utah Supreme Court cases decided under a
version of the Last Injurious Exposure
Rule similar to that in section 35-2-14.
Uta-Carbon v. Industrial Comm'n, 104
Utah 567, 140 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah 1943)
("[I]t is not necessary . . . that evidence
should have been introduced to show that
whatever exposure he may have had in the
coal mine could have produced the disease."); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 451, 205 P.2d 829,
831 (Utah 1949) (surveys tending to show
that quantities of silicone dust were not
"harmful" did not necessitate such a finding and court affirmed award of benefits to
claimant). In Kennecott, the court stated
that liability is "predicated not on having
contracted such ailment in [employer's] employ, but for exposing such employee to
2. We realize that the legislature has now amended the statute to add requirements that the exposure be Ma substantial contributing medical
cause of the . . . disease" and that the employee
be employed at least twelve consecutive months
by the employer. Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-105
(1991). See fn. 1. However, later versions of a
statute do not necessarily reveal the intent behind an earlier version. See 1A Norman J.
Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction
§ 2230 (4th ed. 1985) (a statutory amendment
"indicates that [the legislature] intended to
change the original act by creating a new right
or withdrawing an existing one"). We disagree
with the dissent's view that the amendment here

ha' lful quantities of the dust"
P.2d at 833.

Id. 205

CONCLUSION
Because the A U erred in interpreting
the requirements of Utah Code Ann. section 35-2-14 (1988), we remand to the Commission for consideration of the facts in
light of the interpretation of the statute
established ici this opinion. It would be
presumptuous for us ito apply the law to
the facts of Ithis case, that being the Commission's responsibility.
Reversed and remanded.
BILLINGS, J., concurs.
BENCH, Presiding Judge (dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. While I generally
agree with the standard set forth, I disagree with the analysis used by the majority. I also believe that the ALJ properly
applied the standard set forth and that
Luckau will not receive a more favorable
outcome on reconsideration. Therefore, I
would affirm the Commission's decision.
I write primajily to address the majority's analytical approach to this case. The
majority sets forth an expansive collection
of legal propositions, but then fails to apply
many of them to this ease. I join Justice
Wolfe in "deploying] the setting out of
many abstract propositions of law . . .
which plague one critically reading an opinion and require endless time to analyze
when they do not seem necessary to a
decision of the case." Hess v. Robinson,
109 Utah 60, 70, 163 P.2d 510, 514 (1945)
(Wolfe, J., concurring in the result). Since
was merely explanatory. The amendment added new substantive requirements for liability to
attach—that the exposure "substantially" contribute to the disease and that employment be
for at least twelve montiis. "Every amendment
not expressly characterized as a clarification
carries the rebuttable presumption that it is
intended to change existing legal rights and liabilities." Suite v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233, 1234
(Utah App 1991) (citing Madsen v. Borthick, 769
P-2d 245, 252 n. 11 (Utah 1988)). We, unlike
our colleague in dissent, conclude this amendment was not a clarifying one, but one which
substantively changed the act
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the majority does not utilize many of the
legal principles it recites, readers are left
to guess how they apply. In order to avoid
future confusion, the principles cited
should have been either used or deleted
from the opinion.

rule. It also purportedly utilizes the rule
that the entire statute should be considered
when interpreting ambiguous statutory
language.1 The majority, however, never
identifies the different plausible interpretations of section 14 that render it ambiguous.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Identifying the ambiguous language at
While the majority has attempted to set issue, and its plausible interpretations, is
forth the standard of review found in Mor- the threshold question when statutory lanton International, Inc. v. State Tax Com- guage does not have a plain meaning. If
mission, 814 P.2d 581, 688-89 (Utah 1991), the majority would attempt to articulate
it has not precisely followed the supreme the plausible interpretations of the specific
court's directions. When a petitioner language actually used by the legislature
claims that an agency has misinterpreted a in section 14, rather than focus on general
statute, the first question to be answered is policy considerations, it would find that
whether the statute is ambiguous. Id, "If section 14 is not ambiguous.2
the statute is clear and unambiguous, there
is no implicit grant of discretion possible
ANALYSIS
because there is no interpretation required
Plain Meaning
by the agency." Ferro v. Department of
Commerce, 828 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah App.
The phrase "last injuriously exposed to
1992). "Where statutory language is plain the hazards of such disease'1 has only one
and unambiguous, this Court will not look plausible meaning. It refers to the last
beyond to divine legislative intent" Alii- time the employee was exposed to the hazsen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 ards of the disease in a manner that injured
P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988). Rather, "the the employee. The plain meaning of the
plain language of the statute must be tak- term ''injuriously exposed" logically reen as the expression of the Legislature's quires a showing that the exposure injured
intent" RLE. Employees Fed. Credit the employee by causing or contributing to
Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1151 (1988). the employee's disease. The exposure
"A statute is ambiguous if it can be therefore must either be in an amount or
understood by reasonably well-informed over a period of time sufficient to cause or
persons to have different meanings." Tan- contribute to the disease in order for it to
ner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231, 233 be deemed injurious. "JTJhe duration and
(Utah App.1990). The majority in this case extent of exposure must have some signifiseems to hold that Utah Code Ann. § 35-2- cance or the plain meaning of the words
14 (hereinafter section 14) is ambiguous lose their significance.9' Larson, Workbecause it sets forth two interpretations, or men's Compensation Law, § 95.26(a).
"definitions," of the last injurious exposure The majority may therefore reach its stan1. The majority purports to "analyze the act in its 2. Under the analysis set forth in Morton, it is
entirety," but it never considers any other proviimproper for this court to embark on a policy
sion of the Act Instead, it quotes Tisco Interquest If section 14 is ambiguous and we are
mountain v. Industrial Commission, 744 P.2d
unable to identify the legislature's policy deter1340, 1343 (Utah 1987). also a mesothelioma
minations by using the rules of statutory concase, for the proposition that Tpjolicy considerstruction, we must defer to the agency's policy
ations in workers' compensation cases dictate
determination as evidenced by its interpretathat statutes should be liberally construed in
tion S14 ?2d at 589 (we are to assume the
favor of an award." The majority omits the
legislature intended that the agency apply its
next sentence in Tisco: "However, policy conexpertise to resolve any questions where legislasiderations have no application in the absence
tive intent is not discernible).
of any evidence to support an award, nor can
they be used to controvert the clear meaning of
the statutory requirements upon which an
award must be based." Id. (emphasis added).
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dard by simply looking to the plain meaning of the language used by the legislature
in section 14.
There is additional plain language in section 14 that makes it clear that the last
injurious exposure rule only applies after a
causal connection has been otherwise established. Section 14 begins with the following precondition: "When compensation
is payable
" As is clear from this language, Luckau must show that compensation is otherwise payable by Broadway for
a covered exposure before she may invoke
the last injurious exposure rule to place
full liability on Broadway. Section 35-227 (hereinafter section 27) of the Act makes
it clear that compensation is not payable
unless causation is established. It therefore follows, as a matter of logic, that
before section 14 may be applied, Luckau
must prove that the exposure at Broadway
could have directly caused or contributed to
the mesothelioma as required by section 27.
Resolving Ambiguity
Subsequent to the initiation of this matter, but prior to hearing, the legislature
amended section 14 by adding a clarifying
provision clearly describing the degree of
injurious exposure required. The amendment provides that in order for the last
injurious exposure rule to apply, the employer's exposure must have been "a substantial contributing medical cause of the
alleged occupational disease." Utah Code
Ann. ( 35-2-105 (Supp.1992) (effective
April 29, 1991).
If the majority is correct in assuming
that section 14 is ambiguous, it fails to
properly interpret it in light of the clarifying amendment Under traditional rules,
"[w]hen a statute is amended, the amendment is persuasive evidence of the legislature's intent when it passed the former,
unamended statute." State v. Bishop, 753
3. The majority fails to provide any justifiable
reason for not applying the clarifying amendment retroactively. It erroneously relies upon
the "presumption of change" rule. The presumption of change rule, however, only applies
to material changes in the original language, not
to mere additions that only add explanatory
language. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Con-

VM 439, 486 (Utah 198$. See also Foil v.
Ballinger, 601 93? 144, 150 (Utah 1979)
(amendment clarlied original legislative intent by adding language explaining when
original language is applicable); Okland
Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 520
P.2d 208, 210-11 (Utah 1974) (amendment
dealing with "clarification or amplification
as to how the law should have been understood" prior to the amendment should be
applied retroactively); State v. Davis, 787
P.2d 517, 523 (Utah App.1990) (legislature
clarified its original intentions by subsequently adding prohibition); Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 818 P.2d 1316,
1320 n. 3 (Utah App.1991); Shelter America Corp. v. Ohio Cos. and Ins. Co., 745
P.2d 843, 845 (Utah App.1987). If the majority were to consider the 1991 amendment, there would be no debate as to the
legislature's intended standard.1
PREJUDICE
Before we may grant relief from an
agency action, we are statutorily required
to find that a petitioner would have likely
received a more favorable outcome had an
alleged error not been made. Morton, 814
P.2d at 584 (interpreting Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-16(4) (1989)). Luckau alleges
that the ALT misinterpreted section 14 by
stating that the last injurious exposure rule
requires a ''substantial dosage of exposure,
and/or duration of exposure." The majority remands because it holds that this statement was an erroneous Btatement of the
law. Luckau, however, hiis not shown how
this statement hast prejudiced her claim.
A review of the record reveals that despite the apparent indication of a more
demanding standard, the ALT actually applied the very standard set forth today, and
found against Luckau. The AU expressly
found that decedent's death was not covered because any exposure' to asbestos sufstruction, Vol. 1A § 11230 at 265 (4th ed. 198S).
"An amendment of an unambiguous statute indicates a purpose to change the law, whereas no
such purpose is indicated by the mere fact of an
amendment of an ambiguous provision." Id. at
266 (emphasis added). If the majority finds
section 14 to be ambiguous, it clearly ens in
relying upon the presumption of change rule.
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f ered by the decedent at Broadway was not
a "conjunctive cause of the decedent's fatal
mesothelioma." The ALJ expressly found
that decedent's exposure to asbestos at the
shop was "only a de minimis exposure, of
no more consequence on this 6 to 9 month
daily basis, than what we are all exposed to
in a non-industrial, ambient air setting." 4
These factual findings have not been challenged and therefore remain undisturbed.
Consequently, when the Commission reconsiders the facts in light of the standard
identified today, it will necessarily deny
benefits.

ter of his occupation, it appears that even if
the alleged exposure was a contributing
cause, it was not covered under the Act
It also appears that section 85-2-13(bX4)
of the Act requires that decedent's death
occur within three years from the last date
on which he actually worked for Broadway
in order to be covered. Since decedent
passed away more than three years after
he worked for Broadway, any claim is apparently barred under the express terms of
the Act Tisco, 744 P.2d at 1842.

A further review of the record also reveals that Luckau is not entitled to compensation because she has not satisfied other
requirements found in section 27. In particular, there is no showing that the decedent's mesothelioma was "incidental to the
character of the business" as required by
subsection 27(5). In Palmer v. Del Webb's
High Sierra, 838 P.2d 435 (Nev.1992), the
Nevada Supreme Court held that an employee's lung disease that resulted from
exposure to environmental smoke at the
casino where the employee worked was not
an occupational disease because the disease
Was not related to the nature or character
of the job. The court reasoned that the
requirement that the disease-causing conditions be "incidental to the character of the
business" makes it "apparent that the legislature intended that there must be a connection between the kind of job and the
kind of disease. Mere causation is not
enough." Id. at 435-436. Luckau has not
made any claim, nor presented any evidence, that the nature or character of the
shoe repair business creates a risk that
shoe repairers will contract mesothelioma.
The record is unequivocal that decedent's
exposure to asbestos, if any, was caused by
the physical structure wherein the shoe
repair business was located, not by the
character of shoe repair. Since the decedent's alleged exposure to asbestos was
purportedly caused by his structural surroundings, and not by the nature or charac-

Under the plain language of the Act, the
last injurious exposure rule only applies
when the exposure caused by the target
employer is shown to have caused or contributed to the disease. The Commission
found that the decedent's exposure to asbestos at Broadway was not a contributing
cause of the disease. Since Luckau has not
made any showing of the likelihood of a
different result on remand, the majority
errs in reversing.
I would therefore affirm the Commission's decision to deny benefits.

4. The last sentence of section 27 explicitly provides that. "No disease or injury to health shall
be found compensable where it is of a character

to which the general public is commonly exposed."

CONCLUSION
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Cite as
elements of the offense to which he is entering
the plea; that upon trial the prosecution would
216 Utah Adv. Rep. 12
have the burden of proving each of those
-elements beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the
IN THE
plea is an admission of all those elements;
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon
him for each offense to which a plea is entered,
Kerry L. WILLARDSON,
including the possibility of the imposition of
Petitioner,
consecutive sentences;
(f) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea
discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH;
agreement has been reached; and
Beaver Creek Coal Co.; Cigna Insurance
(g) the defendant has been advised of the time
Co.; and the Employers9 Reinsurance
limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of
Fund,
guilty or no contest.
Respondents.
A 1989 amendment redesignated the subdivisions in
the rule.
4. The district court rules of practice in effect at the No. 920165-CA
time when both Willet and Stilling entered their pleas, FILED: June 28,1993
required the court to determine "that there is a factual
basis for the plea." Rules of Practice, Utah District Original Proceeding in this Court
and Circuit Courts, Rule 3.6(c) (replaced by the Code
of Judicial Administration).
5. Although in Alford, the Court found a "strong" ATTORNEYS:
factual basis for the plea under the particular facts, we Virginius Dabney, Salt Lake City, for
Petitioner
do not read the opinion as specifying the quantum of
evidence needed to establish the required factual basis. Steven J. Aeschabacher, George S.
Adondakis, Erie V. Boonnan, and Robert J.
6. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides: "Notwithstandingtheacceptanceof a plea of
Shaughnessy, Salt Lake City, for
guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon
Respondents
such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy
it that there is a factual basis for the plea." Fed. R. Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Greenwood.
Crim. P. 11(f). Rule 11 of Utah's Criminal Procedure
Code does not contain the same provision See State
This opinion is subject to revision before
v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 478 n 3 (Utah App. 1991)
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
(Utah may have deliberately omitted 11(f) from our
rules).
7. See, e.g., Johnston v. State, 829 P.2d 1179, 1182 GREENWOOD, Judge:
Petitioner Kerry L . Willardson appeals from
(Wyo. 1992), Amerson v. State, 812 P.2d 301, 303
(Idaho App. 1991), Simons v. State, 773 P.2d 1156, the Industrial Commission's denial of permanent
1163 (l<&ho App. 1989), Tiger v. State, 654 P.2d total disability benefits. The Commission denied
1031, 1033 (Nev. 1982).
benefits because it found no medical causation
8. We note a possible conflict between our holding in between the industrial accident and petitioner's
this case and State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 478 n.4 disability. We affirm.
(Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1992). To the extent that Smith implied that a factual
BACKGROUND
basis was not necessary for an Alford plea, it was
incorrect. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, Based upon a claim that he injured his back in
an industrial accident, petitioner sought
38 n.10, 91 S.Ct. 160, 167 n.10 (1970)
9. In Willeti, the supreme court remanded the case to permanent disability benefits from the Industrial
the trial court to determine if the preliminary hearing Commission (the Commission). During the
transcript contained evidence of a factual basis for the hearing on petitioner's application for benefits,
guilty plea. WilUtt, 842 P.2d at 863. Similarly, Alford he acknowledged a substantial medical history of
plea cases have examined the record of both the plea pre-existing back problems. According to
and preliminary hearings to deduce the factual basis petitioner, he first injured his back in 1970
for a defendant's charges. See State v. Hamilton, 6fcS while working in Colorado and underwent a
P.2d 983, 985 (Ariz. 1984). However, because lumbar laminectomy in 1971. He sought further
Stilling did not have a preliminary hearing, we are treatment for pain in his back, shoulders and left
precluded from issuing a similar remand order.
hip in 1983. His treating physician ordered
10. Because the affidavit was initially submitted in x-rays and diagnosed petitioner as having severe
response to Stilling** claim of ineffective assistance of degenerative osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine
counsel, it did not violate the attorney-clientprivilege.
Utah R. Evid. 504(d)(3). See also Hunt v. Blackburn, with multi-level degenerative disc disease and
128 U.S. 464,470-71,9 S. a . 125, 127 (1888); Rule scoliosis. In January of 1988 he was injured
during a fall at home. This accident caused a
1.6(b)(3) Utah R. Prof. Conduct.
tboracic-cervicalst rain/sprain, intervertebrald isc
syndrome, and brachial extension neuralgia of
the right shoulder and arm, Tor which petitioner
received medical treatment nineteen times during
the next three months.
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On the date of the alleged industrial injury,
April 15, 1988, petitioner, who was fifty-seven
years old, had worked for Beaver Creek Coal
Company (respondent) for about three years as
a conveyer belt supervisor. Petitioner testified
that he was replacing heavy wire mesh guards
on a conveyer belt so that no rock would fall off
the belt. While trying to jerk one of the guards
free from its stack, petitioner stated that he felt
a sharp pain in his lower back at about belt
level. Because of the pain, he left work.
Although petitioner was treated that same day
by Dr. Kotrady, he did not mention jerking wire
screens as the cause of his discomfort. Dr.
Kotrady ordered x-rays and diagnosed petitioner
as having severe degenerative arthritic hips,
pelvis and lumbar spine; degenerative disc
disease at all levels of the lumbar spine; and
scoliosis. Similarity between these x-rays and
those taken in 1983 indicated that the
degenerative arthritis and disc disease
pre-existed the industrial accident. Dr. Kotrady
told petitioner he could return to work th? next
week. However, 4lue to recurrent pain,
petitioner sought further treatment. This
treatment, which included a CT scan, disclosed
extensive degenerative and arthritic lumbar
changes, but no fractures or acute herniations.
Beginning on April 30, 1988, Dr. Heiner and
Dr. Gaufin both treated petitioner. Although
neither doctor had petitioner's prior medical
records, they indicated by filling in blanks on
forms provided by petitioner's attorney, that
one-half of petitioner's lumbar spine impairment
was due to the April 15,1988 industrial incident
and one-half to pre-existing conditions. Dr.
Gaufin rated petitioner with a fifteen percent
whole person impairment, while Dr. Heiner
rated petitioner with a thirty percent whole
person impairment.
Petitioner filed for permanent total disability
benefits in 1988. In response to petitioner's
claim, respondent argued that even if he did
sustain a compensable industrial injury, his
current disability was an inevitable consequence
of his pre-existing condition.
After a hearing and review of the medical
records, the administrative law judge (ALT)
found that petitioner had not established by a
preponderance of the evidence that the incident
on April 15, 1988 contributed to his disability.
Further, the ALJ concluded that the disability
after April 15, 1988 resulted from petitioner's
long-standing degenerative condition in his
lumbar spine. Without referring the matter to a
medical panel, the ALJ dismissed petitioner's
claim for failure to establish a compensable
industrial injury. Petitioner then filed a request
for review with the Commission. The
Commission essentially adopted the ALTs
findings and conclusions and affirmed the ALTs
order. This appeal followed.
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cause of petitioner's disability, (2) claims the
ALJ applied the wrong standard of proof, and
(3) argues the ALJ abused her discretion by
failing to convene a medical panel.
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
The Commission's findings of fact regarding
medical causation "will be affirmed if they are
'supported by substantial evidence when viewed
in light of the whole record.*" Stewart v. Board
of Review, 831 P. 2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1992)
(quoting Merriam v. Board of Review, 812 P.2d
447, 450 (Utah App. 1991)). See also Utah
Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g)(1989). Substantial
evidence is "'such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.'" Department ofAir Force
v. Swider, 824 P.2d 448, 451 (Utah App. 1991)
(citations omitted.)
We review the Commission's interpretation of
general - questions of law under a
correction-of-error standard, with no deference,
given to the expertise of the Commission.
Questar Pipeline v. Tax Comm'n, 817 P.2d 316,
317-18(Utah 1991); King v. IndustrialComm'n,
850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993).
Statutory interpretation or application by the
Commission will be reviewed without deference
unless there is. an express or implied grant of
discretion to the Commission. Morton Int'l, Inc.
v. Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah
1991). Because the Commission has issued a
rule limiting the discretion granted to it under
Utah Code Arm. §35-1-77(1 )(a) (1988),
concerning when it may appoint a medical panel,
we Teview the agency^s action for
reasonableness; Hinder Utah Code Ann.
§63-46b-14(h)(ii). See SEMECO v. Tax
Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 1993)
(Durham, J., dissenting).

Medical Causation
We first address petitioner's contention that
the industrial accident was a medical cause of
his disability. Utah Code Ann. §35-1^5 (1988)
mandates compensation where a sufficient causal
connection exists between the disability and the
working conditions. A claimant must establish
both legal and medical causation in order to find
a compensable injury under Utah's workers'
compensation scheme. Mi era v. Industrial
Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1986).
Medical causation demands that petitioner
"prove [his] dusability is medically the result of
an exertion1 or injury that occurred during a
work-related activity" Allen v. Industrial
Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986). If "the
claimant cannot show a medical causal
connection, compensation should be denied." Id.
Only those injuries which occur because some
condition or exertion required by employment
increases the risk of injury which a worker
ISSUES
normally faces in h.is everyday life is
On appeal petitioner (1) challenges the finding compensable, while symptoms which
that the industrial accident was not the medical coincidentallv appear alt work because of a
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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preexisting condition without any enhancement
from the work place are not compensable. Id. at
25.
Generally, industrial injuries that aggravate
or "light up" pre-existing conditions and are
causally connected to the subsequent onset
of symptoms of the disease or condition, are
compensable . . . « [but,] a claimant must
prove the subsequent disability is "medically
the result of an exertion or injury that
occurred during a work-related activity . . .
and not solely the result of a pre-existing
condition."
Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284,1288
(Utah App. 1990) (quoting Allen, 729 P.2d at
27). See also Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev.9 736
P.2d 237 (Utah 1987); Olsen v. Industrial
Comm'n, lie P.2d 937, 939 (Utah App. 1989)
off'd, 797 P.2d 1098 (Utah 1990). The ALJ has
the responsibility to resolve factual conflicts.
Lancaster, 736 P.2d at 241. .
Petitioner concedes that he has a lengthy
medical history of pre-existing back problems.
His medical records indicate that for some
seventeen years before the date of the alleged
industrial injury, petitioner had undergone
extensive treatments for his back problems,
which included degenerative arthritis, disc
disease and scoliosis. The x-rays taken on April
15, 1988 were similar to those taken in 1983,
demonstrating the presence of degenerative
arthritis and disc disease, but cot indicating
fractures or acute herniations. Accordingly, no
surgery was needed to correct any problem
allegedly aggravated by the incident on April 15,
1988. In light of petitioner's f>re-existing
physically degenerative condition, -he bore the
burden of proving that the April 15,1988 injury
he sustained ~was sot his physical body's
inevitable breaking point.
While petitioner argues that his work activities
while jerking the belt screens aggravated his
pre-existing disability, the evidence before the
A D does not unequivocally support that
contention. Although both Dr. Heiner's and Dr.
Gau fill's reports diagnosed petitioner as
suffering from degenerative osteoarthritis and
rated him respectively with a thirty and fifteen
percent impairment, neither explained the
relationship of the impairment to the industrial
incident. Therefore, their attribution of fifty
percent of petitioner's impairment to the
industrial accident lacks a rational or factual
basis. The ALJ also found the attribution to be
further weakened because the doctors used
pre-printed fill-in-the-blank forms in which they
merely inserted a percentage figure and because
they did not have or refer to petitioner's prior
medical history. The ALJ's finding of "no
medical causation" was also based on Dr.
Kotrady's medical opinion of pre-existing
medical condition.
We find substantial evidence in the record to
support findings th* t the 1988 injury was not the
medical cause of petitioner's disability and that
his pre-existinp condition caused his disability
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"Where the disability is the result of pre-existing
conditions and not an industrial accident, a
claimant is not entitled to disability benefits."
Large K Industrial Convn Vi, 758 P.2d 954, 957
(Utah App. 1988). See also Giesbrecht v. Board
of Review, 828 P.2d 544, 547 (Utah App.
1992).
Standard of Proof
Petitioner also argues the ALJ applied the
wrong standard of proof to his claim for
benefits. The ALJ's conclusions of law state that
"the preponderance of the medical evidence
strongly suggests that the applicant's symptoms
and disability after April 15, 1988 were the
result of his long-standing and significant
degenerative condition in his lumbar spine and
were not the result of any significant
contribution by the activities of April 15,1988."
(Emphasis added.) Petitioner correctly asserts
that there is no requirement in the appbcable
statute that the work-related activities
"significantly" contribute to an injury in order
for a compensable industrial accident to occur.
The only requirement is that there be a medical
and legal causal relationship between petitioner's
condition and work-related activities, significant
or otherwise. Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729
P,2d 15,25 (Utah 1986).
However, the correct "preponderance t>f
medical evidence" standard of proof clearly
prefaced the ALJ's medical causation
conclusions. Considering both the record and the
ALJ's order as a whole, we agree with the
Commission that the ALJ's usage of the word
"significant" was merely unintended surplusage;
which constitutes only harmless error2 and does
not alter the ALJ's determination of no medical
causation. We are persuaded that the ALJ and,
more importantly, the Commission,3 did not use
a "significant -contribution" standard to
determine the existence of medical causation.
Rather, as discussed above, the ALJ found no
credible medical evidence to relate petitioner's
current disability to the industrial accident.
Thus, we find no reversible error.
Medical Panel Referral
Finally, petitioner argues that because a causal
connection between his injury and his
employment depends on the production and
interpretation of medical evidence, the ALJ
abused her discretion in not referring the
medical causation aspect of the case to a medical
panel. Petitioner, however, bases this claim on
the Commission's application of its own rules,
and we review such application under a
reasonableness and rationality test. Ashcrofi v.
Industrial Comm'n, No. 920586, sbp op. at 4
(Utah App. June 9, 1993).
Appointment of a medical panel is addressed
in Utah Code Ann. §35-l-77-(l)(a) (1988) as
follows:
Upon the filing of a claim for
compensation for injury by accident, or for
death, arising out of or in the course of
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employment, and if the employer or its
insurance carrier denies liability, the
commission may refer the medical aspects of
the case to a medical panel appointed by the
commission.4
(Emphasis added.) This statute grants the
Commission the discretion to appoint a medical
panel, but does not require it in all cases.
Ashcrofty slip op. at 4; Intermountain Health
Care v. Industrial Comm'n, 839 P.2d 841, 845
(Utah App. 1992).
However, the Commission has adopted a rule
implementing the statute, which limits the
Commission's discretion by identifying
circumstances when a medical panel "will be
utilized." Ashcroft,, slip op. at 4. This rule
states:
A. A panel will be utilized by the
Administrative Law Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues
may be involved. Generally a significant
medical issue must be shown by conflicting
medical reports. Significant medical issues
are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of
permanent physical impairment which vary
more than 5% of the whole person.
Utah Adm. Code, R568-1-9 (1993). 5
Petitioner argues that the Commission's rule
required review of his case by a medical panel,
because there were medical reports which
conflicted as to the extent of his impairment by
more than five percent-Dr. Gaufin reported a
fifteen percent impairment, while Dr. Heiner
indicated a thirty percent impairment.
Petitioner's argument, however, overlooks the
critical threshold issue which precedes the
requirement of review by a medical panel.
Before discrepancy in reports of impairment is
relevant, an A U must find credible evidence of
medical causation. Because the Commission
found no credible evidence to support a finding
of medical causation, any conflict over
impairment ratings is irrelevant and the rule is
inapplicable. We conclude, therefore, that the
A U did not abuse her discretion by tailing to
refer the medical causation issue to a medical
panel.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the Commission's
denial of permanent total disability benefits to
petitioner.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Regnal W. GarfT, Judge
1. "Pine key question in determining causation is
whether, given this body and this exertion, the
exertion in fact contributed to the injury." Allen v.
Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 24 (Utah 1986)
(citations omitted).
2. An error is harmless if it is "sufficiently
inconsequential that . . . there is no reasonable

likelihood that the error alfected the outcome of the
proceedings.*" Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div.t
814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v.
Verde,T70 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989).
3 . See Virgin v Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284,
1289 (Utah App 1990) (the Commission, in
reviewing the evidence presented to the ALJ, is the
ultimate fact finder).
4. Prior to 1982 the statute was mandatory, and
provided as follows:
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for
injury or by accident or for death arising out of
or in the course of employment and where the
employer or insurance carrier denies liability, the
commission shall refer the medical aspects of the
case to a medical panel appointed by the
commission. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-77 (1953).
(Emphasis added.)
5. Adoption of this rule is consistent with the Utah
Supreme Court's Morton decision, holding that the
legislature may explicitly grant discretion to an
administrative agency. Morton Int'l Inc. v. Auditing
Drv., 814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 1991). It follows that
the agency can then act by rule to limit its own.
discretion, so long as such action is not inconsistent
with the implementing legislation. Ashcroft, slip op. at
4.
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Kevin Holland seeks review of a decision of
the Career Service Review Board of the State of
Utah denying a grievance filed by Holland
against the Utah State Office of Education and
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determining the amount of a reasonable
attorney fee.
B. RDA's Liability For Owner's Attorney
Fees Incurred On Appeal
Owners argue that because Utah Code
Ann. § 11-19-23.9 (1986) authorizes an
award of attorney fees to condemnees,
RDA should be be ordered to pay Owners'
attorney fees necessarily incurred on appeal. Rule 34(a) of the Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals, however, states that "if
a judgment or order is affirmed, costs [including attorneys' fees] shall be taxed
against the appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is reversed,
costs shall be taxed against the respondent
unless otherwise ordered."
Owners appealed the trial court's decision in RDA's favor on two major issues:
(1) Owners' entitlement to interest paid into
the court clerk's office pursuant to the
August 16, 1985 stipulation, and (2) reimbursement for expert witness fees under
Utah Code Ann. § 11-19-23.9. We affirm
the trial court's judgment on both of these
issues. Therefore, Owners are not entitled
to attorney fees on appeal.
BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.
{O
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Steve ZIMMERMAN, Petitioner,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Granite Beef, Inc. and/or Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah and Employers' Reinsurance Fund, Respondents.
No. 890191-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 28, 1989.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 20 "989.
Workers' compensation chimant was
denied benefits by the Industrial Commis-

sion and claimant appealed, The Court of
Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that: (1)
claimant's preexisting condition was not
aggravated by industrial injury; (2) Commission's conclusion that claimant had not
suffered compensable industrial injury precluded consideration of whether he qualified for tentative permanent total disability; and (3) medical panel was qualified.
Affirmed.
1. Workers9 Compensation «=>1545
Employee did not suffer any aggravation of preexisting condition on basis of
industrial accident; aggravation which
medical panel referred to was that due
solely to temporary pain experienced by
employee following accident and not aggravation of or by preexisting conditions of
spinal stenosis and Reiter's syndrome.
2. Workers9 Compensation <S=847
Permanent total disability benefits
may be awarded when relatively small percentage of impairment caused by industrial
accident is combined with other factors to
render claimant unable to obtain employment
3. Workers9 Compensation *=>847, 1377
In order for employee to obtain tentative finding of permanent disability under
"odd lot doctrine," employee must prove
that he or she can no longer perform duties
required in his or her occupation; employee, having been referred to Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation by Industrial
Commission, must, through cooperation
with Division, establish that he or she cannot be rehabilitated; and burden thereafter
shifts to employer to prove existence of
steady work employee can perform, taking
into account several factors, including employee's education, mental capacity and
age.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
4. Workers9 Compensation «=»1633
Industrial Commission's finding that
employee did not suffer compensable indus-
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trial injury precluded consideration of
whether employee qualified for tentative
permanent total disability; employee failed
to demonstrate necessary causation between impairment and industrial accident
in order to support his claim to permanent
disability benefits.
5. Workers' Compensation «=»1937
Employee was not substantially prejudiced by Industrial Commission's medical
panel's composition; at time panel was appointed, initial diagnosis and treatment focused on employee's complaints of back
and hip pain and thus, panel properly included neurologist and orthopedic surgeon
and further, panel reviewed x-ray studies
with specialist on bone radiology and rheumatology after diagnosis of Reiter's syndrome was made.
€. Workers9 Compensation <$=> 1939.6
Industrial Commission's medical panel's limited assessment of workers' compensation claimant's credibility was not improper; panel's assessment of credibility
went only to judging whether claimant was
capable of accurately relating to panel
symptoms he suffered and was not basis of
panel's report
Bruce J. Wilson, Provo, for petitioner.
Richard Sumsion, Salt Lake City, for
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah.
Erie V. Boorman Jr., Salt Lake City, for
Employers' Reinsurance Fund.
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and
GREENWOOD, JJ.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Stephen P. Zimmerman appeals an Industrial Commission order which denied him
permanent disability benefits. We affirm.
In January 1987, Zimmerman was employed by Granite Beef, Inc. His duties
consisted of cutting and boxing meat, requiring him to lift heavy boxes and pallets.
On January 26, 1987, Zimmerman, while
lifting an empty pallet, heard* a pop in his
low back and felt an immediate sharp pain.
He reported the incident to his supervisor

and left work to obtain medical attention.
At the time of the accident, Zimmerman
was twenty-two years of age. He had
worked as a laborer since age seventeen
and had never complained of back problems
prior to the accident. X-rays and a CT scan
revealed no acute fracture. His injury was
diagnosed as a musculotendinous strain.
Zimmerman applied for disability benefits on February 5, 1987 and received temporary total disability benefits from January 30,1987 to March 4,1987. On approximately March 1, 1987, Zimmerman returned to work. While lifting a heavy
piece of meat at work, he experienced a
recurrence of back pain. He remained off
work for another period of time and was
again paid temporary total compensation
from March 11, 1987 through April 29,
1987. His benefits were terminated, however, when he failed to keep two doctor
appointments. Compensation was reinstated on May 27, 1987 and he was paid
through June 25, 1987, when his benefits
were again suspended for failure to keep a
physical therapy appointment
Following further therapy, on approximately July 1, 1987, Zimmerman began
working for a new employer, Wescot Fiberglass Company. After working approximately one month with Wescot, Zimmerman was injured while grinding down the
edges of a large fiberglass container. The
boards on which he was sitting gave way
and he rolled off, landing on his back. He
experienced shooting sensations and pain in
his lower back and qunt work because of
pain. He did not file a claim in connection
with this accident Additional temporary
total disability benefits, however, were paid
by the Workers' Compensation Fund from
September 9, 1987 through January 29,
1988.
On January 6, 1988, a hearing was conducted before an administrative law judge
(A.LJ.) on Zimmerman's claim for permanent disability benefits. The A.LJ. appointed a medical panel to review Zimmerman's case. The medical panel submitted
its report to the A.LJ. on April 29, 1988.
The report found as follows:
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1. There is BO medically demonstrable
causal connection between the applicant's ongoing problems and the industrial accident of January 26, 1987.
2. All of the residual problems complained of by the applicant were caused
by a pre-existing condition.1
3. We find no period of time after
1/1/88 during which the applicant has
been temporarily or totally disabled as a
result of the industrial injury.
4. We suggest a current permanent
physical impairment of 10% because of
the pain and x-ray findings at the sacroiliac joints, understanding that his Reiter's
disease has a good chance of progressing
in the future, and there seems to be no
waj of telling whether it is currently
stabilized
5. Assuming that his condition is stabilized, his total impairment is 10%.
€. No portion of the permanent physical
impairment is attributable to the applicant's industrial injury.
7. The percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to any cause
is 10%.
8. We believe that the industrial injury
aggravated the pre-existing condition,
since we are unable to find any evidence
©f pain before the injury.
Following objections by Zimmerman, the
A.LJ resubmitted the case to the medical
panel A supplemental report of the medical panel, released on August 26, 1988,
increased Zimmerman's physical impairment by another ten percent but attributed
the increase to a pre-existing spinal stenosis
On October 7, 1988, the A.LJ. entered
findings of fact, which adopted the medical
1. The pre-existing condition identified by the
panel was Reiter's syndrome, which is a disease
of uncertain cause, characterized by arthritis,
conjunctivitis, and urethritis Webster's Medi
cal Desk Dictionary 611 (1986)
2. Utah Code Ann % 63-46b-16(4) (1989) ftates
The appellate court shall grant relief only if,
on the basis of the agency's record, it deter
mines that a person seeking judicial review
has been substantial^ prejudiced by any of
the following

panel'sfindings,conclusions of law, and an
order. The A.LJ. determined that the residual problems Zimmerman complained of
were caused by his pre-existing conditions
of Reiter's syndrome and spinal stenosis.
Because she found that Zimmerman failed
to demonstrate that his ongoing medical
condition was related to his industrial accident, the A.LJ. denied permanent disability
benefits.
On March 19, 1989, the Industrial Commission denied Zimmerman's motion for review. The Commission adopted the A.L.
J.'s findings of fact and determined that
the A.LJ. correctly adopted the medical
panel finding that Zimmerman's condition
was unrelated to his industrial accident
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondents contend that our review of
the Commission's findings is limited to
'•whether the Commission's findings are
^arbitrary and capricious' or Vholly without cause' or contrary to the 'one [inevitable] conclusion from the evidence' or
without *any substantial evidence' to support them" Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev.,
736 P.2d 237,238 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888,
890 (Utah 1981)) However, because this
proceeding was commenced after the effective date of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann
{ 63-46b-l to -22 (1989), we review the
Commission's decision under the standards
set forth in that act Johnson v. Department of Employment Sec, 121 Utah Adv.
Rep 26, 27 (1989), Grace Drilling Co v.
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 66 (Utah
CLApp.1989). Under the UAPA,1 the
(*) the agency action, or the statute or rule
on which the agency action is based, is uncon
stiruuonal on its face or ms applied,
(b) the agency has acted beyond the Jurisdiction conferred by an> statute,
(c) the agency has not decided all of the
issues requiring resolution,
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted
or applied the law,
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful
procedure or decision making process, or has
'.Ailed to follow prescribed procedure.

1130 Utah

785 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Board's finding? "will be affirmed only if
they are 'supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court* This 'substantial evidence test' grants appellate courts greater
latitude in reviewing the record
"
Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 67 (quoting
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1989)).

For purposes of this section, (a) any
aggravation of a pre-existing injury, disease, or congenital cause shall be deemed
"substantially greater", and compensation, medical care, find other related
items shall be awarded on the basis of
the combined injuries as provided in this
Subsection (1)
Zimmerman contends that the Industrial
Commission's determination that "[t]he
medical panel found there was no aggravation of a pre-existing condition" contradicted the panel's finding that "the industrial
injury aggravated the pre-existing conditions, since we are unable to find any evidence of pain before the injury." Zimmerman concludes that the Commission's disregard of clear evidence showing aggravation was a misapplication of law, and that
we should, therefore, reverse.
Utah Code Ann. $} 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1989)
provides that relief shall be granted if an
"agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law." Id. (emphasis added). According to this count's previous interpretation of this section, '"we will not disturb the
Board's application of factual findings to
the law unless its determination exceeds
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Pro-Benefit Staffing Inc. v. Board
of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah CtApp.
1989). We do, however, accord less deferehce^to the Commission's factual findings
than under the pre-UAPA standard, upholding its factual findings if they are
"supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before
the court" Grace Drilling Co., 776 P.2d
at 67 (quoting Utah Code Ann.
{ 63-46b-16(4Xg) (1989)).

AGGRAVATION OF
PRE-EXISTING CONDITION
Zimmerman first claims that because the
industrial accident aggravated his previous
asymptomatic conditions, disability benefits
should have been granted as required by
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-^9 (Supp.1987) (repealed 1988).* Section 35-1-69 mandates
apportionate compensation by the Workers'
Compensation Fund and the Second Injury
Fund for disability resulting from combination of a pre-existing condition and an industrial injury, as follows:
(1) If any employee who has previously incurred a permanent incapacity by
accidental injury, disease, or congenital
causes, sustains an industrial injury for
which either compensation or medical
care, or both, is provided by this chapter
that results in permanent incapacity
which is substantially greater than he
would have incurred if he had not had
the pre-existing incapacity, or which ^ag^
gravates or is aggravated by such preexisting incapacity, compensation, medical care, and other related items as outlined in Section 35-1-81, shall be awarded on the basis of the combined injuries,
but the liability of the employer for such
compensation, medical care, and other related times shall be for the industrial
injury only. The remainder shall be paid
out of the Second Injury Fund provided
[1] Zimmerman argues that the Comfor in Subsection 35-1-68(1)
mission erred in concluding that he was not
(0 the persons taking the agency action
were illegally constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute;

(ii) contrary to a rule of tthe agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice,
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency
by giving and reasons that demonstrate a fair
and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
3. Laws 1988, ch. 116 § 6 repealed section 35-169 (1987), and enacted Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-69 (1988), which was effective July 1,
1988.
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entitled to permanent benefits from the
facts as found by the medical panel, the
A.LJ., and the Commission. We disagree
and find that the Commission's conclusion
denying permanent benefits did not exceed
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality and is supported by substantial evidence.
With respect to the term "aggravation,"
the Utah Supreme Court has found that
compensation is required under section 351-69(1) "if the industrial injury results in a
permanent impairment that is aggravated
by or aggravates a pre-existing permanent
impairment to any degree
" Second
Injury Fund v. Streator Chevrolet, 709
P.2d 1176, 1181 (Utah 1985) (emphasis in
original). The record viewed in its entirety,
demonstrates that the aggravation the
medical panel referred to was that due
solely to the temporary pain experienced by
Zimmerman following the accident and not
aggravation of or by the pre-existing conditions of spinal stenosis and Reiter's syndrome. No permanent impairment was
found to have resulted from the industrial
injury itself or in combination with the
prior existing conditions. Because the industrial accident did not result in a permanent impairment, the Board correctly denied Zimmerman permanent benefits. We
acknowledge that the medical panel's findings in this matter, as adopted by the
A.LJ. and the Commission, are not as clear
as could be desired, but our analysis and
review of the record convince us that the
panel determined that Zimmerman's impairment was solely because of pre-existing,
though dormant, conditions. If there had
been any aggravation, or if a combination
of pre-industrial accident conditions and industrial accident injuries met the requisite
statutory percentages of impairment, Zimmerman would have been entitled to compensation. Id However, the Commission
found otherwise, and its findings are supported by substantial evidence.
TENTATIVE TOTAL DISABILITY
Zimmerman also argues that the Industrial Commission erred in refusing to address his request that they make a tentative finding of permanent total disability.
Section 63-46b-16(4)(c) of UAPA allows for

appellate review when "the agency has not
decided all of the issues requiring resolution/' resulting in substantial prejudice to
the petitioner.
[2] The Workers' Compensation Act establishes a procedure by which a finding of
permanent total disability may be determined. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (Supp.
1987) states in pertinent part:
A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be
tentative . . . If the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and
totally disabled, it shall be mandatorythat the industrial commission of Utah
refer the employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under the state
board of education for rehabilitation
training
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the
"odd lot doctrine," which allows the Commission to find permanent total disability
when a relatively small percentage of impairment caused by an industrial accident
is combined with other factors to render
the claimant unable to obtain employment.
See Norton t>. Industrial Comm'n, 728
P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1986); Hardman t;.
Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725
P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1986).
£3] Zimmerman cites Hardman for the
proposition that the only requirement for a
tentative finding of permanent disability is
that the employee ttot be able to return to
his or her former occupation. Hardman
sets forth the following steps for qualification under the "odd lot" doctrine: (1) the
employee must prove that he or she can no
longer perform the duties required in his or
her occupation; (2) the employee, having
been referred to the Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation by the Industrial Commission, must, through cooperation with the
Division, establish that he or she cannot be
rehabilitated; and (3) the burden then
shifts to the employer to prove the existence of steady work the employee can perform, taking into account several factors,
including the employee's education, mental
capacity, and age. Hardman, 725 P.2d at
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1326-27. See also Peck v. Eimco Process
Equip. Co., 748 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1987).
Zimmerman argues that the medical advice he received to avoid heavy lifting or
heavy work and the medical panel's recommendation for re-education to "stave off
unemployment" are undisputed evidence
that Zimmerman is medically unable to return to his former occupation. Consequently, argues Zimmerman, the Commission erred in not referring him to Rehabilitation for further evaluation.
The Commission determined that because
Zimmerman did not claim permanent total
disability until after the hearing, there was
no evidence on the record to justify sending
Zimmerman to Rehabilitation for a complete evaluation. Zimmerman claims, however, that even though his request came
after the hearing, the Commission still had
five months to consider the request and
should have done so.
[4] We find, however, that notwithstanding the timeliness of Zimmerman's request, the Commission's conclusion that he
had not suffered a compensable industrial
injury precludes consideration of whether
he qualifies for tentative permanent total
disability. "[UJnless the claimant has suffered a compensible industrial injury, the
[odd lot] doctrine is inapplicable no matter
how compelling the other factors." Ortiz
v. Industrial Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1092,1094
(Utah CtApp.1989). The medical panel's
findings, adopted by the Commission, clearly show that Zimmerman failed to establish
the necessary causation between his impairment and his industrial accident in order to support his claim to permanent disability benefits. See Allen v. Industrial
Comm'n of Utah, 729 P.2d 15, 24-25 (Utah
1986); Ortiz, 766 P.2d at 1094; Large v.
Industrial Comm'n, 758 P.2d 954, 956
(Utah Ct.App.1988). Since the Commission
did not find compensable permanent disability, a rehabilitation evaluation was not
necessary. Ortiz, 766 P.2d at 1095.
Therefore, the Commission did not err in
failing to determine the issue or to make a
finding of tentative permanent disability,
and Zimmerman suffered no prejudice
thereby.

QUALIFICATION OF
MEDICAL PANEL
Zimmerman next claims that the medical
panel was not properly qualified as required by statute. Qualifications of a
medical panel in workers' compensation
cases are set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-2-56(2) (1988). The statute states in
pertinent part
Where a claim for compensation based
upon partial permanent disability due to
an occupational disease or industrial injury is filed with the commission, the commission shall appoint an impartial medical panel to consist of one or more physicians specializing in the treatment of the
disease or condition involved in the claim,
and such medical panel shall make such
study, take such X-rays and perform
such tests as the panel may determine
and certify to the commission the extent,
if any, of the permanent disability of the
claimant
Zimmerman claims that the Industrial Commission's failure to appoint a rheumatologist who specializes in Reiter's disease to
the medical panel was a substantial error.
We disagree.
When the panel WJIS appointed, the initial
diagnosis and treatment focused on Zimmerman's complaints of back and hip pain.
Consequently, the panel properly included
Dr. Leonard Jarcho, a neurologist, and Dr.
Geoffery Orme, an orthopedic surgeon.
Zimmerman's pre-e:dsting Reiter's syndrome was unknown until he was seen by
Dr. Charles Rich and referred to Dr. Christopher Jaclcson, a specialist in rheumatology.
[5] We find that Zimmerman was not
substantially prejudiced by the Industrial
Commission's composition. The panel reviewed all medical records and diagnostic
studies. Dr. Jarcho also took the extra
precaution of reviewing the X-ray studies
with a specialist on bone radiology and a
specialist in rheumatology at the University Medical Center. Zimmerman's claim
that Dr. Jackson's findings contradict the
panel's findings is unsupported. Zimmer-
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man quotes isolated excerpts from Dr.
Jackson's notes to support the notion that
Dr. Jackson believed Zimmerman's Reiter's
disease was minor and the symptoms were
due to the protruding disc in the congenially narrow spinal canal. Review of Dr.
Jackson's entire report indicates his agreement with the panel's findings.
MEDICAL PANEL'S
CREDIBILITY JUDGMENT
[6] Lastly, Zimmerman claims that the
Industrial Commission improperly adopted
the medical panel's opinions relative to his
credibility. In its report, the panel questioned Zimmerman's reliability and motivation. However, the panel's assessment of
Zimmerman's credibility only went to judg-

ing whether he was capable of accurately
relating to the panel the symptoms he suffered and was not, as Zimmerman contends, the basis of their report We find,
therefore, no error in the Commission's
adoption of the panel's findings, including
the limited assessment of Zimmerman's
credibility.
We affirm.
GARFF and BILLINGS, JJ., concur.
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Employers' Reinsurance Fund; Uninsured
Employers' Fund; and Kaiser Steel
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ATTORNEYS:
Virginius Dabney and Robert Bentley, Salt
Lake City, for Petitioner
Edwin C. Barnes, Salt Lake City, for
Respondents Kaiser Steel Corp. and
Uninsured Employers* Fund
Benjamin A. Sims, Salt Lake City, for
Respondent Industrial Commission of Utah
Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for
Respondent Employers' Reinsurance Fund
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter,
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
John W. Zupon filed this Petition for Review
from an order of the Industrial Commission
denying his claim for permanent total disability
benefits. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
In 1975, petitioner was employed by Kaiser
Steel as an electrician. On August 7 of that year,
he felt a pain in his back while lifting an
acetylene tank at work. In February of 1977, an
administrative law judge found petitioner had a
ten percent permanent physical impairment and
was entitled to twenty-six weeks of temporary
total compensation and thirty-one weeks of
permanent partial compensation. The ALJ based
his ruling on the opinion of a medical panel
which found petitioner had total physical
impairment of sixty percent. The panel,
however, found only ten percent of the total
physical impairment attributable to the industrial
accident. It attributed the balance of petitioner's
impairment to a preexisting condition known as
ankylosingspondylitis, a degenerative disease of
the spine. The panel concluded the ten percent
impairment was attributable to the industrial
accident because there was "a one-in-six chance
that the ankylosingspondylitis was aggravated by
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the lumbar back strain on the basis of the
progression of the x-ray changes."
In June of 1976, petitioner applied for social
security disability benefits. His initial
application, application for a rehearing, and
application on appeal were all denied. Following
a court order obtained to acquire review of
unspecified new evidence, petitioner had a new
hearing in May of 1978. In June of 1978, the
Social Security Administration's ALJ granted
petitioner benefits. The ALJ ruled petitioner's
total disability was not a result of his back
problems but rather a result of arthritis in his
hands that became more severe starting in
January of 1977. A doctor who assessed
petitioner in 1981 to determine whether his
Social Security benefits should continue noted:
"I think this patient's symptoms are way out of
proportion to the objective findings which are
presented."
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed an
application for permanent total disability based
on his 1975 accident. A hearing was held and
the ALJ concluded petitioner had failed to
establish the necessary medical causation
between his 1975 industrial accident and his
permanent total disability. The ALJ based her
conclusion on two rationales: First, the medical
evidence demonstrated it was petitioner's
arthritic condition, which was unrelated to the
industrial injury, that caused petitioner's
inability to work; Second, -even
if
ankylosingspondylitis contributed to petitioner's
inability to work, the industrial accident did not
cause the disease and "only questionably
aggravated it."
On August 3,1992, the Industrial Commission
issued an order affirming the ALJ's order and
denying petitioner's motion for review.
Petitioner brings a petition for review to this
court from the Commission's order.1
On appeal, petitioner argues the Commission
erred by failing to apply the "odd lot** doctrine
to ids situation and award him permanent total
disability benefits.2 Petitioner further claims the
Commission's determination of no medical
causation was contrary to its prior determination
of ten percent causation and therefore in error.3
The Commission responds that the odd lot
doctrine is inapplicable because medical
causation must be established prior to the
doctrine's application and the Commission
properly found petitioner's industrial injury did
not cause his permanent total disability.

ODD LOT DOCTRINE
The odd lot doctrine "allows the Commission
to find permanent total disability when a
relatively small percentage of impairment caused
by an industrial accident is combined with other
factors to render the claimant unable to obtain
employment." Zimmerman v.
Industrial
Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah App.
1989). See also Marshall v. Industrial Comm'«,
681 P.2d 208, 212-13 (Utah 1984) (discussing
odd lot doctrine). To qualify as a recipient of
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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benefits under the odd lot doctrine, an employee
must first "prove that he or she can no longer
perform th^ duties lequiitd in hie ot^her
occupatioi^^m/n^mta/i, 785 P.2d at 1131.
Next, the employee, Through cuupeiatiuu with
the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, must
"establish that he or she cannot be
rehabilitated " W. After the employee has shown
that rehabilitation is not possible, the employer
has the opportunity "to prove the existence of
steady work the employee can perform." Id. The
work the employer establishes is available must
take into consideration all relevant factors
"including the employee's education, mental
capacity, and age" as well as physical
limitations. Id.4
Before a claimant can acquire benefits under
the odd lot doctrine, however, the claimant must
establish a compensable industrial injury.
Zimmerman, 785 P.2d at 1132. "4[U]nless the
cfaimant has suffered a compensable industrial
injury, the [odd lot] doctrine is inapplicable no
matter how compelling the other factors/" Id.
(quoting Ortiz v. Industrial Comm'n, 766 P.2d
1092,1094 (Utah App. 1989)) (modifications in
original). The claimant must prove the
compensability of an injury by a preponderance
of the evidence. Ashcrqft v. Industrial Comm Vi,
855 P.2d 267, 269 (Utah App. 1993). Proving
medical causation between the industrial accident
and the disability for which the claimant seeks
compensation is a necessary component for
recovery. Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d
15, 27 (Utah 1986).
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different conclusion based on new medical
evidence at the 1992 hearing. See Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-78(1) (Supp. 1993). While the 1977
decision was some evidence supporting medical
causation for the new permanent total claim
brought sixteen years after the industrial
accident, the ALJ and the Commission properly
reassessed all the medical evidence in the
record.
Based primarily on the Social Security
Administration's determination petitioner's total
disability was a result of the arthritis in the
petitioner's hands, the Commission found there
was no medical causation between the 1975
industrial injury and his permanent total
disability claim.5 Thus, the Commission's
determination petitioner did not establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the 1975
industrial accident was a medical cause of his
now claimed total permanent disability is
supported by substantia], undisputed evidence in
the record. We therefore affirm.
CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission's determination
that petitioner failed to establish his 1977
industrial injury was a medical cause of his now
claimed permanent total disability is supported
by substantial evidence. We therefore affirm the
denial of permanent total disability benefits.
Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge
WE CONCUR:
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
Russell W. Bench, Judge

MEDICAL CAUSATION
Medical causation is an issue of fact and we 1. In his reply brief, petitioner challenges, under Utah
review the determination of the Industrial Code Ann. §63-46b-12(6)(c)(1989), the sufficiency of
Commission under the substantial evidence the Industrial Commission's findings of fact in its
standard. See King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 order denying review. We note the facts in this case
undisputed and in such a case the failure to
P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993); Utah Code are
disclose a specific subsidiary finding is not fatal to the
Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g) (1989). "Medical agency's decision. See Adams K Board of Review,
causation demands that petitioner 'prove [his] 821 P.2d 1,5 (Utah App. 1991). Although we do not
disability is medically the result of an exertion remand here because of the nature of the record, we
or injury thjiL aumucd during a *>u*k<elated strongly encourage the Industiial Commission to
activity.%TWillnr4^nv
IndustrialCommw216 clearly articulate its factual findings in all cases to
Utah Adv. Kep. 12, 13 (Utah App. 1993) erhance our ability "to conduct a meaningful review."
(quoting Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d Id. at 4.
2. Petitioner also argues the Commission erred when
15, 27 (Utah 1986)) (footnote omitted).
Petitioner claims the Commission committed it rejected his claim, made for the first time in his
error in ignoring its prior decision that ten Motion for Review, that he deserved compensation for
percent of petitioner's permanent partial an additional fifty percent permanent partial disability.
The application for a heai ing does not specify such a
impairment was attributable to the industrial claim. The ALJ, in a response letter, indicates that
accident. This argument misapprehends the such a claim was not presented at the hearing.
impact of the Commission's earlier decision.
Although the Commission rejected the claim based on
For the odd-lot doctrine to apply, the the eight year statute of limitations which had expired
Commission must first determine there is more than seven years before petitioner raised this
medical causation between the petitioner*! 1975 claim in his motion for teview, we do not consider
industrial accident and his now claimed Mr. Zupon's claim because his failure to raise the
permanent total disability. That is a different claim at the original hearing precludes any review on
question from, and not controlled in anyway by, appeal See Ashcroft v. industrial Comm'n, S55 P.2d
the determination that his industrial accident 267, 268-69 (Utah App 1993).
caused a permanent partial
disability. 3. Petitioner also claims we should remand the case
Furthermore, the determination that there was for factual findings because the Commission applied
the substantial evidence taiX rather than a
medical causation in the 1977 hearing did not preponderance of the evidence standard. See Ashcrqft
prevent the Commission from reachine a
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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v. Industrial Comm'u, 855 P.2d 267, 269 (Utah App. J
1993). In Ashcrqft, the Industrial Commission held I
221 Utah Adv. Rep. 39
petitioner had failed to meet his burden of proof under I
the substantial evidence standard. Furthermore, the I
IN THE SUPREME COURT
only evaluation of the evidence the Commission did I
was under the substantia] evidence standard. We noted J
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
substantial evidence review is not the role of the I
Commission, a trier of fact. Id.
I
The case at hand is significantly different. Here, die I THORUPBROTHERSCONSTRUCTlON,
Commission ruled the ALT* findings were supported I INC.,
by substantia] evidence, t h e order found the I
Petitioner,
•respondents had established no medical causation by I • .
^substantial evidence." This is the exact opposite of I Auditing Division of the UTAH STATE
Ashcrqft. A substantial evidence standard represents a I
TAX COMMISSION,
higher burden of proof and thus the comment I
Respondent.
represents at most a harmless error.
I
Furthermore, in the order denying review, the I
Commission systematically responded directly to the I No. 920184
challenges the petitioner asserted to the ALTs I FILED: September 15, 1993
findings. In response to the petitioner*s challenge that
the A U improperly found no medical causation, the I Original Proceeding in this Court
Commission recited the evidence supporting medical I
causation and concluded "the medical records do not
establish a medical causal connection between ATTORNEYS:
applicant's August 7, 1975 industrial injury and his Bill Thomas Peters, Salt Lake City, for
petitioner
permanent total disability.* As opposed to Ashcrqft,
where substantia] evidence was the only comment on R. Paul Van Dam, Att'y G e n . , Clark L .
the evidence by the Commission, in this case the
Snelson, Asst. AtTy G e n . , for respondent
substantial evidence standard is simply recited in
response to an unclear nonspecific challenge. The
substantive, factual discussion of the case applies the
This opinion is subject to revision before
necessary preponderance of the evidence standard.
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
4. Although petitioner argues that application of the !
odd lot analysis indicates he is entitled to benefits, it !
is clear from the record there was, at the very least, DURHAM, Justice:
ThorupBrothers Construction, Inc., asks us to
never any rehabilitation evaluation ordered. See
Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725 review an order of the Auditing Division of the
Commission
assessing
P.2d 1323, 1328 (Utah 1986) (remanding for Utah State Tax
rehabilitation determination). See oho Norton v. $26,328.30 in additional sales tax plus interest.
IndustrialComm'n, 728 P.2d 1025,1028 (Utah 1986) We reverse.
(per curiam) (remanding to assess disability and
In 1987, the Catholic Diocese o f Salt Lake
provide employer opportunity to prove existence of City contracted with
Thorup
Brothers
work).
Construction, Inc. (Thorup), t o construct an
5. The ALJ and the Commission discussed an addition to Judge Memorial Catholic High
alternative basis for the rejection of petitioner's claim. School, a tax-exempt entity under Utah Code
Based on the medical panel's assessment that there Ann. {59-12-104(8) (Supp. 1993), which is
was only a one-in-six chance petitioner's back injury owned and operated by the Diocese. (The
aggravated his spine disease, the A U questioned the
Diocese and Judge Memorial will be referred to
validity of the earlier ALJ's finding of medical
causation. The ALI noted a one~in-six, or 16 and 66 collectively as Judge Memorial.) Thorup agreed
one~hundredths percent, chance is significantly less to build an auditorium, a music room, and
than the 50 percent required under the preponderance locker rooms. In return, Judge Memorial agreed
of the evidence standard. Furthermore, the ALJ to pay Thorup for its labor and purchased
explicitly and completely reviewed the substantial, materia] costs plus sales tax. Judge Memorial
undisputed medical evidence in the case. The specifically reserved the right to donate
Commission also affirmed the ALJ's finding of no construction materials to the project1 and Thorup
medical causation on this basis and recited undisputed agreed to credit Judge Memorial for those
facts in the record to support its conclusion. The materials. Consistent with this agreement, Judge
commission noted* (1) The medical records show no Memorial issued purchase orders totalling
treatment for back pain after 1976; (2) The doctors I $374,102 based on Thorup's detailed materials
who treated petitioner immediately after the accident
noted he complained of pain and limited use of much lists.
To support the project, Judge Memorial also
of his body, 'suggesting that the applicant was
experiencing symptoms of progressive arthritis of the contracted with Scott, Louie & Browning
spine, shoulders, elbows, and hands;" (3) A doctor in Architects (Scott). Both Scott and Thorup
1976 concluded petitioner could return to work; and entered into subcontracts. Scott also hired The
(4) A doctor evaluating petitioner for Social Security Rboads Company, Inc., to conduct the ongoing
Benefits in 1981 concluded petitioner's symptoms inspection of the project's masonry work. In
were out of proportion with the doctor's objective addition, Judge Memorial hired £ . W. Allen and
analysis.
James S. Bailey as structural engineers for the
project. Finally, James Maher, a member of
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